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ECLECTIC  EDUCATIONAL  SERIES 

ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

DESIGNED  ESPECIALLY  FOR  YOUNG   TEACHERS 


EDWIN  C.   HEWETT,   LL.D. 

President  of  the  Illinois  Stale  Normal  University 


NEW-YORK     •:•     CINCINNATI     .;.     CHICAGO 

AMERICAN   BOOK  COMPANY 


COHYRIGHT,    1889,    BY    VaN    AnTWERI",    BrAGG,  &    Co. 


f^9r 


printcJ*  at 
Zhe  Eclectic  press 
Cincinnati,  U.  S.  H. 


H4-9 


Thi"  author's  aim  in  this  Httle  book  is  to  set  before  the 
reader,  in  a  simple  and  compact  form,  some  of  the  lead- 
ing facts  of  the  human  mind, —  its  power  and  capabilities, 
the  laws  that  govern  its  working  and  growth, — and  some 
truths  concerning  ways  of  strengthening  and  cultivating 
its  powers. 

He  has  not  been  ambitious  to  make  a  large  book.  On 
the  contrary,  it  has  been  his  constant  purpose  to  use  the 
fewest  words  that  would  enable  him  to  make  his  thought 
clear.  He  has  tried  to  say  just  enough  to  set  forth  the 
leading  points  of  his  subject,  and  to  pave  the  way  for  a 
more  extended  pursuit  of  the  study.  In  short,  the  aim 
has  been  to  make  a  text-book,  that  is,  a  book  of  texts. 

The  book  is  written,  not  for  philosophers,  learned  men, 
or  controversialists,  but  for  young  people  of  moderate  ac- 
quirements, who  are  likely  to  need  the  facts  of  Psy- 
chology as  a  guide  to  the  practical  work  of  the  teacher. 
It  is  hoped,  moreover,  that  they  will  be  induced  to  read 
deeper  and  more  pretentious  books  on  the  subject,  as  well 
as  to  continue  the  study  by  means  of  their  own  observa- 
tion and  introspection.  And  the  author  hopes  that  this 
book  may  assist  in  preparing  them  for  future  study. 

One  of  the  reasons  why  many  books  on  Psychology 
are  hard  to  understand,  is  the  lack  of  sharp,  formal  defi- 

(V) 


VI  I-RKFAC-e 

nitions.  It  has  been  a  purpose  of  the  author  to  supply 
this  lack.  He  does  not  expect  that  all  his  definitions  will 
be  accepted ;  but  he  believes  they  are  tolerably  clear,  and 
he  hopes  that  where  they  are  defective,  they  may  start 
inquiries  wlnich  will  result  in  something  better. 

He  holds  that  Pyschology  is  an  inductive  science ;  but 
m  this  book  he  has  not  made  the  least  attempt  to  develop 
it  inductivefy.  Yet  he  most  earnestly  urges  all  who  study 
the  book  to  test  its  statements  for  themselves.  In  a 
science  that  is  derived  by  induction  from  the  study  of 
facts,  no  one  can  speak  with  any  authority  other  than  the 
authority  of  i  witness.  The  author  has  put  his  state- 
ments in  u  dv.  ^matic  form  for  the  sake  of  clearness  and 
brevity,  and  because  he  believes  them  to  be  true.  But 
he  cheerfully  invites  his  readers  to  test  their  truth. 

He  lays  claim  to  no  originality  in  the  book.  In  the 
course  of  many  years  of  teaching  he  has  given  much 
attention  to  the  study  of  mind ;  he  has  also  read  some  of 
the  many  books  that  have  been  written  on  the  subject. 
In  this  book  he  has  stated  as  well  as  he  could,  some  of  the 
most  important  facts  of  mind  just  as  they  now  appear  to 
him.  He  has  not  hesitated  to  take  from  any  author  any 
statement  that  commended  itself  to  his  judgment.  When 
the  form  of  the  statement  has  been  retained,  he  has  used 
(juotation  marks;  but  it  has  not  seemed  worth  the  while 
to  give  the  name  of  the  author  in  every  case,  for,  as  was 
said  before,  nothing  in  Psychology  rests  upon  authority. 

Such  as  the  book  is,  it  is  submitted  to  the  public  with 
the  fond  hope  that  it  may  be  found  of  some  use,  especi- 
ally to  young  teachers. 

Edwin  C.  Hkwett. 

Illinois  State  Normal  University, 
Normal,  June  4,  1889. 


CHAPTER  PAllK 

I.  Definitions,  and  General  Statements        -  -        9 

II.  The  Nature  of  Mind  -          -       ■''-           -             19 

III.  General  Powers, —  Consciousness      '.      -  "     -9 

IV.  General  Powers, — Attention  and  Conception  -        36 

V.  The    Intellect,- — Definitions  and  First  Principles     47 

VI.  The  Presentative  Powers,  or  the  Senses  -            54 

VII.  The  Presentative  Powers,  Co7ichided        -  -    63 

VIII.  The  Representative  Powers, — Memory  -             75 

IX.  Memory,  Concluded          .        .        .        .  -     86 

X.  Imagination, and  Constructive  Conception        -        96 

XI.  The  Reflective  Power,— Concepts  and  Terms  108 

XII.  Judgment,  Proposition,  and  Reasoninj,'         -  118 

XIII.  Reasoning,  Conchtded          ...  -       126 

XIV.  The  Sensibility,— General  Statements  -         -137 

XV.  Specific  Feelings  ...            -         146 

XVI.  Conscience  and  Morality  -               -            -  '57 

XVII.  The  Will  .            -                         -            -         165 

XVIII.  Conclusion       ...  -             -            -    176 


(vii) 


ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


CHAPTER   I 

DEFINITIONS    AND    GENERAL    STATEMENTS 

HAT  IS  Mental  Philosophy? — Philos- 
ophy hterally  means  love  of  wisdom. 
But,  as  the  term  is  commonly  used,  it 
means  the  explanation  of  things,  or 
giving  the  reasons  for  them ;  for  in- 
stance, to  give  the  philosophy  of  a  pump  is  to  show 
in  what  way  it  produces  its  results. 

By  Mental  Philosophy,  we  mean  an  explanation 
of  the  action  and  growth  of  the  human  mind ;  it  in- 
cludes a  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  the  mind,  —  that 
is,  of  its  powers  of  knowing,  feeling,  and  willing, — 
and  a  statement  of  the  laws  according  to  which  it 
acts  and  grows. 

A  text-book  on  Mental  Philosophy  should  state 
these  facts  and  laws  exactly,  clearly,  and  concisely. 
Psychology. — This  word  is  derived  from  two  Greek 
words,  one  of  which  means  the  soul,  or  mind,  and  the 
other  means  a  discourse,  or  science.  Hence,  Psy- 
chology, the  science  of  the  soul,  is  a  good  name  for 
Mental  Philosophy. 

(9) 


lO  KLliMKM'S    t)F    PSVCHULUGV 

Several  other  words  are  sometimes  used  to  designate  this 
science;  among  them  are  Anthropology  and  Metaphysics.* 
But  Anthropology  includes  much  more  than  the  philosophy 
of  the  mind;  and  Metaphysics  is  used  in  several  senses,  some- 
times meaning  more  than  Psychology,  and  sometimes  less. 

What  is  a  Science? — A  Science  is  the  body  of 
knowledge  concerning  some  subject,  systematically 
arranged  in  accordance  with  general  principles  or  laws. 

Two  Kinds  of  Science. — In  some  cases,  the  gen- 
eral principles,  or  laws,  are  first  laid  down,  and  then 
the  science  is  derived  from  them ;  such  a  science  is 
termed  a  deductive  science. 

Geometry  is  a  good  example  of  a  deductive  science;  a  few 
general  principles,  viz.,  the  definitions  and  axioms,  are  given, 
and  the  science  is  built  up  from  them. 

Other  sciences  are  formed  by  first  collecting  a 
large  number  of  facts,  and  then  deriving  the  laws  and 
general  principles  from  a  study  of  these  facts.  Such 
a  science  is  termed  an  inductive  science. 

Botany  is  a  good  example. 

How  Developed? — In  developing  an  inductive  sci- 
ence, we  may  recognize  four  steps: 

First,  The  collection  of  a  large  number  of  facts. 

Secotid,  A  comparison  of  the  facts,  noting  resem- 
blances and  differences,  and  an  arrangement  of  them 
in  classes  accordingly. 

Third,  A  discovery  of  laws,  or  uniformities. 

Fourt/i,  Careful,  formal  statements  concerning  these 
facts  and  laws,  or  uniformities. 


*Let  the  student  consult  the  Unabridged  Dictionary',  and  study  carefully 
the  etymological  meaning  of  these  words,  and  difficult  or  scientific  terms. 


DEFINITIONS  AND  GENERAL  STATEMENIS  I  I 

By  the  word  "law, "-in  Science,  is  meant  simply  A  uniformity. 
It  is  a  law  of  plant-life  that  every  plant  must  have  root,  stem, 
and  leaf.  But  to  write  this  law,  is  only  another  way  of  saying 
that  every  plant  does  have  root,  stem,  and  leaf. 

Psychology,  an  Inductive  Science.  — We  class 
Psychology  among  the  Inductive  Sciences,  because 
its  facts  are  gathered  by  observation,  and  its  laws 
are  discovered  by  a  careful  study  of  the  facts  after 
they  have  been  scanned  and  classified.  Thus,  Psy- 
chology conforms  to  our  definition  of  an  Inductive 
Science ;  and  it  is  built  up  in  the  same  way  as  other 
inductive  sciences  are. 

It  may  be  claimed  that  there  are  some  facts  and 
laws  in  Psychology  which  may  be  reached  by  deduc- 
tion ;  but  the  same  thing  is  true  of  the  other  induct- 
ive sciences.  And  these  exceptions  do  not  invalidate 
the  statement  that  the  general  truths  of  the  science 
are  established  mainly  by  induction. 

For  the  reasons  given  above,  vi^e  claim  that  Psychology  is 
an  Inductive  Science.  And,  unless  we  deny  that  Mind  is  a 
part  of  Nature,  we  must  allow  that  it  is  an  Inductive  Natural 
Science.  But,  in  general,  the  term  Natural  is  confined  to 
those  sciences  which  treat  chiefly  or  entirely  of  matter. 

How  ARE  Facts  in  Science  Obtained? — Facts  in 
science  are  learned  by  observation ;  but  this  observa- 
tion is  of  two  kinds.  Every  careful  .student  of  sci- 
ence knows  some  facts  of  his  science  from  personal 
observation ;  some  he  learns  from  the  observation  of 
others,  reported  to  him  orally,  or  by  writing  or  print- 
ing. Hence,  it  may  be  said  that  his  knowledge  rests 
upon  two  foundations,  viz.,  obscivatioii  and  tcstivwtiy — 
the  term  observation  being  confined  usually  to  per- 
sonal observation  or  experience. 


12  ELEMENTS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

Facts  in  Psychology  are  learned  in  both  these 
^vays ;  careful  observation  of  the  gestures  and  actions 
of  others  will  reveal  much  respecting  the  operations 
of  their  minds,  while  their  words,  written  or  spoken, 
will  reveal  much  that  is  additional. 

A  Striking  Peculiarity.  —  The  field  of  observa- 
tion in  all  the  sciences  excepting  those  that  relate  to 
sentient  man,  is  wholly  external  to  the  observer  him- 
self. But,  in  Psychology,  by  far  the  most  important 
field  of  observation  for  any  student,  is  his  own  mind. 
The  mental  phenomena  shown  by  his  own  mind,  re- 
vealed to  him  by  his  own  consciousness,  claim  his 
most  careful  attention.  Here  is  a  field  of  observation 
quite  different  from  any  found  in  most  of  the  other 
sciences;  and  knowledge  gained  in  this  field  rests 
upon  experience  alone.  No  other  than  the  observer 
himself  can  aid  him  here,  save  only  as  he  may  be  di- 
rected in  making  his  observations. 

A  student  of  Psychology  should  test  every  statement  made 
in  a  te.xt-book,  or  by  a  teacher,  comparing  it  with  what  he 
knows  of  his  own  mental  operations.  If  he  finds  that  his  own 
experience  does  not  attest  the  truth  of  the  statement,  he  may 
conclude  that  the  statement  is  false  entirely,  or  that  it  is  true 
of  some  minds  only,  and  not  of  mind  in  general — provided  he 
is  qualified  to  exercise  sound  judgment  in  the  case. 

In  fact,  a  little  reflection  will  convince  us  that  we  can  know 
absolutely  nothing  of  other  minds,  except  through  what  we 
know  of  our  own  minds.  All  expressions  of  countenance,  all 
gestures,  all  words,  in  so  far  as  they  reveal  to  us  anything  of 
the  operations  of  other  minds,  reach  this  result  through  the 
interpretation  which  we  give  to  them  in  the  light  of  our  owti 
mental  experiences.  Let  no  student  of  Psychology  lose  sight 
of  the  truth  here  stated. 

Psychology,  a  Noble  Science. — One  way  of  de- 


DEFINITIONS  AND   GENERAL   STATEMENTS  I3 

termining  the  rank  of  a  science  is  found  by  determin- 
ing the  rank  of  the  subject  to  which  it  relates.  Min- 
eralogy has  to  do  with  dead  matter;  Botany  deals 
with  plant  life;  Zoology  has  for  its  subject,  animal 
life;  Physiology  treats  of  physical  man.  Here  we 
have  an  ascending  series  of  subjects  of  scientific 
study.  But  Psychology  has  to  do  with  man  as  an 
intellectual,  rational,  and  moral  being.  Judged  on 
this  basis,  then,  Psychology  must  be  regarded  as  a 
very  noble  science. 

Again,  mind  is  the  organizer  of  all  the  sciences; 
and  of  some  of  the  deductive  sciences,  like  geometry, 
it  may  be  said  to  be  the  creator.  Surely,  we  must 
accord  a  very  high  rank  to  that  science  which  has 
mind  itself  for  its  subject. 

Sciences  differ  greatly  in  rank,  according  to  their 
value  in  aiding  to  make  human  life  successful  and 
happy.  From  this  practical  point  of  view,  we  think 
it  can  be  shown  that  Psychology  should  be  given  a 
very  high  place. 

Relation  to  Personal  Interests.  — The  success 
and  happiness  of  every  one  depend  largely  upon  the 
wisdom  of  his  thinking,  the  right  control  of  his  ap- 
petites, impulses,  and  emotions,  and  the  character  of 
his  purposes  and  actions.  The  better  he  understands 
his  mind,  its  powers,  capabilities,  limitations,  and  the 
laws  which  govern  its  action,  the  more  able  he  is  to 
control  himself  rightly  in  all  the  respects  just  named. 

Some  sciences,  like  Astronomy,  are  very  interesting,  but  tlicy 
have  little  to  do  with  the  affairs  of  one's  every-day  life.  We 
may  watch  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies  with  an  in- 
terest similar  to  that  with  which  a  spectator,  standing  on  the 


14  ELIiMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

shore,  would  watch  the  movement  of  ships  far  out  on  the  ocean. 
But,  if  he  were  a  passenger  on  one  of  those  ships, — moreover, 
if  he  were  responsible  for  the  safe  navigation  of  the  ship  on 
which  he  was  sailing,— his  interest  would  be  of  quite  another 
kind.  It  would  be  an  interest  similar  to  that  which  we  should 
have  in  Psychology,  when  its  practical  relation  to  our  life  and 
destiny  is  duly  appreciated. 

SPECIAL  VALUE  TO    DIFFERENT   PROFESSIONS 

The  Clergyman.  —  One's  Theology,  his  ideas  and 
beliefs  respecting  God,  are  largely  determined  by  his 
system  of  Psychology.  The  qualities  of  the  Divine 
Mind,  as  we  conceive  them,  are  qualities  of  human 
minds  refined  and  enlarged  in  our  conception.  This 
aspect  of  Theology  is  sometimes  criticised ;  but  there 
seems  to  be  no  alternative,  unless  we  boldly  assume 
that  we  can  know  nothing  about  God.  Further- 
more, if  we  accept  the  ideas  of  God  which  the  Bible 
gives  us,  this  view  of  God  is  the  correct  one. 

But  the  clergyman  must  have  a  theory  of  human 
duty  and  human  responsibility.  This  theory  will  be 
determined  by  his  theory  concerning  human  thought, 
and  the  relation  of  the  human  will  to  life  and  con- 
duct. For  instance,  if  man  has  no  power  to  direct  his 
thoughts  and  feelings,  if  he  has  no  liberty  of  choice 
and  action,  has  he  any  duty  or  responsibility  at  all  in 
respect  to  his  life  and  character?  These  questions 
clearly  belong  to  Psychology. 

Again,  it  is  an  important  part  of  the  clergyman's 
business  to  influence  the  thinking  and  action  of  men. 
His  success  will  depend  largely  upon  his  knowledge 
of  the  laws  of  human  thought,  and  of  the  use  of  ar- 
guments and  motives. 


DKIINITIONS  AND  GENERAL  STATEMENIS  I  5 

TJic  Teacher. — It  is  the  teacher's  special  work  to 
lead  his  pupils  to  know,  and  to  train  them  into  ri^ht 
habits  of  thought  and  action.  How  can  he  do  this, 
unless  he  understands  the  processes  by  which  the 
mind  comes  to  know,  and  the  processes  by  which 
growth  in  right  habits  is  secured  ? 

To  suppose  that  one  will  be  a  good  teacher  simply  because 
he  knows  well  the  subjects  which  he  is  to  teach,  is  very  shal- 
low, and  it  is  the  cause  of  a  great  deal  of  poor  work  in  the 
school-room.  Some  one  has  compared  such  a  teacher  to  a  per- 
son who  should  attempt  to  play  a  piano,  knowing  only  the  tunes 
he  is  to  play,  but  entirely  unacquainted  with  the  instrument. 
The  illustration  is  good  as  far  as  it  goes,  but  it  is  very  made- 
quate.  To  reach  the  case  of  such  a  teacher  in  an  ordinary 
school,  we  must  suppose  the  musician  to  attempt  to  play  on 
thirty  or  forty  instruments  at  the  same  time.  Nay,  we  must 
suppose  that  these  thirty  or  forty  instruments,  no  two  of  which 
are  quite  alike  at  the  start,  are  daily  growing,  each  into  some- 
thing a  little  different  from  what  it  was  the  day  before. 

The  Physician.  —  The  relation  between  mind  and 
body  is  such  that  a  physician  can  hardly  hope  to  deal 
successfully  with  bodily  weakness  and  disease,  if  he  is 
ignorant  of  mental  phenomena,  and  of  the  influence 
of  the  mind  on  the  body. 

The  Lawyer. — No  man  needs  to  know  more  clearly 
than  the  lawyer,  the  movements  of  the  human  mind, 
and  the  way  in  which  men  are  led  to  different  opin- 
ions and  courses  of  action.  How,  otherwise,  can  he 
unravel  his  "cases,"  or  how  can  he  bring  judge  or 
jury  to  decide  in  his  favor? 

The  Orator. — The  orator's  success  in  arousing,  con- 
vincing, and  persuading  those  who  hear  him,mu.st  be 
determined  by  his  ability  to  play  on  that  most  won- 
derful of  all  instruments,  the  human  soul. 


1 6  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

To  Men,  in  Goicral.  —  The  success  of  any  man  in 
dealing  with  his  fellows  will  depend  largely  upon  his 
"knowledge  of  human  nature."  But  three  fourths 
of  one's  knowledge  of  human  nature  is  a  knowledge 
of  the  capabilities  and  modes  of  activity  of  the  hu- 
man mind. 

A  Mental  Discipline.  —  Few  studies  are  better 
calculated  to  give  good  mental  discipline  than  Psy- 
chology. This  study  demands:  (i)  Close  observa- 
tion; (2)  Careful  reflection;  (3)  The  making  of  fine 
and  critical  distinctions;  (4)  Precision,  and  exactness 
in  the  use  of  terms  and  in  the  making  of  statements. 
These  are  the  exercises  that  are  especially  calculated 
to  sharpen  and  strengthen  the  intellectual  powers. 

Common  and  Scientific  Knowledge.  —  It  must 
not  be  inferred  from  what  has  been  said,  that  no  one 
but  those  who  have  studied  formal  Psychology  in 
school  or  college  can  possess  any  of  the  advantages 
that  we  have  claimed  for  this  study.  Here,  as  in 
Botany,  Zoology,  and  every  other  science,  one  may 
have  a  great  deal  of  knowledge  "picked  up"  in  a 
hap-hazard  way,  crude  and  unorganized,  but  which 
may  be  very  useful  so  far  as  it  goes. 

In  every  field  of  human  thought,  the  difference 
between  scientific  knowledge  and  common  knowledge 
is  not  a  difference  of  kind,  but  of  precision,  order, 
and  efficiency. 

Neglect  of  Psychology.  —  Notwithstanding  all 
that  is  claimed  for  Psychology,  it  must  be  confessed 
that,  as  a  general  thing,  it  is  not  a  very  popular 
study  in  the  schools,  nor  among  studious  men  who 
conduct  their  studies  in  private.      Nor  does  it  offer 


DEFINITIONS  AND    GENERAL   STATEMENTS  1/ 

much  that  is  attractive  to  the  great  muhitude  who 
are  not  students.  It  may  be  said  that  one  reason 
for  this  is  that  the  subject  is  usually  presented  in  a 
dry  and  unattractive-  wajt  While  this  may  explain 
the  fact  in  part,  tliere  seem  to  be  several  other  rea- 
sons. 

Why  Neglected. — First,  The  practical  value  of 
Psychology,  its  relation  to  the  common  affairs  of  life, 
is  not  seen  so  readily  as  in  the  case  of  some  other 
studies.  Arithmetic  teaches  how  to  compute  inter- 
est. Geography  aids  in  trade  and  travel,  Chemistry 
teaches  how  to  deal  with  soils,  medicines,  and  ex- 
plosives, Physics  has  to  do  with  the  making  and  us- 
ing of  machinery,  etc.  But  the  value  of  Psychology 
does  not  so  readily  show  itself  in  the  outward  and 
visible. 

Second,  This  science  can  make  no  show  of  speci- 
mens and  apparatus,  like  some  of  those  mentioned, 
and  others  that  might  be  mentioned.  An  appeal  to 
the  senses  has  a  wonderfully  attractive  power  to  most 
minds. 

Thij'd,  Psychology  is  a  very  old  science;  much 
that  is  most  valuable  in  it  has  come  down  from  the 
old  Greeks,  or  from  remoter  sources.  This  science 
has  little  of  the  charm  of  novelty — nor  is  there  much 
hope  of  making  any  new  discoveries  here.  In  Geol- 
ogy, Botany,  Chemistry,  Electricity,  etc.,  astonishing 
discoveries  and  inventions  arc  often  made,  and  men's 
names  are  sent  down  to  posterity  in  connection  willi 
them.  But  who  expects  to  discover  a  new  mental 
power,  or  to  invent  a  new  process  of  thinking? 

Fourth,    In   a  new  country  like   ours,   the  pursuits 

Psy— 2. 


i8 


ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


that  have  to  do  with  taming  and  controlling  nature, 
with  furnishing  food,  clothing,  and  shelter,  may  al- 
ways be  expected  to  receive  the  largest  share  of  at- 
tention. But,  as  better  provision  is  made  for  sup- 
plying the  most  urgent  needs  of  our  bodily  existence, 
it  is  to  be  expected  that  men  who  are  willing  to  think 
at  all, will  turn  their  thoughts  more  and  more  to  those 
subjects  which  are  more  intimately  connected  with 
man's  inner  life  and  well-being,  although  they  appeal 
less  strikingly  to  the  senses. 

Among  those  who  are  teaching  and  guiding  in  the 
work  of  our  schools,  there  is  an  increasing  interest 
in  questions  of  Psychology.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
cheering  facts  in  the  whole  field  of  public  education. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE    NATURE    OF    MIND 


IND  AND  Matter.  —  Man  is  curiously 
made  up  of  mind  and  matter,  so  won- 
derfully blended  that  no  one  can  tell 
exactly  how  they  live  and  work  to- 
gether. Of  the  real  nature  of  both 
mind  and  matter,  we  are  profoundly  ignorant.  No 
one  can  tell  what  either  is;  we  can  study  their  phe- 
nomena only.  Man  has  a  body,  and  he  has  a  mind; 
he  has,  also,  powers  that  belong  to  the  body,  and 
others  that  belong  to  the  mind. 
Power  is  tJie  ability  to  do  sonictJiiiig. 
For  distinction,  we  may  call  the  powers  that  pertain 
especially  to  the  body,  as  the  muscular  powers,  phys- 
ical;  and  we  may  call  those  powers  that  pertain  es- 
pecially to  the  mind,  as  the  power  to  remember,  the 
power  to  love,  etc.,  psychical  powers.  To  bC  sure, 
the  mind's  powers  do  not  show  themselves  wholly 
independent  of  the  body;  all  mental  activity  is  prob- 
ably attended  by  movements  among  the  molecules 
of  the  brain.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that,  in  some 
way  not  fully  understood,  the  mind  uses  the  brain  as 
its  instrument. 

('9) 


20  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

Our  best  philosophers  teach  us  that  the  mind  itself  is  one 
indivisible  thing;  it  does  not  possess  organs,  as  the  body  does, 
nor  is  it  a  bundle  of  powers;  but  it  has  many  powers,  which  it 
can  exercise  in  various  ways.  When  we  love,  it  is  the  entire 
mind  that  loves,  and  not  part  of  it,  although  it  may  work  with 
more  or  less  force  in  the  act.  The  same  is  true  when  we  re- 
member, when  we  will,  etc. 

Grand  Divisions  of  Mental  Power.  — The  pow- 
ers of  the  mind  are  numerous,  but  they  may  all  be 
arranged  in  three  classes ;  viz. ,  intellect,  sensibility,  ivill. 

Writers  on  Psychology  differ  greatly  on  many 
questions;  and  their  discussions  about  some  of  them 
are  very  fierce.  But,  on  the  division  of  mental  pow- 
ers into  three  groups,  as  here  given,  there  is  almost 
complete  unanimity  among  all  modern  writers. 

Definitions.  —  The  Intellect  comprises  those  pow- 
ers by  which  we  are  able  to  know. 

The  Sensibility,  or  the  Emotions,  is  that  group  of 
powers  by  which  we  feel. 

The  Will  is  the  power  to  choose  and  execute. 

In  speaking  of  the  psychical  powers  of  man  and  their  phenom- 
ena, we  are  obliged  to  borrow  our  terms  from  the  body  and  its 
phenomena.  This  is  somewhat  unfortunate,  as  the  terms  thus 
borrowed  are  likely  to  be  misunderstood.  The  word  feel,  which 
we  have  just  used,  is  an  example  of  such  a  term.  When  one 
speaks  of  feeling  sorrow,  he  means  something  very  different 
from  that  which  he  means  when  he  speaks  of  feeling  the  table 
with  his  finger.  In  the  latter  case,  he  means  an  affection  of 
the  mind  through  the  nerves  of  the  body.  This  is  perce^Dtion, 
or  an  exercise  of  one  of  the  knowing  powers.  In  the  former 
case,  he  means  an  affection  of  the  mind  independent  of  the 
nerves,  as  when  he  feels  sorrow  for  the  loss  of  a  friend.  This 
is  an  exercise  of  sensibility. 

Illustration.  —  The  action  of  the  three  grand  classes 


THE  NATURE  OF  MIXD 


21 


of  mental  powers  may  be  illustrated  in  the  following 
way:  You  take  up  a  newspaper  and  read  of  the  floods 
in  the  lower  Mississippi  valley.  You  are  able  to  un- 
derstand what  the  writer  says — to  think  his  thoughts 
after  him — and  his  thoughts  awaken  new  thoughts  of 
your  own.  Thus,  you  see  that  you  have  the  power 
to  know,  to  think,  —  or,  you  have  Intellect.  As  you 
read  of  the  sufferings  the  floods  cause  the  people, 
you  begin  to  pity  them,  and  to  desire  to  relieve  their 
suffering.  You  thus  see  that  you  have  the  power  to 
feel,  —  or,  you  possess  Sensibility.  You  learn  that 
others  are  sending  money  to  aid  these  poor  people ; 
moved  by  your  feelings,  you  determine  to  join  in  the 
contribution ;  and  you  do  contribute.  Thus,  you  see 
that  you  have  the  power  to  choose,  to  determine,  and 
to  execute,  —  or,  you  have  Will. 

Order  of  Action.  —  These  are  the  three  grand 
cla.sses  of  mental  powers;  nor  is  there  any  mental 
faculty  that  can  not  be  properly  grouped  under  one 
of  the  three  classes.  Moreover,  these  classes  of  men- 
tal powers  always  act  in  the  order  here  given.  It  is 
inconceivable  that  we  should  have  feeling  in  regard 
to  any  matter  until  we  know  something  about  it,  or 
think  we  do.  Nor  do  we  ever  put  forth  any  activity 
of  the  will  till  we  are  prompted  to  it  by  some  feeling. 

This  is  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  "prodigal  son."  He 
"came  to  himself,"  and  thought;  he  felt,  in  respect  to  his 
wretched  condition,  and  the  plenty  at  his  father's  house;  he 
then  resolved  to  arise  and  go  to  his  father. 

A  wise  writer,  or  orator,  or  teacher,  who  wants  to 
lead  men  up  to  a  resolution,  always  observes  this  order. 
He  strives  first  to  awaken  thought, — to  make  people 


22  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

know  something  about  the  matter  in  hand.  He  then 
seeks  to  arouse  their  feeUngs  in  view  of  what  they 
know  and  think.  It  is  only  after  both  these  results 
are  reached  that  he  hopes  to  bring  them  to  any  res- 
olution, or  choice,  or  action,  respecting  the  matter. 
Division  of  the  Powers. —  By  the  earlier  philos- 
ophers, the  mind's  powers  were  divided  into  two 
classes  instead  of  three.  They  were  termed  the  coti- 
teniplative  and  active,  or  the  cognitive  and  motive;  that 
is,  powers  exercised  in  knozving,  or  the  Intellect,  as 
we  now  say,  and  powers  concerned  in  action  or  in 
motives  to  action,  including  what  we  now  call  both 
the  Emotions  and  the  Will. 

Observations. — We  give  a  few  general  observations  con- 
cerning the  three  Grand  Classes  of  mental  powers. 

The  Intellect.  —  A  writer  says:  "The  infant  soul  contains 
implicitly  all  the  faculties  of  developed  intelligence  ;  reason  is 
there  with  all  its  essential  characteristics,  but  it  is  there  only  in 
its  intuitive  form." 

He  says  again:  "Each  faculty  has  a  primitive  state  corre- 
sponding to  its  spontaneous  development.  Primitive  judgments 
form  the  basis  of  all  our  knowledge."  A  "  primitive  judgment" 
is  defined  by  another  as  the  "judgment  of  a  relation  between 
the  conscious  subject  and  the  immediate  object  of  conscious- 
ness." An  act  of  sense-perception  is  such  a  judgment;  a  child 
can  make  it  long  before  he  can  make  the  formal  judgment 
called  a  thought, —  that  is,  a  judgment  of  agreement  or  non- 
agreement  between  two  concepts. 

Again,  it  is  well  said,  "That  our  intellectual  faculties  may 
exist  in  two  distinct  states  of  development,  seems  to  have  been 
overlooked  by  teachers,  as  well  as  by  educational  writers.  We 
have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  the  higher  faculties,  in  their 
first  or  simpler  forms,  may  be  healthfully  exercised  at  an  early 
age.  A  child  of  seven  years  readily  forms  simple  abstractions, 
and  reasons  clearly  about  concrete  things." 


THE  NATURE  OF  MIND  23 

The  Evwtions.  —  Another  able  writer  says:  "We  demand 
that  ■zf^ /dv/ towards  objects  in  proportion  to  their  rank  and 
worth.  To  be  interested  solely  in  physical  goods,  is  the  mark 
of  an  animal  life.  To  be  enthusiastic  over  the  insignificant,  is  a 
form  of  folly  that  finds  its  perfection  in  the  fool.  To  be  cold 
and  indifferent  towards  the  highest,  indicates  either  an  atrophy, 
or  a  distortion,  of  the  emotional  nature.  The  indifferent  must 
be  treated  with  indifference  ;  the  commonplace  must  not  be  ex- 
alted; enthusiasm  and  devotion  belong  only  to  noble  objects; 
and  wrath  must  be  reserved  for  injustice,  baseness,  and  degra- 
dation." 

The  Will. — Of  the  will,  another  keen  writer  says:  "When 
exercised  only  in  the  gratification  of  animal  appetites,  it  is 
brute-will ;  when  fulfilling  the  ends  of  free,  spontaneous  (vol- 
untary) thinking,  it  is  the  scientific  will  ;  and  when  executing 
the  imperatives  of  the  reason,  it  is  the  spiritual  will  in  liberty." 

Nature  of  Mind.  —  Although  we  claim  to  know 
nothing  of  the  real  nature  of  mind,  or  of  matter,  still 
it  is  important  that  we  have  certain  clear,  fundamental 
conceptions  regarding  each,  and  regarding  their  rela- 
tions to  each  other. 

Mind,  a  Unit. — We  should  think  of  the  mind  as 
one  indivisible  thing,  neither  made  up  of  parts,  nor 
an  aggregate  of  powers  or  capabilities.  And  yet  it 
has  the  power  of  acting  in  various  ^\■ays ;  and  to  these 
several  ways  of  acting,  we  find  it  necessary  to  give 
names.  Hence,  we  speak  of  the  mind's  Powers  or 
Faculties;  but  we  must  not  think  of  these  powers  as 
things  in  themselves,  nor  as  h€\\\^  parts  of  the  mind. 
For  instance,  the  mind  has  the  power  to  remember, 
which  we  call  Memory.  But  Memory  is  not  a  part 
of  the  mind;  it  is  the  ability  of  the  mind  to  do  a  spe- 
cific act.  An  act  of  memory  is  an  act  of  the  whole 
mind,  in  accomplishing  a  certain  result. 


24  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Mind,  an  Entity.  —  We  believe  that  the  mind  is  a 
real  thing,  and  that  it  will  live  after  the  body  is  dead. 
Although  we  know  nothing  of  human  minds  discon- 
nected from  bodies,  we  see  no  reason  to  doubt  that  a 
soul  may  be  thus  disconnected  without  any  essential 
change  in  its  nature  or  function.  Even  Mr.  Bain  says: 
"For  anything  we  can  see,  the  body  might  have  its 
bodily  functions  without  the  soul,  and  the  soul  might 
have  its  psychical  functions  in  some  other  connection 
than  our  present  bodies." 

Differences  of  Mind  and  Matter.  —  There  are  good 
reasons  for  denying  that  mind  and  matter  are  the 
same  thing  viewed  from  two  different  stand-points,  or 
that  mind  is  a  product  of  matter. 

(i.)  Matter  manifests  itself  only  by  its  qualities; 
mind  manifests  itself  only  by  its  acts. 

(2.)  The  characteristic  quality  of  matter  is  its  occu- 
pation of  space ;  it  is  impossible,  perhaps,  even  to 
conceive  of  mind  as  occupying  space. 

(3.)  The  law  of  matter  is  Inertia,  —  it  never  moves 
unless  some  force  moves  it;  we  are  sure  that  mind 
has  the  power  to  originate  its  own  activity. 

(4.)  The  characteristic  of  mind  is  consciousness; 
wherever  there  is  consciousness  there  is  mental  activ- 
ity, or  mind.  But  there  is  no  evidence  that  con- 
sciousness is  ever  found  in  dead  matter. 

(5.)  Mind  has  the  power  to  know  its  own  acts; 
only  mind  knows  the  qualities  of  matter. 

Mind,  a  Product  of  Matter?  —  There  are  philoso- 
phers who  teach  that  mind  is  the  product  of  molec- 
ular movements  in  the  brain, — that  a  "little  agitation 
of  the  brain"  is  thought, — that  the   "brain  secretes 


THE  NATUR'E  OF   MIXD  2$ 

thought  as  the  Hver  secretes  bile."  But  to  suppose 
that  matter  in  any  way  produces  mind  involves  the 
absurdity  of  supposing  that  something  totally  inert 
and  unconscious  can  produce  that  which  is  both  con- 
scious and  self-active.  Can  anything  be  greater  than 
its  maker?     Can  any  effect  exceed  its  cause? 

Mind  and  Body  Closely  Related.  —  But,  while 
we  believe  that  rrMnd  and  body  are  not  the  same 
thing,  nor  one  the  product  of  the  other,  yet  in  the 
living  human  being  they  are  very  closely  related.  A 
keen  writer  says:  "Body  and  mind  are  so  closely 
connected  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  anything 
ever  takes  place  in  the  one  without  being  registered 
in  the  other." 

We  all  know  how  intense  thought  shows  itself  in 
the  bowed  head,  the  contracted  brow,  or  the  clenched 
hand;  it  may  even  make  one  unconscious  of  physical 
discomfort.  Strong  emotion,  as  anger,  joy,  or  fear, 
will  not  only  show  itself  by  involuntary  movements 
of  the  muscles,  but  will  seriously  interfere  with  llic 
vital  functions  of  the  stomach,  the  heart,  etc.;  n;iy, 
will  sometimes*  even  cause  death.  The  action  of  a 
strong  will  shows  itself  in  the  whole  bodily  attitude 
and  movement.  Almost  every  form  of  mental  activ- 
ity has  its  appropriate  outward  bodily  manifestation ; 
in  this  fact  lies  the  significance  of  gestures. 

On  the  other  hand,  causes  that  belong  in  the  body 
alone,  have  much  influence  on  mental  states  and  activ 
ities.  Who  can  think  well,  or  be  perfectly  cahn  and 
serene,  when  suffering  from  toothache?  Whose  mini! 
is  clear  when  his  stomach  is  struggling  with  an  over- 
load of  indigestible   food?     And   a  mental  state,   or 

Psy.— 3. 


26  ELEMENTS  QF   PSYCHOLOGY 

form  of  mental  activity,  may  often  be  induced  by  the 
performance  of  the  appropriate  bodily  act. 

Mind  and  Brain.  —  While  there  is  a  close  connec- 
tion between  the  mind  and  the  whole  body,  the  con- 
nection is  most  intimate  between  the  mind,  and  the 
brain  and  nervous  system.  The  brain  seems  to  be 
the  mind's  instrument;  probably  there  is  never  any 
mental  activity  that  is  not  accompanied  by  move- 
ments and  changes  in  the  brain. 

A  description  of  the  brain  and  nervous  system  be- 
longs to  physiology.  But  all  teachers  should  feel  the 
importance  of  having  the  brain  nourished  with  good 
blood ;  this  is  impossible  without  good  food,  good  air, 
and  exercise.  Nor  should  they  forget  that  the  brain 
always  demands  rest  after  labor.  Especially  is  this 
true  of  the  brains  of  children,  for  the  child's  brain, 
like  his  muscle,  has  not  the  power  of  enduvance  that 
belongs  to  the  adult.  The  best  rest  for  the  brain  is 
sound  sleep. 

It  is  well-known  that  the  muscles  of  children  can  not,  with- 
out damage,  be  put  to  the  hard  work  which  the  muscles  of  a 
man  can  safely  perform.  But  physiologists  tell  us  that  the 
child's  brain  grows  more  rapidly,  proportionately,  than  his  mus- 
cles; is  there  not,  therefore,  much  greater  danger  of  overtaxing 
the  child's  brain  than  of  overtaxing  his  muscles  ? 

Culture  of  the  Mind's  Powers. — The  specific 
work  of  the  teacher  is  the  cultivation  of  the  minds 
of  his  pupils,  —  not  simply  giving  them  knowledge  to 
be  memorized.  And  even  the  knowledge  acquired, 
useful  as  it  may  be,  should  confer  a  greater  benefit 
upon  the  pupil  by  the  mental  culture  it  gives  than  by 
the  practical  ends  it  may  serve. 


THE  NATURE  OF  MIND  2/ 

TEN    PRECEPTS    OF    MENTAL    CULTURE  * 

1.  The  object  of  mental  culture  is  the  fullest  de- 
velopment and  highest  right  activity  of  the  faculties 
of  the  mind. 

2.  One  of  the  primary  conditions  of  mental  culture 
is  a  well  organized  and  healthy  brain. 

3.  The  mind  is  cultivated  by  the  right  activity  of 
its  faculties. 

4.  The  mind  requires  objective  realities  for  it  to 
act  upon. 

5.  Each  faculty  of  the  mind  requires  a  culture 
adapted  to  itself 

6.  The  culture  of  the  mind  should  be  adapted  to 
the  order  of  the  development  of  its  faculties. 

7.  The  culture  of  the  mind  should  aim  at  a  har- 
monious development  of  all  the  faculties. 

8.  The  culture  of  the  mind  should  be  modified  to 
suit  the  different  tastes  and  talents  of  the  pupils. 

9.  The  culture  of  the  mind  is  not  creative  in  its 
character;  its  object  is  to  develop  existing  pos.sibili- 
ties  into  realities. 

10.  The  ultimate  end  of  mental  culture  is  the  at- 
tainment of  the  threefold  result  —  learning,  develop- 
ment, and  efficiency. 


« These  ten  precepts  of  Mental  Culttire  have  been  taken  from  Dr.  I-xl- 
ward  Brooks,  and  slightly  changed  in  phraseology. 


f  I.   Consciousness. 
General  Powers,  -j   2.  Attention. 
y  J.   Conception. 


5  ^^^ 


(U    .S  tH      f<      O 

t.  J-  (u  c  1/, 

U  X  5  <  Oi  c^U 

x/jvo  t>.od  d>  6  M 


U 


Sri 


Note. — In  this  Scheme,  we  have  included  only  such  of  the  sensibilities 

as  have  special  importance  for  tlie  teacher. 
(28) 


'-  AKGjELEB, 


CHAPTER   ITT 


GENERAL    POWERS, —  CONSCIOUSNESS 


N  order  to  bring  before  the  mind  of  the 
reader  clearly  and  distinctly,  the  psychic- 
al powers  and  their  relation  to  each 
other,  we  give  the  foregoing  scheme. 
General  Powers. — We  have  already 
defined  a  Power  as  the  ability  to  do  something ;  but 
some  philosophers  make  a  distinction  between  a  mental 
Power  and  a  mental  Faculty. 

A  Faculty  is  a  pozver  under  the  control  of  the  will, 
having  a  specific  zvork  of  its  oxvn  to  do. 

According  to  this  definition,  we  must  class  Seeing, 
Memory,  Judgment,  I^ove,  etc.,  as  mental  faculties. 
But  the  mind  has  three  very  important  powers  that 
do  not  answer  to  the  definition  of  faculties ;  these  are, 
Consciousness,  Attention,  and  Conception. 

The  powers  of  Consciousness,  Attention,  and  Conception 
never  act  separately  from  each  other,  nor  from  some  one  or 
more  of  the  mind's  fiiculties.  These  powers  are  not  co-ordi- 
nate with  the  faculties,  but  are  connected  with  them  all.  Hence, 
in  the  Scheme,  their  names  arc  written  across,  ojjpositc  a  brace 
that  includes  the  faculties  in  all  the  three  (hand  Divisions. 

(29) 


30  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Definition. —  Coiisciousncss  is  tJic  pcivcr  the  mind 
has  to  knoiv  its  ow7i  actions  and  states,  and  to  knozv  them 
as  belonging  to  the  Ego. 

This  is  not  a  faculty ;  it  is  not  under  the  control  of 
the  will,  nor  does  it  perform  any  specific  act  of  itself; 
it  gives  cognizance  of  the  acts  performed  by  the  fac- 
ulties, and  of  the  Ego  as  their  subject. 

Dr.  Hopkins  says:  "We  would  define  consciousness  to  be 
the  knowledge  by  the  mind  of  itself  as  the  permanent  and  in- 
divisible subject  of  its  own  operations.  Consciousness  holds 
the  whole  in  unity  by  a  constant  reference  of  the  dift'erent  acts 
and  states  of  the  mind  to  the  indivisible  self  or  Ego."  Thus, 
consciousness  is  the  ground  of  the  idea  of  personal  identity. 
We  think  this  is  true ;  but  we  believe  consciousness  includes 
both  the  state,  or  act,  and  the  Ego. 

Necessary  to  Mental  Activity.  —  Consciousness 
is  necessary  to  any  mental  activity ;  it  is  the  charac- 
teristic of  mind.  Two  persons  direct  their  eyes  to  the 
same  landscape  or  picture ;  the  same  image  is  upon 
the  retina  of  the  eye  in  both.  But  both  do  not  see 
the  same  things ;  each  sees  what  he  is  conscious  of 
seeing,  —  no  more.  In  fact,  he  may  be  so  absorbed 
in  thought,  or  so  overpowered  by  emotion,  as  to  see 
absolutely  nothing.  A  burst  of  harmony  from  several 
instruments  or  several  voices  may  fall  on  the  ear ;  the 
hearer  may  be  conscious  of  the  harmony  as  a  whole, 
or  he  may  be  conscious  of  the  individual  tone  of  one 
voice  or  one  instrument.  He  hears  just  what  he  is 
conscious  of  hearing.  So  of  all  other  mental  acts, — 
there  is  no  unconscious  mental  activity;  not  to  be 
conscious  that  you  remember,  is  not  to  remember. 

Consciousness  has  sometimes  been  compared  to  a  light,  show- 
ing to  one's  self  what  is  in  his  mind.     It  puts  nothing  into  the 


GENERAL  POWERS  — CONSCIOUSNESS  3  I 

mind  ;  it  simply  shows  what  is  already  there.  We  can  not  will 
to  be  more  or  less  conscious  ;7ive  shall  be  more  conscious  when 
we  have  more  in  the  mind  to  be  conscious  of, — in  no  other  way. 

Objects  of  Consciousness. —  In  other  words,  of 
what  can  we  be  conscious? 

I.  The  Ego.  —  We  may  be  conscious  of  the  Ego, 
as  thinking,  feeling,  or  wiUing. 

^  2.  Acts  and  States. — We  may  be  conscious  of  the 
activity,  or  state  of  the  mind,  in  perceiving,  remem- 
bering, loving,  choosing,  etc. 

3.  Products.  —  We  may  be  conscious  of  the  prod- 
ucts of  these  actions,  —  our  concepts,  our  thoughts, 
our  feelings,  our  choices,  etc. 

4.  The  No?i-Ego  in  Contact  f — Some  hold  that  we 
may  be  conscious  of  the  Non-Ego,  as  in  the  case  of 
something  resisting  our  muscular  effort;  Sir  William 
Hamilton  thinks  so,  if  we  understand  him. 

All  these  objects  of  consciousness,  except  the  last,  belong 
strictly  to  the  Ego.  Nor  can  we  be  conscious  of  anything  ex- 
cept that  which  is  before  the  mind  at  the  present  instant ;  con- 
sciousness can  not  deal  with  the  past  nor  the  future.  In  re- 
membering, we  are  not  conscious  of  that  which  we  remember ; 
we  are  conscious  only  of  the  concept  of  it  which  is  now  before 
the  mind.  You  may  be  conscious  that  you  were  conscious 
yesterday, — that  is,  you  are  conscious  of  your  present  concept 
of  the  former  consciousness.  You  may  be  conscious  of  a  pres- 
ent concept  of  that  which  is  future. 

Testimony  of  Consciousness.  —  We  know  most 
thoroughly  that  of  which  we  are  conscious.  You 
know  that  you  are  hearing  when  you  are  conscious 
that  you  hear;  and,  if  you  are  asked  hoiv  you  know 
you  are  conscious,  there  is  no  further  answer  to  be 
given,  —  consciousness  is  the  "bottom  fact."  When 
one  forms  a  judgment,  he  is  conscious  of  the  result; 


32  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

that  is,  he  knows  what  decision  he  has  made.  The 
decision  may  be  false  or  true,  consciousness  can  tell 
him  nothing  as  to  that;  but  consciousness  can  not 
mistake    as  to  what  the  decision  is. 

Mental  Activity  without  Coislsciousness? — We 
have  said  that  consciousness  is  the  characteristic  of 
mind.  If  this  be  true,  there  is  no  exhibition  of  mind 
apart  from  consciousness, — there  can  be  no  uncon- 
scious mental  activity.  ' '  Unconscious  knowing  and 
unconscious  willing  are  phrases  which  defy  all  inter- 
pretation." But  cases  are  often  cited  where  there 
seems  to  be  mental  activity  without  any  conscious- 
ness; at  least,  there  is  no  remembrance  of  any  con- 
sciousness. It  is  said  that  a  reporter  in  the  House  of 
Lords  became  very  weary,  and  fell  into  a  state  of  un- 
consciousness; but  that  he  m-ade  a  correct  report  of 
all  that  was  said  during  the  time  he  was  unconscious. 
The  explanation,  doubtless,  is  either  that  he  was  not 
entirely  unconscious,  but  was  simply  unable  to  re- 
member the  slight  degree  of  consciousness  that  he 
had,  or  that  his  action  in  reporting  was  purely  auto- 
matic,— that  his  fingers,  through  long  habit,  responded 
correctly  to  the  impressions  that  fell  upon  his  ear, 
without  any  mental  action  whatever. 

"Unconscious  knowledge"  seems  to  be  contradictory  in 
terms.  Yet  much  of  our  knowledge,  doubtless,  has  not  been 
coxi^zxowsXy  formulated ;  a  child  or  a  savage  knows  that  a  part 
can  not  equal  the  whole,  and  still  he  may  not  be  able  to  state 
his  knowledge  to  another.  Perhaps  his  mind  has  never  con- 
ceived such  a  statement. 

Unconscious  Cerebration.  —  Such  action  as  the 
supposition  about  the  reporter  implies,  would  be  a 
case   of   "unconscious    cerebration", —  that  is,   brain 


GENERAL  POWERS,— CONSCIOUSNESS  33 

activity  unaccompanied  by  mental  activity.  All  mus- 
cular activity  is  prompted  by  an  impulse  from  the 
nervous  system ;  but  often  this  is  attended  by  no 
mental  activity.  An  involuntary  kick  when  the  foot 
is  tickled,  is  a  movement  of  this  kind.  It  is  called 
"natural  reflex  action,"  which  is  an  mvolwitary  re- 
sponse of  the  motor  nerve  to  an  excitement  of  the  sejisoiy 
neroe.  The  limbs  of  a  dead  man  may  be  made  to 
move  in  this  way,  by  an  electric  shock. 

Habit. —  But  it  is  found  that  movements  which 
were  at  first  guided  by  the  mind  may  become  so  fa- 
miliar that  they  become  reflex,  and  require  no  more 
thought,  or  mental  activity,  than  natural  reflex  action 
does.  It  is  so  in  walking;  and,  with  an  expert  mu- 
sician, the  playing  on  an  instrument  may  be  of  the 
same  kind.  Muscular  habit  is  induced  reflex  action ; 
that  is,  it  is  prompted  by  unconscious  cerebration.  In 
this  consists  the  value  of  such  habits:  they  enable 
us  to  do  things  correctly  and  rapidly  without  any  out- 
lay of  mental  power. 

And  it  is  very  important  to  notice  that  mental  hab- 
its may  be  formed,  which  tend  to  become  similarly 
automatic,  perhaps  because,  by  long  continuance,  the 
action  of  the  brain  becomes  reflex,  like  the  action  of 
the  mu.scles.  This  shows  how  a  result  of  the  multi- 
plication of  two  small  numbers  appears  without  effort 
in  the  mind  of  one  familiar  with  the  multiplication 
table.  Thus,  you  think  "twelve"  whenever  you  hear 
"four  times  three."  Anything  in  which  one  is  thor- 
oughly educated  has  taken  on  the  form  of  habit ;  ami 
it  is  the  true  business  and  aim  of  education  to  form 
right  habits,  —  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral. 


34  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Some  very  curious  phenomena,  aside  from  those  that  result 
from  known  habit,  may  be  explained,  perhaps,  by  unconscious 
cerebration.  You  grapple  with  a  difficult  problem  in  the  even- 
ing ;  it  baffles  you,  and  you  give  it  up,  retire,  and  sleep.  In  the 
morning,  the  solution  is  perfectly  easy  and  clear.  You  try  to 
recall  the  name  of  a  person  ;  you  fail,  and  give  it  up.  An  hour 
after,  when  all  desire  or  use  for  the  name  has  passed,  it  sud- 
denly comes  before  your  mind  with  provoking  clearness.  In 
these  and  many  similar  cases,  it  may  be  that  movements  in  the 
brain,  having  been  started  in  a  certain  direction,  have  continued 
until  they  have  wrought  out  the  result,  simply  by  unconscious 
cerebration, — without  any  mental  activity  until  we  become  con- 
scious of  the  result  itself. 

What  we  Know. —  In  the  strictest  sense,  we  know 
nothing  except  what  is  before  consciousness  at  this 
moment.  In  a  looser  sense, —  which  is  the  common 
one,  —  we  know  all  that  we  can  recall  into  conscious- 
ness. When  the  child  truthfully  says,  "I  know,  but 
I  can't  think,"  he  means  that  it  is  possible  for  him  to 
bring  the  thing  in  question  into  his  consciousness,  but 
that  he  can  not  do  it  at  this  moment. 

Our  knowledge  now  in  consciousness  is  like  our  money  in 
hand;  all  our  other  knowledge  is  like  our  money  in  the  bank. 
And  the  one  who  can  not  recall  what  he  knows,  at  the  moment, 
is  like  a  depositor  after  the  bank  is  shut. 

The  Ego  in  Consciousness.  —  Our  definition  of 
consciousness  implies  that  each  act  of  consciousness 
has  two  sides;  one  relates  to  the  thing  known,  the 
other  relates  to  the  Ego  as  knowing.  But  attention 
may  be  directed  more  fully  to  the  one  or  to  the  other. 
The  expression  "  I  am  conscious  that  I  see,"  may  in- 
dicate to  which  side  the  attention  is  directed,  by  the 
word  on  which  the  emphasis  is  placed.  Place  the 
emphasis   on  the   last  word,   and  note  the  meaning; 


GENERAL   POWERS,— CONSCIOUSNESS 


35 


now  place  it  on  next  to  the  last  word,  and  note  the 
striking  difference  in  meaning. 

All  consciousness  is  of  necessity  self-consciousness, 
but,  when  undue  attention  is  given  to  the  Ego,  we 
have  what  is  commonly  called  self-consciousness,  or 
abnormal  consciousness.  Every  thoughtful  person 
knows  how  much  such  consciousness  of  self  interferes 
with  our  best  performances,  and  how  ridiculous  and 
contemptible  it  sometimes  makes  one  appear.  Eor- 
get  self,  if  you  would  do  your  best  before  your  fellows. 
Such  unfortunate  and  mischievous  consciousness  of 
self  may  be  due: — 

1.  To  morbid  "sensitiveness",  —  the  result  of  he- 
redity  or  of  bad  education. 

2.  To  a  real,  or  supposed,  feeble  or  morbid  condi- 
tion of  the  body. 

3.  To  undue  pride,  vanity,  or  self-love. 

4.  To  a  knowledge  of  personal  defect,  ignorance, 
or  unworthiness. 

Can  Consclgusness  be  Cultivated? — Conscious- 
ness is  not  under  control  of  the  will,  —  it  can  "pro- 
duce" nothing.  Hence,  to  speak  of  its  products  or 
its  cultivation,  seems  to  be  an  abuse  of  language. 


■^c3k®>c. 


CHAPTER  IV 

GENERAL    POWERS, ATTENTION   AND    CONCEPTION 

EFINITIO^ .  —  AUaitwu  is  the  poiver  the 
mind  has  to  bring  all  its  force  to  bear  on 
one  tiling. 

Important  as  this  power  is,  it  pro- 
duces no  result  alone,  and  of  itself. 
Hence,  it  is  not  to  be  considered  a  faculty,  although 
it  is  under  the  control  of  the  will. 

When  we  say  that  attention  is  nnder  the  control  of  the  will, 
we  do  not  mean  that  it  never  acts  except  in  obedience  to  a 
mandate  of  the  will,  but  simply  that  the  will  can  cause  it  to 
act.  The  same  is  true  of  other  voluntary  powers  ;  we  often  re- 
member without  willing  to  do  so,  but  memory  can  be  moved 
by  the  will. 

Mode  of  Action.  —  If  it  be  asked  how  the  mind 
turns  its  force  to  one  thing  in  an  act  of  attention, 
the  answer  seems  to  be  that  it  is  done  by  not  allow- 
ing the  mental  force  to  move  towards  anything  else. 
This  restraining,  or  limiting,  of  the  mental  force  is 
the  act  of  attention. 

Illustration. — ^The  mental  current  may  be  compared 
to  a  stream  of  water — it  flows  constantly.      In  revery 
and  absence  of  attention,  it  is  like  that  stream  flow- 
ing   down   the  mountain  side,   and   spreading,   unre- 
(36) 


ATTENTION  AND  CONCEPTION  37 

stricted,  over  the  meadows ;  it  may  be  pleasant 
enough,  but  it  does  no  work.  When  one  wishes  to 
put  the  stream  to  work,  he  puts  a  dam  across  it,  and 
allows  no  place  of  escape,  except  at  the  point  where 
he  puts  his  wheel.  So  we  put  the  mind  to  work  by 
confining  the  mental  force  to  one  point  of  escape. 
If  we  can  do  this  completely,  the  attention  is  per- 
fect,—  no  force  is  lost;  if  not,  the  power  in  part  es- 
capes, like  lost  water  through  a  leaky  dam. 

Meanings  of  the  Word. — When  we  speak  of  At- 
tention, we  always  have  reference  to  the  direction  in 
which  the  force  and  activity  of  the  mind  are  turned. 
It  may  be  spontaneous,  —  it  is  always  so  in  the  case 
of  the  child,  —  as  when  something  attracts  us  power- 
fully; or  as  in  the  case  of  revery  or  day-dreaming, 
although  the  lat-ter  is  often  called  lack  of  attention. 
Or  the  attention  may  be  voluntar>^  as  when  one  reso- 
lutely sets  himself  to  the  performance  of  a  task.  We 
properly  mean,  however,  by  attention,  cither  the 
power  of  the  mind  to  direct  its  course  by  the  force 
of  the  will,  or  the  act  which  this  power  thus  performs. 
There  is  a  close  connection  between  interest  and  at- 
tention ;  it  is  very  easy  to  attend  to  anything  that  in- 
terests us  deeply.  Interest  may  even  compel  us  to 
attend  against  our  will.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if, 
through  a  sense  of  duty  we  oblige  ourselves  to  at- 
tend to  that  which  does  not  interest  us  at  present, 
interest  is  very  sure  to  follow.  Attention  is  al\va>s 
due  to  interest  or  will,  or  to  both. 

The  word  "attention"  is  often  used  to  signify  the  mind's  force 
itself,  rather  than  the  power  of  the  will  over  it;  as  when  one 
says,  "Give  your  whole  attention  to  this  subject." 


38  elements  of  psychology 

Power  of  the  Will  over  the  Mind's  Action. — 
In  what  respects  has  the  will  power  over  the  mind's 
activities?  First,  it  may  arouse  and  incite  the  mind 
to  activity;  or,  in  other  words,  the  mind  may  arouse 
itself  through  the  action  of  the  will.  Secondly,  the 
mind  may  direct  the  course  of  its  activity,  by  will- 
power; this  is  properly  the  power  of  attention. 

And  one  who  has  complete  control  of  himself  in 
this  respect,  can  call  off  his  mental  forces  from  any 
object  with  the  same  readiness  that  he  can  direct 
them  towards  any  object. 

The  true  conception  of  the  operation  of  the  will  in  an  act  of 
attention  seems  to  be,  not  that  the  will  seizes  the  mind's  powers 
and  turns  them  towards  a  certain  object  as  the  hand  uses  a 
crow-bar,  but  that  the  will  prevents  the  mental  force  from 
moving  in  any  but  the  desired  direction,  as  in  the  illustration 
just  given.  And,  in  consequence,  the  mental  force,  by  virtue 
of  its  own  essential  activity,  goes  in  the  way  desired.  This 
"  liquid  theory,"  if  we  may  so  call  it,  seems  to  be  preferable  to 
the  "  crow-bar  theory." 

Ment-'^l  Activity  without  Attention?  —  There 
can  be  no  mental  activity  without  some  expenditure 
of  the  mind's  force  in  a  certain  direction ;  hence,  there 
must  be  some  degree  of  attention.  Some  of  our  ac- 
tivities are  thoroughly  habitual ;  in  such  cases,  there 
is  no  attention,  for  there  is  no  niaita/  activity,  —  the 
movements  are  purely  automatic.  For  instance,  take 
the  case  of  a  mechanic  at  familiar  work,  of  a  person 
walking  and  reading,  or  of  a  musician  playing  a  tune 
and  talking  with  a  friend  at  the  same  time. 

Can  we  Attend  to  More  than  one  Thing  at  a 
Time?  —  Much  has  been  said  on  this  question;  many 
learned  men  have  declared  in  the  negative.     They  as- 


ATTENTION   AND   CONCEPTION  39 

sert  that,  in  cases  where  the  mind  seems  to  attend  to 
more  than  one  thing,  the  fact  is  that  the  mind  vibrates 
rapidly  from  one  to  the  other ;  and  they  tell  us  that, 
in  the  comparing  of  two  objects,  we  can  detect  this 
vibratory  movement.  They  seem  to  be  clearly  wrong. 
In  a  case  of  perfect  attention,  the  mind's  forces  are  all 
brought  to  bear  on  one  thing,  but  experience  shows 
that  in  imperfect  attention  the  mental  force  is  divided ; 
in  the  case  of  comparing,  no  conclusion  could  ever  be 
reached,  if,  in  the  vibration,  only  one  of  the  objects 
was  the  point  of  attention.  The  mind  must  have 
both  before  it,  in  order  to  decide. 

Every  one  must  have  observed  that  in  readinej  or  conversa- 
tion there  is  often  an  under-current  of  thought  passing  in  liis 
mind,  of  which  he  is  vividly  conscious. 

Objects  of  Attention.  —  As  attention  has  refer- 
ence to  all  the  mind's  activities  or  force,  and  as  the 
word  often  means  the  mental  force  itself,  of  course  the 
objects  of  attention  will  include  everything  on  which 
mental  force  can  be  made  to  bear. 

Can  be  Cultivated. — As  the  will  has  the  power 
to  direct  the  attention,  attention  can  be  cultivated; 
and  the  success  of  a  student  will  be  almost  projior- 
tioned  to  the  degree  of  that  cultivation.  This  is 
equally  true  of  the  pupil  in  school,  and  of  the  pro- 
found scholar.  How  shall  it  be  done  ?  By  a  com- 
plete, continued,  persistent  exercise  of  sheer  will-power 
over  the  mind's  movements. 

In  order  that  a  teacher  may  be  of  any  service  to 
his  pupils,  he  must  have  the  power  to  secure  their 
attention.  For  securing  attention  in  recitation,  wc 
offer  the  following  rules: — 


40  ELEMENTS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Rules.  —  I.    Look  the  pupils  squarely  in  the  eye. 

2.  Say  nothing  till  you  have  the  attention  of  your 
class;  stop,  if  you  lose  it. 

3.  Talk  slowly  and  clearly. 

4.  Say  a  thing  but  once. 

5.  Hold  the  pupils  strictly  responsible  for  what  you 
have  said. 

6.  Do  not  put  questions  to  your  class  in  a  fixed 
order;  propound  the  question,  then  name  a  pupil  to 
answer  it.      Do  this  habitually. 

7.  When  the  class  need  such  discipline,  stop  the 
one  who  is  reading  or  reciting,  in  the  middle  of  a  sen- 
tence, and  require  another  to  begin  exactly  where  he 
left  off. 

Attention  of  little  children  must  accompany  every  successful 
mental  effort.  There  are  two  ways  in  which  the  man  may  be 
led  to  give  attention  :  one  is  by  attracting  it,  so  that  he  attends 
without  effort;  the  other,  by  inducing  him  to  attend  through 
sheer  force  of  his  will-power.  The  attention  of  the  child  can 
be  gained  in  the  first  way  only.  It  can  be  attracted  and  held 
for  a  short  time ;  but  his  will  is  not  strong  enough  to  enable 
him  to  attend  against  his  inclination,  nor  after  he  has  become 
weary.  And  yet  he  must  attend,  if  he  is  to  do  anything  to  any 
purpose.  Nor  can  his  attention  be  secured  by  frequent  calls 
for  attention,  nor  even  by  authority.  It  must  be  attracted  at 
first,  and  its  object  must  be  changed  frequently.  It  is  a  grad- 
ual process,  by  which  he  gets  the  power  to  comtnattd  /its  a/tin- 
Hon,  and  this  power  must  be  gained  by  a  judicious  course  of 
training. 

To  the  teacher  there  is  no  subject  more  important  than  this 
of  attention.  Dr.  Rosenkranz  says:  "To  education,  the  con- 
ception of  attention  is  the  most  important  of  all  those  derived 
from  Psychology." 

Conception.  —  It  is  not  easy  to  frame  a  short  sat- 
isfactory definition  for  Conception,  but  there  is  little 


ATTENTION  AND  CONCEPTION  4 1 

difficulty  in  naming  the  particular  things  that  it  docs. 
It  is  the  power  by  which  we  see  with  the  "mind's 
eye"  absent  objects;  by  which  we  perceive  the  ab- 
stract relations  of  things ;  by  which  we  get  clear  no- 
tions through  discourse  or  thinking;  by  which  we 
understand  why  and   how  things  may  be,  etc. 

When  a  teacher,  after  explaining  a  problem  in  algebra,  asks 
the  pupil  if  he  "  sees  it,"  he  means  to  ask  if  it  is  clear  to  his 
conception ;  of  course,  he  has  no  reference  to  the  act  of  sight. 

Perhaps  the  best  short  statement  for  Conception,  is 
to  say  that  //  is  the  power  by  xvhicJi  we  see  ivitJi  the 
''mind's  eye."  When  we  conceive  of  a  thing  fully, 
we  see  all  around  it,  as  it  were ;  we  become  acquainted 
with  all  its  limitations;  we  "take  it  in";  we  compre- 
hend it.  But  we  often  apprehend  things  that  we  can 
not  comprcJiend ;  just  as  one  may  see  something  of  a 
mountain  when  much  of  it  is  hidden  in  clouds. 

We  must  not  limit  the  possibility  of  things  by  our  power  to 
comprehend  them.  Many  possible  things  are  inconceivable  ; 
for  instance,  the  matter  of  this  earth  must  have  been  created 
out  of  nothing,  or  it  must  always  have  existed  in  some  form, 
without  any  beginning  ;  both  these  things  are  utterly  inconceiv- 
able, and  yet  not  only  is  one  of  them  possible,  but  it  is  certain. 
On  the  other  hand,  some  impossible  things  are  perfectly  con- 
ceivable, as  the  passage  of  a  flying  ship  to  the  moon. 

Not  a  Faculty.  —  Conception  is  largely  under  the 
control  of  the  will,  but  it  accompanies  all  the  other 
mental  powers,  and  produces  no  specific  results  alone. 
Hence,  it  is  not  a  faculty. 

There  is  a  special  use  of  the  Conceptivc  power  in  forming 
abstract,  general  concepts  ;  for  instance,  when  tlie  ideas  of  sur- 
face limited  by  three  lines,  are  combined,  we  have  the  abstract, 
generalconcept  signified  by  the  word  "  triangle."  Tliiscomliina- 

P.sy.-4. 


42  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

tion  is  made  by  Conception  acting  with  the  Reflective  Power  ; 
such  a  use  of  the  Conceptive  Power  may  be  called  Logical  Con- 
ception.    More  will  be  said  of  this  hereafter. 

Meanings  of  the  Word.  —  Dr.  Haven  says,  "This 
term  (Conception)  has  been  employed  in  various  senses 
by  different  writers.  I  conceive  of  a  thing  when  I 
make  it  a  distinct  object  of  thought,  when  I  appre- 
hend it,  when  I  construe  it  to  myself  as  a  possible 
thing,  and  as  being  thus  and  thus.  This  form  of 
mental  activity  enters  more  or  less  into  all  our  mental 
operations;  it  is  involved  in  perception,  memory, 
imagination,  abstraction,  judgment,  reasoning,  etc. 
For  this  reason,  it  is  not  to  be  ranked  as  one  of,  and 
correlate  with,  these  several  specific  faculties." 

It  seems  to  us  that  these  statements  are  eminently 
just,  and  that  we  must  reckon  conception  as  a  general 
mental  power;  but  it  is  not  a  faculty,  for  the  reason 
given  by  Dr.  Haven. 

We  think  common  language  shows  that  in  the  minds  of  men 
in  o-eneral  there  is  such  a  conception  of  this  mental  power  as 
is  expressed  above.  Take  such  expressions  as  "  I  have  a  dis- 
tinct conception  of  his  personal  appearance," — "  I  have  no  con- 
ception how  that  can  be," — "This  is  my  conception  of  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statement,"  etc.  Common  language  is  the  expres- 
sion of  common  knowledge,  and  of  common  modes  of  thought ; 
and  it  often  deserves  great  weight  in  considering  a  thing  in  its 
scientific  aspect.  Note  what  is  said  on  page  i6,  about  common 
knowledge  and  scientific  knowledge. 

What  is  Conception? — From  Dr.  Haven's  state- 
ment of  the  several  uses  of  conception,  it  is  readily 
seen  that  a  short  and  comprehensive  definition  for  this 
power  is  not  easily  found.  We  venture  to  propose 
the  following,  as  a  tentative  definition :  Conception  is 
the  mind's  power  to  represent  things  to  itself. 


ATTENTION  AND  CONCEPTION  43 

What  is  a  Concept? — A  concept  is  a  product  of 
the  conceptive  power;  it  is  the  elementary  unit  of  the 
mind's  operations.  Or,  A  Concept  is  a  mental  product 
tvhosc  exp7'ession  is  a  single  term. 

The  concept  may  be  simple,  as  that  expressed  by  the  word 
"redness";  or  it  may  be  complex,  as  that  expressed  by  the 
words,  "A  man  in  uniform,  riding  rapidly,  on  a  spirited  black 
horse  ";  but  the  expression  makes  but  a  single  term  in  language. 

A  concept  of  an  object  of  sight  is  perhaps  the  most 
readily  recognized,  as  the  concept  of  an  absent  friend's 
face,  or  of  some  familiar  scene.  But  we  certainly 
have  concepts  of  sounds,  odors,  tastes,  sensations. 
Nor  are  our  concepts  by  any  means  confined  to  prod- 
ucts of  the  senses ;  we  have  concepts  of  all  our  mental 
activities  and  states.  We  also  have  concepts  of  the 
abstract  qualities  of  things,  as  well  as  of  relations  of 
all  kinds,  —  for  instances,  the  relation  of  eight  to 
twelve,  or  of  crime  to  ill-desert. 

Many  writers  use  the  words  "idea,"  "picture,"  "image," 
etc.,  where  we  would  use  the  word  "  concept.''  These  words  all 
refer  to  the  sense  of  sight.  "  Idea"  comes  from  a  Greek  word 
which  means  a  form  ;  hence,  these  words  may  do  very  well  for 
concepts  of  objects  of  sight,  but  they  are  not  strictly  appropriate 
when  applied  to  other  concepts.  "A  picture  of  an  odor"  is  a 
strange  use  of  words,  to  say  the  least. 

The  Concept,  an  Intellection. — We  may  readily 
form  a  concept  of  an  emotion  or  a  volition,  but  the 
concept  itself  is  a  pure  intellection.  Your  present 
concept  of  a  sorrow  felt  a  year  ago  is  not  sorrow,  is 
not  an  emotion.  It  may  give  rise  to  a  new  feeling  of 
sorrow,  or  you  may  have  learned  that  the  sorrow  was 
causeless,  and  so  have  no  present  feeling  in  regard  to 
it;  or,  again,  it  may  have  been  caused  by  something 


44  ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

which  turned  out  to  be  ludicrous,  and  so  it  now  may 
give  rise  to  a  feehng  of  mirth. 

Truth  of  Concepts.  —  Our  concepts  in  tliemselves 
are  neither  true  nor  false ;  we  can  predicate  nothing 
of  truth  or  falsity  concerning  them  till  we  have  some 
judgment  or  belief  respecting  them.  I  may  conceive 
of  a  horse  with  wings  of  silk ;  this  concept  is  neither 
true  nor  false.  But  if  I  judge,  or  believe,  that  such 
a  horse  really  exists,  it  is  quite  probable  that  my 
judgment  concerning  that  concept,  is  false. 

Logical,  or  General,  Concepts.  —  Many  writers 
attempt  to  confine  the  word  "  conception,"  exclusive- 
ly to  that  use  of  the  power  by  which  we  form  general, 
or  logical,  concepts.  But  very  few  of  them,  so  far  as 
we  have  observed,  fail  to  use  the  word  repeatedly  in 
their  -writings,  as  though  it  meant  what  we  have  ex- 
plained above;  we  think  they  show  in  this  way  their 
mistake  in  attempting  to  restrict  its  meaning  to  only 
one  of  its  uses. 

A  logical  concept,  such  as  is  expressed  by  the  word 
"man  "  or  the  word  "triangle,"  is  not  a  concept  of  an 
object,  but  of  a  bundle  of  attributes  that  belongs  to 
every  one  of  the  class  to  which  the  term  may  properly 
be  applied.  The  term  itself  serves  as  a  cord  or  strap 
to  hold  the  bundle  together. 

If  one  uses,  in  speaking  to  you,  the  phrase  "  a  man,"  he  asks 
you  to  respond  with  the  concept,  or  "image,"  of  an  individual 
man;  but  if  he  says  "man,"  he  asks  you  to  respond  with  a 
concept  of  a  bundle  of  qualities  common  to  all  men.  Rarely 
are  all  the  elements  of  such  a  concept  distinct  and  perfectly 
clear  in  the  mind  of  the  one  who  uses  the  term,  or  of  the  one  who 
hears  it ;  and  still  it  serves  very  well  for  ordinary  purposes. 
Were  it  not  so,  our  language  would  become  very  meager  and 


ATTENTION  AND  CONCEPTION  45 

very  barren.  Even  a  child,  who  could  do  little  or  nothing  to- 
wards analyzing  and  defining  the  general  concept  expressed 
by  the  word  "  cow,"  must  have  that  concept  in  his  mind  with 
some  fair  degree  of  distinctness.  How,  else,  could  he  place  an 
animal  in  the  class  "  cow,"  so  readily,  on  seeing  an  individual 
specimen  of  the  class? 

Cultivation  of  Conception. — The  will  has  great 
control  over  our  conceptions ;  hence,  the  power  can 
be  highly  cultivated,  both  in  its  common  use,  and 
in  its  use  to  form  and  analyze  general  and  logical  con- 
cepts. And  the  work  of  the  wise  and  earnest  teacher 
will  show  no  more  profitable  results  in  the  culture  of 
any  other  mental  power  of  his  pupils.  A  bright  mind 
is  one  whose  conceptive  power  is  clear  and  strong. 
Dullness  is  due  to  lack  of  this  power.  "  Parrot  "  reci- 
tations are  of  words  without  their  accompanying  con- 
cepts. Mechanical  reading  is  calling  over  words,  in 
this  way,  from  a  book.  Mechanical,  meaningless 
mathematical  work  is  the  bhnd  following  of  rules 
while  the  conceptive  power  is  asleep.  Much  of  our 
school  work,  we  are  sorry  to  say,  is  performed  in  such 
a  way  as  to  put  this  power  to  sleep;  and  the  more 
we  work  with  tongue,  or  pen,  or  hand  while  concep- 
tion sleeps,  the  more  soundly  it  will  sleep  while  we 
thus  work.  This  is  the  process  by  which  many  little 
children,  who  entered  school  bright,  keen,  and  inquis- 
itive, are  made  dull  and  stupid  after  attending  the 
school  for  a  few  months. 

A  really  "lively"  school  exercise  of  any  kind  is 
not  to  be  measured  by  the  noise  made,  nor  by  the 
amount  of  manual  activity;  but  by  the  fullness  and 
clearness  of  the  conceptive  power  used.  No  reading 
by  older  or  younger  pupils  will  be  correct, —  except. 


46 


ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 


perhaps,  with  the  correctness  of  mechanical  imita- 
tion,— until  conception  gives  life  to  the  words  spoken. 
No  Geography  lesson  is  worth  anything  that  does  not 
fill  the  mind  with  correct  and  lively  pictures.  No 
mathematical  work  is  anything  but  a  mechanical 
"grind"  till  the  pupil  "sees"  the  relation  of  the 
parts  with  his   "mind's  eye." 

Our  concepts  of  sensible  things  must  be  based  on  our  sense- 
perception  of  them ;  hence  the  importance  of  careful  and  cor- 
rect perceptions,  in  order  that  our  concepts  derived  from  them 
may  be  correct.  These  concepts  are  to  be  the  material  with 
which  the  mind  must  work,  in  all  its  thought  and  reflection 
concerning  objects  of  sense. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE    INTELLECT,  —  DEFINITIONS    AND    FIRST    PRINCIPLES 


HE  Intellect.  —  The  group  of  knowing 
powers,  or  the  Intellect,  is  subdivided 
into  four  groups;  viz.,  the  Prcsentativc 
Powers,  the  Representative  Powers,  the 
Reflective  Powers,  and  the  Intuitive 
Power.     This  division  is  exhaustive. 

TJie  Prcscntative  Powers  give  us  hioivlcdgc  of  the  out- 
side zvorld  tJu'ougJi  the  senses. 

The  Representative  Powers  give  us  concepts  of  absent 
objects. 

The  Reflective  Pozvers  show  us  the  relations  and  con- 
tie  ctions  of  objects,  or  of  their  concepts. 

The  Intuitive  Power  is  the  poiver  by  ivhich  %ve  knoio 
certain  findamental  things  luitJiout  being  taught. 

The  word  "object"  must  not  be  confined  to  material  tliin^js. 
When  we  say  that  these  powers  do  these  acts,  we  must  remem- 
ber that  the  powers  themselves  are  not  entities.  It  is  the  mind, 
— the  one  indivisible  mind, — that  performs  all  these  acts;  but 
its  power  to  do  one  thing  is  called  by  one  name,  and  its  power 
to  do  another  thing  is  called  by  another  name.  It  is  the  mind 
that  j)erceives  through  the  senses,  that  represents,  that  reflects, 
that  has  certain  ideas  and  thoughts  without  tcacliing. 

(47) 


48  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  Intuitive  Power.  —  Because  of  its  funda- 
mental character  and  the  intimate  relation  of  its  action 
and  products  to  the  other  intellectual  powers,  it  seems 
best  to  say  something  about  this  power  and  its  prod- 
ucts, before  we  proceed  to  speak  of  the  other  divis- 
ions of  the  Intellect. 

It  is  said  that  the  Intuitive  Power  acts  in  only  one 
way,  but  that  its  products  are  of  two  kinds.  By  this 
power,  we  have  certain  fundamental  notions,  ideas,  or 
concepts;  and  also  certain  necessary,  self-evident  truths. 
.  Some  assert  that  we  get  all  our  knowledge,  of  every  sort, 
through  experience  and  reflection ;  they  claim  that  this  is  as 
true  in  regard  to  what  we  have  called  the  ideas  and  truths  of 
intuition,  as  it  is  of  our  knowledge  of  the  qualities  of  objects. 
We  hold,  however,  that  observation  and  experience  merely 
furnish  an  occasion  for  this  kind  of  knowledge;  they  do  not 
cause  us  to  have  it. 

Truths.  —  Thus,  we  know  that  a  part  can  not  equal 
the  whole ;  we  know  that  the  same  thing  can  not  be 
in  two  places  at  the  same  time ;  we  know  that  a  state- 
ment can  not  be  both  true  and  not  true  at  the  same 
time  and  in  the  same  sense.  All  such  truths  every 
sane  and  sound  mind  knows  at  once,  as  soon  as  it  is 
capable  of  comprehending  clearly  what  is  said.  We 
•can  not  disbelieve  them,  if  we  try.  No  attempt  at 
proof  can  make  us  believe  them  any  more  firmly. 
In  fact,  no  proof  of  them  is  possible  ;  we  may  illustrate 
such  truths  by  individual  instances,  but  we  can  not 
demonstrate  them.  Many  of  these  truths  are  included 
in  the  axioms  of  mathematics;  but  there  are  axioms 
which  do  not  belong  to  mathematics. 

All  necessary,  self-evident  truths  have  these  three 
characteristics:    ist.   They  are   true   everywhere,  and 


THE   INTELLECT  49 

at  all  times ;  2d,  They  can  not  be  demonstrated  ;  3d, 
The  contradictory  of  any  one  of  them  is  manifestly 
absurd.  To  illustrate,  take  the  axiom  that  a  whole  is 
equal  to  the  sum  of  all  its  parts.  This  must  be  true 
everywhere,  and  it  must  be  true  at  all  times.  We 
may  illustrate  it,  —  that  is,  we  may  show  it  to  be  true 
in  any  given  case ;  but  we  can  not  prove  that  it  will 
always  be  true  in  every  case.  The  contradictory,  viz., 
that  the  whole  is  not  equal  to  the  sum  of  all  its  parts, 
is  seen  to  be  absurd  at  once  by  any  one  capable  of 
understanding  the  statement. 

Ideas.  —  Philosophers  do  not  agree  as  to  the  num- 
ber of  fundamental  ideas  given  us  by  Intuition.  We 
may  safely  say  that  there  are  seven  of  them,  at  least; 
viz.,  Being,  Time,  Space,  Beauty,  Cause,  Right,  and 
Personal  Identity. 

Being. —  By  the  intuitive  idea  of  Being,  we  mean 
that  all  men  naturally  and  always  believe  in  the  ex- 
istence of  themselves  and  of  other  things.  None 
but  crazy  men  and  some  philosophers  ever  think  or 
talk  as  if  there  could  be  any  doubt  about  this. 

Time.  —  The  intuitive  idea  of  Time  is  the  nec- 
essary notion  of  time  as  passing  whenever  we  think 
of  the  occurrence  of  events.  We  can  not  rid  our- 
selves of  this  idea;  in  thought  we  may  empty  time 
of  every  event,  but  we  can  not  think  the  time  away. 
In  respect  to  definite  amounts  of  time,  we  exerci.sc 
our  judgment  and  experience ;  but  the  idea  that  there 
must  be  some  amount  of  time,  is  intuitive. 

Space. — The  intuitive  idea  of  Space  is  very  .similar; 

when  we  think  of  bodies,  we  are  compelled  to  think 

of  them  as  existing  in  space.    Wc  judge  of  the  amount 
T'-y  -5- 


50  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  space  in  any  particular  instance,  but  we  can  not 
get  rid  of  the  idea  that  space  is,  and  must  be ;  we  can 
empty  it  in  thought,  but  we  can  not  think  it  away, 
nor  think  of  it  as  finite. 

Beauty.  —  The  intuitive  idea  of  Beauty  is  that  there 
is,  and  must  be,  such  a  thing  as  beauty ;  or,  in  other 
words,  that  some  things  are  beautiful  and  some  are 
not.  The  child  shows  that  he  has  this  idea  very  early ; 
"pretty"  is  one  of  his  first  words.  The  judgment 
decides  as  to  the  beauty  of  any  particular  thing,  and 
the  decisions  differ  very  widely. 

Cause.  —  We  believe  intuitively  that  every  effect 
must  have  a  cause ;  the  child  shows  that  this  idea  is 
inherent  by  his  questions  "Why?"  "What  makes 
it?"  etc.  A  cause  that  is  not  itself  caused  is  incon- 
ceivable to  him ;  is  it  not  beyond  the  comprehension 
of  any  one?  Judgment  pronounces  as  to  what  the 
cause  is,  in  a  particular  case. 

It  is  highly  important  that  we  do  not  confound  the  occasion 
of  a  thing  with  its  cause.  The  occasion  of  a  thing  allows  it  to 
be  or  to  be  done ;  the  cause  makes  it  to  be  or  to  be  done.  To 
illustrate  :  The  expansive  force  of  steam  is  the  cause  of  motion 
in  the  locomotive;  the  opening  of  the  valve,  or  throttle,  is  the 
occasion  of  the  motion. 

Right.  —  The  idea  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
Right,  —  that  some  things  are  right,  and  others  are 
wrong,  —  seems  to  be  intuitive.  "Is  it  right?"  is  a 
question  that  has  a  meaning  to  a  very  young  child; 
parents  and  teachers  would  do  better  to  ask  it  more 
frequently.  Judgment  decides  whether  a  specific 
thing  is  right  or  not.  As  in  the  other  cases  named, 
these  decisions  vary  greatly. 


THE  INTELLECT  51 

Personal  Identity.  —  No  sane  person  can  divest  him- 
self of  the  idea  that  he  is  himself,  —  the  same  person- 
ality that  he  always  has  been.  It  is  intuitive;  he  is 
conscious  that  it  is  so,  and  that  is  the  end  of  all 
question.  Nor  would  the  testimony  of  a  thousand 
strengthen  his  conviction. 

We  may  say  that  a  knowledge  of  these  fundamental, 
intuitive  truths  and  ideas,  is  innate;  that  is,  we  are  so 
constituted  at  birth  that,  as  soon  as  the  occasion  arises 
for  this  knowledge,  we  have  it,  and  that  without  any 
instruction  or  study.  And  we  take  it  for  granted  that 
every  one  else  has  this  knowledge  the  same  as  we 
have;  we  pronounce  one  an  idiot,  or  insane,  if  he  ia 
lacking  in  this  respect.  For,  a  recognition  of  these 
products  of  Intuition  constitutes  what  we  call  natural 
reason.  Reason,  as  we  here  use  it,  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  the  Power  of  reasoning;  some  insane 
people  can  reason  most  logically,  but  they  have  lost 
their  reason,  as  they  show  in  various  ways. 

OBSERVATIONS  ON    THF,    INTELLECT 

Tlie  Mind  knoius  by  its  ozun  Activity. —  A  writci 
truly  says,  "Every  concept  or  idea  is  formed  in  the 
mind  that  possesses  it,  by  the  mind's  own  activity.  It 
is  not  received;  it  is  produced."  A  skillful  teacher 
will  cause  a  pupil  to  know  what  he  did  not  know  be- 
fore. But  he  does  this,  not  by  transferring  his  own 
concepts  and  thoughts  to  the  learner,  but  by  causing 
the  learner  to  produce  in  his  own  mind  the  same  con- 
cepts and  thoughts  that  are  in  the  teacher's  mind. 
Hence,  knowledge  can  not  be  imparted,  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word ;  it  can  only  be  induced,  or  awak- 


52  elemp:nts  of  psychology 

ened.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  knowledge  differs 
wonderfully  from  money  or  material  goods,  in  that  the 
one  who  imparts  it  has  no  less  than  he  had  before. 
The  wonder  disappears  when  we  see  that  knowledge 
is  never  imparted  at  all.  The  mind  that  gets  knowl- 
edge must  produce  it  for  itself,  under  proper  condi- 
tions and  with  proper  helps.  This  is  a  fundamental 
principle  of  mental  acquisition  that  no  teacher  can 
ignore  without  disastrous  consequences;  some  of  the 
greatest  evils  in  our  schools  are  due  to  the  false  no- 
tion that  words  convey  knowledge. 

What  the  Jmman  Mind  is  Like. — On  the  one  hand, 
the  human  mind  is,  in  some  of  its  aspects,  like  the 
minds  of  intelligent  animals.  There  seems  to  be  the 
clearest  evidence  that  the  mind  of  a  horse  or  a  dog  per- 
ceives through  the  senses  much  as  a  human  mind  does; 
and  some  of  the  acts  of  animals  in  remembering  seem 
to  be  exactly  like  similar  acts  of  memory  in  man.  But 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  animal  can  perform  the 
higher  acts  of  abstraction  and  reasoning,  nor  that  he 
has  an  intuition  of  right,  nor  any  sense  of  obligation, 
nor  any  conscience,  nor  any  religious  capacity. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  man  can  under- 
stand the  laws  of  nature,  that  he  can  in  some  cases 
demonstrate  their  necessity  by  mathematical  formulae, 
seems  to  show  very  clearly  that  man's  mind  is  akin 
to  the  Mind  that  made  and  governs  the  Universe. 
Who  can  doubt  that  the  old  astronomer  was  right, 
when  he  said,  "Oh,  my  God,  I  think  thy  thoughts 
after  Thee!"  Any  student  of  natural  science  who 
clearly  comprehends  one  of  its  laws,  thinks  the 
thoughts  of  God  after  him, —  in  some  degree,  at  least. 


THE   INTELLECT  53 

Three  Steps  in  the  Intellectual  Proeess.  —  The  mind 
gathers  the  crude  material  of  its  knowledge  by  the 
use  of  the  perceptive  powers.  The  exercise  of  sense- 
perception  is  also  the  occasion  of  the  development 
of  those  fundamental  ideas  and  truths  which  the  mind 
has  through  the  intuitive  power.  Conception  after- 
wards brings  before  the  mind  the  concepts  of  that 
knowledge  which  has  been  gathered  by  the  use  of 
the  perceptive  powers.  Then,  by  the  reflective 
power,  or  the  "  Elaborative  Faculty,"  the  significa- 
tion, the  relation,  and  the  use  of  what  has  been  gath- 
ered, are  discovered.  The  three  steps,  then,  are  Per- 
ception, Conception,  and  Reflection,  or  Thinking, 
as  that  word  is  used  by  philosophers.  It  is  an  old 
saying  that,  "There  is  nothing  in  the  Intellect  that 
was  not  first  in  the  Sense."  This  is  very  true,  if  we 
except  the  products  of  intuition,  or  the  "Natural 
Reason."  All  the  highest  thoughts  of  the  philoso- 
pher or  the  poet  have  been  elaborated  from  the  crude 
material  obtained  through  sense-perception.  A  failure 
to  recognize  these  three  necessary  steps  in  their  order 
is  the  reason  why  so  many  teachers  are  vainly  striv- 
ing to  build  up  conceptions  or  to  induce  reasoning  in 
the  minds  of  their  pupils,  by  the  use  of  mere  words 
which  have  never  been  filled  with  meaning  through 
a  proper  use  of  the  perceptive  powers. 

Mr.  Tate  says,  "All  our  knowledge  is  derived  from  thri-c 
sources;  Vxz.,  sensation,  reflection,  and  \X\q  primitive  laws  in- 
volved in  our  mental  operations."  By  the  last,  he  means  the 
ideas  and  truths  given  to  us  by  Intuition  ;  that  is,  by  the  very 
nature  of  the  mind  itself. 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE  PRESENTATIVE    POWERS,   OR  THE    SENSES 

HE  Presentative  Powers.  — The  Pre- 
sentative  Powers,  often  called  the  Per- 
ceptives,  seem  to  get  their  name  in  this 
way:  Since  the  days  of  the  old  Greeks, 
men  have  divided  the  Universe  for  every 
man,  into  the  Ego  and  the  Non-Ego;  the  Ego  is  the 
man  himself,  and  the  Non-Ego  includes  everything 
except  himself  The  Presentative  Powers,  or  the 
senses,  present,  as  it  were,  the  things  of  the  Non-Ego 
to  the  Ego,  shut  up,  as  he  seems  to  be,  somewhere 
in  this  bodily  tenement.  They  are  a  kind  of  "  intro- 
duction committee." 

The  Senses.  —  The  senses  are  commonly  said  to  b^, 
five  in  number : —  Feeling,  or  the  sense  of  touch.  See- 
ing, Hearing,  Tasting,  and  Smelling.  To  these,  some 
philosophers  add  a  sixth  sense,  which  they  call  the 
Sense  of  Resistance  to  Muscular  Effort. 

Feeling  is  the  most  general  of  all  the  senses,  as  it 
extends  over  the  whole  body,  wherever  the  nerves 
are  found.  There  is  some  propriety  in  saying  that 
the  other  senses  are  modifications  of  feeling,  because 
they  all  require  special  nerves  for  their  action.      All 


THE  PRESENTATIVE   POWERS,  OR  THE  SENSES       55 

these  special  nerves  are  located  in  the  head.  Two  of 
the  senses,  seeing  and  hearing,  in  addition  to  the  spe- 
cial nerves,  also  require  curiously  constructed  organs. 
Most  of  the  words  used  to  designate  the  powers  of  the  mind, 
may  also  signify  the  acts  which  the  powers  perform,  and  often 
the  products  of  the  acts  ;  thus,  Feehng  may  mean  the  power  to 
feel,  or  the  act  of  feeling.  The  same  is  true  of  Memory, 
Judgment,  etc.  Whenever  we  use  one  of  these  words,  we  do 
vvell  to  think  carefully  whether  we  mean  by  it  the  power,  or 
the  act  which  that  power  is  able  to  perform. 

The  sense  of  feeling  makes  us  acquainted  with  such 
objects  only  as  are  close  to  us.  It  also  acts  slowly, 
from  the  parts  to  the  whole ;  this  is  illustrated  by  the 
actions  of  a  blind  man  as  he  studies  objects  that  he 
handles.  We  all  act  in  a  similar  way  when  we  grope 
in  the  dark ;  hence,  feeling  has  two  limitations. 

Seeing  is  very  different;  it  shows  us  objects  that 
are  near  or  very  distant,  and  it  acts  rapidly ;  it  gives 
us  notions  of  things  as  wholes  at  first,  and  afterwards 
studies  their  parts.  The  special  nerves  of  sight  are 
called  the  optic  nerves.  But  sight  can  not  act  wlien 
light  is  absent,  nor  when  the  rays  are  obstructcil  b)- 
opaque  objects;  hence,  sight  has  two  limitations. 

Hearing.  —  The  medium  through  which  we  hear 
must  always  be  present  where  life  is  possible,  for  it  is 
the  air  we  breathe;  nor  do  intervening  objects  wholly 
prevent  our  hearing.  No  other  sense  affects  the  emo- 
tions .so  quickly  or  so  deeply  as  hearing;  this  is  .seen 
in  the  effects  of  music,  and  of  the  tones  of  the  voice. 
The  auditory  nerve  is  the  special  nerve  of  hearing. 

The  senses  we  have  considered  make  us  acciuainlcd  with  llio 
size,  shape,  position,  resonance,  etc.,  of  bodies;  in  other  words 
with  such  qualities  of  bodies  as  have  relation  to  s/>aci\ 


56  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Tasting  and  Smelling. — But  tastinir  and  smelling-, 
by  means  of  the  gustatory  and  olfactory  nerves,  enable 
us  to  learn  much  of  the  composition  and  condition  of 
bodies.  We  judge  by  the  use  of  these  senses  whether 
substances  are  fit  to  be  taken  into  our  organism  or 
not.  Hence,  the  special  nerves  for  these  senses  are 
found  in  the  mouth  and  nose,  the  gateways  to  the 
stomach  and  lungs. 

Sense  of  Resistance. — When  you  allow  an  object 
merely  to  touch  your  hand,  you  simply  feel  it;  but 
when  you  let  it  rest  upon  your  hand,  and  put  forth 
muscular  effort  to  sustain  it,  your  sense  seems  to  give 
you  something  besides  simple  feeling;  you  have  a 
sense  of  something  resisting  your  muscular  effort. 
This  is  why  some  philosophers  say  that  there  is  a 
sixth  sense ;  and  they  say  that  no  other  sense  makes 
us  know  so  soon  and  so  certainly  that  there  are  ob- 
jects outside  of  our  own  organism. 

Teachers  can  teach  young  children  a  great  many  truths  about 
the  "five  senses,"  but  they  had  better  say  nothing  to  them 
about  the  sixth  sense.  Children  should  understand  that  it  is 
the  mind  that  acts  through  these  nerves  and  organs  of  the 
senses.  The  eye  does  not  see;  but  the  mind  sees  by  means  of 
the  eye,  using  it  as  an  instrument. 

Because  the  Sense  of  Resistance  to  Muscular  Effort  is  not  re- 
garded by  all  as  a  separate  sense,  distinct  from  mere  feeling, 
we  have  placed  an  interrogation  mark  after  it  in  the  Scheme. 

More  about  the  Senses.  —  Having  briefly  defined 
each  of  the  senses,  it  is  now  proper  that  we  study  them 
more  closely,  to  ascertain  their  mode  of  action,  and 
to  see  exactly  what  we  derive  from  their  use. 

Sense- Perception.  —  This  is  the  foundation  of  all 
our  knowledge,  or  mental  activity,    (i)  Because  men- 


THE  PRESENTATIVI':  IHJWERS,  OR    THE  SENSES       57 

tal  activity  begins  with  sense-perception  ;  (2)  Because 
sense-perception  furnishes  the  crude  material  for  all 
our  mental  activity,  as  has  just  been  said.  A  study 
of  a  baby  will  soon  convince  one  that  the  first  signs 
of  mental  activity  appear  in  the  use  of  his  senses. 
Probably  the  first  step,  beyond  the  mere  cognizing  of 
impressions  on  the  nerves,  is  an  act  of  discrimina- 
tion,—  a  cognizing  of  differences. 

Were  an  infant  entirely  deprived  of  the  use  of  all 
his  senses,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  he  would 
ever  show  any  indication  that  he  possesses  a  mind. 
We  have  said  that  his  first  mental  act  is  a  cognizing 
of  impressions  on  the  nerves ;  that  is,  the  first  thing 
he  knows  is  a  sensation. 

A  sensation  is  a  cognised  affection  of  the  neroes. 

Conditions  of  Perception.  —  (i)  There  must  be  a 
perceiving  mind.  (2)  This  mind  must  be  connected 
with  a  nervous  organism,  that  can  be  affected  by  the 
external  world.  (3)  There  must  be  an  external  world 
—  the  Non-Ego  —  to  affect  the  sentient  organism. 
(4)  The  external  world  must  affect  the  nervous  or- 
ganism. (5)  The  affection  must  be  cognized  and  in- 
terpreted by  the  mind.  If  any  one  of  these  five  con- 
ditions be  wanting,  no  perception  is  possible. 

Wliat  Each  Sense  Gives. — The  acquisition  \\\\\c\\ 
the  mind  gains  through  each  of  the  sen.ses  is  distinct 
and  separate  from  anything  acquired  by  the  use  of 
any  other  sense. 

Touch  gives  us  tactual  sensation,  or  fee/in^,  with 
all  its  varieties. 

Sight  gives  us  a  knowledge  of  co/or,  with  all  its  va- 
rieties. 


58  ELEMIiXTS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

Hearing  gives  us  sound,  with  all  its  varieties. 

Taste  gives  us  savor,  with  all  its  varieties. 

Smell  gives  us  odor,  w^ith  all  its  varieties. 

All  the  knowledge  that  the  mind  gets  directly 
through  the  "five  senses"  is  included  in  these  five 
short  statements. 

Is  It  Much  or  Little?  —  From  the  above  bald 
statement  of  the  case,  it  might  seem  at  first  as  though 
we  get  but  little  through  the  senses ;  but,  if  we  will 
reflect  upon  the  vast  amount  that  is  implied  in  the 
phrase,  "all  its  varieties,"  we  shall  see  that  our  ac- 
quisitions through  sense  are  not  small.  At  any  rate, 
they  are  all  we  have;  and  they  are  enough. 

But  Dr.  Hopkins  maintains  that,  if  we  had  only 
what  these  senses  would  receive,  were  w^e  deprived 
of  motion,  and  the  senses  were  passively  acted  upon 
by  the  outer  world,  we  could  never  know  that  there 
is  an  outer  world,  —  a  Non-Ego;  we  could  not  deter- 
mine that  our  knowledge  relates  to  anything  objective. 

But  when  we  exercise  our  power  of  motion  in  con- 
nection with  sense-perception,  we  begin  to  be  aware 
of  the  Non-Ego  as  affecting  us.  This  knowledge  of 
the  Non-Ego  comes  first  and  most  powerfully  through 
the  sense  of  resistance  to  muscular  effort, — a  sense 
which  would  be  impossible  without  the  power  to 
move.  Motion  also  reveals  the  Non-Ego  by  the  sense 
of  feeling,  as  when  we  put  one  finger  on  some  part 
of  the  body,  and  another  finger  on  a  stone ;  in  one 
case  the  sensation  is  double,  in  the  other  it  is  single. 
Motion,  also,  enables  us  to  decide  that  colors,  sounds, 
odors,  and  savors  belong  to  the  external  world,  and 
are  not  merely  subjective  affections  of  our  organism. 


THE    PRESENTATIVE  POWERS,  OR  THE  SENSES       59 

That  is,  the  outer  world  is  revealed  to  us  when  the 
mind  begins  to  act  upon  it,  but  not  so  long  as  wc 
passively  receive  impressions  from  without. 

Probably,  the  infant's  first  impressions  are  not  dis- 
tinguished as  having  any  connection  with  anything 
outside  of  his  organism ;  but  he  soon  begins  to  act 
upon  the  external  world,  and  gradually  to  discover 
the  sources  of  his  sensations.  In  the  adult,  his  senses 
have  so  long  acted  together,  and  in  connection  with 
his  power  to  move,  that  it  is  a  little  difficult  to  dis- 
tinguish what  each  sense  gives  alone,  or  to  realize 
how  much  he  would  be  limited,  were  he  deprived  of 
the  power  to  move. 

Direct  and  Acquired  Perceptions. —  So  true  is 
this  that,  in  common  language,  we  are  accustomed 
to  say  that  we  perceive  directly,  through  one  sense, 
all  that  we  are  enabled  to  know  from  what  that  sense 
gives  us  when  interpreted  by  all  the  light  of  former 
experience,  aided  by  other  senses.  We  say  that  we 
perceive  a  rose  by  the  smell,  or  "We  smell  a  rose." 
All  that  we  smell  is  the  odor;  the  rest  we  know 
through  experience.  One  may  say,  "I  hear  Mr. 
Brown's  wagon,  driving  rapidly  towards  the  south, 
and  it  is  empty."  Does  he  perceive  all  this  through 
his  hearing?  All  that  he  hears  is  a  peculiar  sound; 
the  rest   he  knows  from  experience. 

Sense  oe  Touch.— It  is  usually  said  that  four 
things  are  involved  in  a  perception  through  the  sense 
of  touch.  These  are:  (i)  Simple  sensation;  (2)  Cog- 
nition of  its  character;  (3)  Reference  to  tlie  part  of 
the  body  affected  ;  (4)  Cognition  of  the  object  touchcil. 
These   do    not   differ  psychologically;  that  is.  we  do 


6o  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

not  have  one  of  them  without  the  others,  excepting 
that  the  fourth  is  sometimes  wanting.  But,  logically, 
they  are  different  steps  in  the  complex  process ;  that 
is,  each  may  be  a  subject  of  separate  thought. 

It  is  commonly  said,  too,  that  these  steps  do  not  differ  chron- 
ologically,— that  they  are  synchronous.  But,  in  a  case  where 
the  perception  is  violently  painful,  it  would  seem  that  there  is 
a  slight  difference  in  the  time  of  these  four  steps.  Suppose  one 
to  step  with  the  bare  foot  on  a  hot  iron;  he  exclaims,  "Oh,  I 
burned  my  foot  on  the  iron."  Is  there  not  a  perceptible  differ- 
ence in  the  time  of  the  four  steps,  as  expressed  by  the  order  in 
which  his  words  are  pronounced  ?  First,  there  is  a  violent 
sensation  of  pain,  expressed  by  "Oh";  next,  the  sensation  is 
cognized  as  a  burn;  then  it  is  referred  to  \}nQ.foot;  lastly,  the 
cause  of  the  trouble  is  referred  to. 

Sensation  and  Cognition. — In  every  perception, — 
by  touch  or  by  any  other  sense,  —  there  are  involved 
an  affection  of  the  nerves,  —  a  sensation,  —  and  a  cog- 
nition and  interpretation  of  that  affection. 

It  has  been  said  that  these  two  bear  an  inverse  ra- 
tio to  each  other,  and  the  remark  is  doubtless  true, 
to  a  certain  extent.  An  overpowering  light,  sound, 
odor,  or  taste  has  a  mastery  over  us  to  such  a  degree 
that  the  intellectual  element  in  the  perception  be- 
comes very  small.  On  the  other  hand,  we  may  sup- 
pose a  philosopher  so  intent  in  studying  a  painful  ex- 
periment upon  himself,  as  to  become  almost  uncon- 
scious of  the  pain.  For  instance,  he  might  allow  a 
bee  to  sting  him,  and  be  so  much  interested  in  com- 
paring the  sensation  he  feels  with  some  other  remem- 
bered sensation,  as  hardly  to  feel  the  pain  of  the  sting. 

This  seems  to  be  merely  an  example  of  the  general 
truth  that  intense  feelino-  and  intense  thoug^ht  can  not 


THE  PRKSI-.NTAlIVIi   PCAVKRS,  OR  TUE  SF.NSKS        6l 

CO  exist.  One  partially  or  completely  neutralizes  the 
other;  and  this  is  equally  true  whether  the  feeling  be 
a  sensation  of  the  nerves  or  pure  emotion — a  man 
violently  agitated  by  any  feeling  can  not  think  well. 

Is  THE  Body  Ego  or  Non-Ego? — We  have  seen 
that  every  act  of  perception  has  two  sides,  the  side  of 
sensation  and  the  side  of  cognition  or  interpretation. 
In  sensation  we  involuntarily  regard  the  body  as  Ego ; 
but,  so  far  as  cognition  is  concerned,  the  body  appears 
as  objective, — Non-Ego. 

Questions  as  to  Sight. — Does  sight  give  direct 
knowledge  of  surface  ?  As  sight  gives  color,  and  as 
color  can  not  be  confined  to  a  point,  it  would  seem 
that  sight  necessarily  involves  the  notion  of  surface. 
Practiced  sight,  re-enforced  as  it  has  been  time  and  again 
by  the  testimony  of  the  other  senses,  not  only  gives 
notions  of  surface,  but  of  solidity.  Hence,  we  know 
or  infer  from  sight  alone,  that  a  body  is  a  sphere 
or  a  cube.  That  this  inference  is  due  simply  to  our 
perception  of  colors,  is  proved  by  the  deceptive  ap- 
pearance of  frescoes  and  other  paintings  which  have  a 
well-managed  blending  of  shades  and  perspective. 

Does  Sight  Give  Distance? —  This  question  is 
ambiguous.  If  it  means  to  ask  if  sight  gives  an  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  the  amount  of  distance,  the  an- 
swer is  clearly  in  the  negative;  only  after  long  expe 
rience  can  we  judge  accurately  of  distance,  l^ut,  it 
the  question  inquires  whether  we  see  objects  as  apart 
from  us,  the  answer  is  just  as  clearly  in  the  affirmative. 
The  infant  does  not  think  that  his  rattle  touches  his 
eye,  nor  has  the  chicken  any  doul)t  that  the  corn 
must  be  reached  after. 


62 


ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOEOGY 


Other  Questions.  —  The  image  upon  the  retina  of 
the  eye  is  inverted ;  and  it  is  asked  why  objects  are 
not  seen  inverted.  This  is  an  idle  question ;  until  we 
can  tell  how  we  become  cognizant  at  all  of  what  is 
pictured  on  the  retina,  it  is  not  worth  while  to  discuss 
the  peculiarities  of  that  cognizance. 

Having  two  eyes,  why  do  we  not  see  double  ?  We 
may,  if  we  hold  the  object  very  near  the  eyes,  or  if 
we  press  one  of  the  eye-balls  and  throw  the  axis  of 
the  eye  out  of  its  usual  position.  Ordinarily,  nature 
has  arranged  the  axes  so  that  the  images  appear  to 
coincide. 

Some  books  on  Psychology  give  many  pages  to  the 
discussion  of  these  questions ;  but  we  think  we  have 
said  all  about  them  that  needs  to  be  said  in  a  book 
on  mental  science. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    PRESENTATIVE    POWERS  —  CONCLUDED 

BOUT  Hearing.  —  It  has  been  said  that 
hearing  is  the  most  internal  sense.  This 
is  Hterally  true,  in  that  the  organ  of 
hearing  is  more  internal  than  the  organs 
or  nerves  of  the  other  senses.  But  it 
is  also  true  that  no  other  sense  has  such  power  to 
arouse  emotions.  A  groan  will  awaken  pity  in  one 
who  hears,  more  quickly  and  more  deeply  than  the 
signs  of  suffering  that  appeal  to  the  sight. 

Sounds  have  a  close  connection  with  emotions  not 
only  in  awakening  them,  but  in  expressing  them,  as 
well.  The  language  of  emotion  through  sounds  is  a 
natural  language ;  and  it  is  largely  shared  by  man  and 
animals  in  common.  It  is  easy  to  tell  from  the  cry 
of  a  dog  whether  he  is  in  pain,  or  is  earnest  in  the 
pursuit  of  game.  The  horse  knows  from  the  tone  of 
his  driver's  voice  whether  he  is  frightened,  or  is  calm, 
resolute,  and  self-confident. 

Varieties  of  Sounds.  —  Sounds  differ  in  pitch  and 
in  power;  and  the  range  of  difference  is  very  great. 
It  has  been  estimated  that  a  trained  ear  can  distin- 
guish five  hundred  variations   in   pitch,  and  also  five 


64  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLCXiY 

hundred  variations  in  power.  If  this  is  so,  then  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  different  sounds  can  be 
distinguished,  taking  account  only  of  pitch  and  power. 
But  sounds  also  differ  in  quality,  or  timber.  The 
sounds  of  two  instruments,  —  violins,  for  instance, — 
playing  the  same  tune  with  the  same  power,  are  read- 
ily distinguished  by  their  quality.  In  the  same  way 
we  distinguish  the  voices  of  different  persons,  without 
regard  to  pitch  or  power.  From  this  it  will  appear 
that  the  "varieties"  of  sound  are  almost  unlimited. 

What  is  Sound?  —  Sound  is  the  cognized  vibrations 
from  a  sonorous  body,  conveyed  by  the  air  to  the  auditory 
nerve.  From  this,  it  will  follow  that  vibrations  which 
do  not  affect  the  auditory  nerve  and  become  cog- 
nized, do  not  produce  sound.  In  other  words,  there 
is  no  sound  without  a  hearing  ear. 

Sounds  Express  Emotion  and  Thought.  —We  have 
seen  that  Jiatural  sounds  express  emotion ;  but  the 
sounds  which  express  thought  are  artificial,  or  con- 
ventional. Such  are  the  words  and  sentences  of  a 
human  language.  But  most  of  our  language  is  in- 
tended to  express  both  thought  and  feeling.  Thought 
is  expressed  by  the  right  use  of  the  right  words ;  but 
the  feeling  is  expressed  by  the  tone,  pitch,  quality,  and 
inflection  of  the  voice.  This  is  a  matter  of  great  im- 
portance to  the  public  speaker  and  the  oral  reader  ; 
neither  thought  nor  feeling  should  be  lost. 

Do  We  Hear  Direction  and  Distance  ?  —  Probably 
we  can  judge  nothing  primarily  of  direction  and  dis- 
tance, by  hearing.  But,  through  long  experience,  we 
learn  to  judge  in  these  respects,  with  much  accuracy. 
This,  however,  is  acquired  perception. 


THE  PRESEXTATIVE  POWERS— CONCLUDED  65 

Taste  and  Smell.  —  The  varieties  of  savors  and  of 
odors  are  very  numerous.  The  odor  of  the  apple 
differs  much  from  that  of  the  orange ;  and  each  dif- 
fers from  that  of  any  other  odorous  body.  X(jr 
do  all  apples  smell  alike,  by  any  means,  although  all 
have  the  peculiar  odor  of  the  apple.  The  same  is 
true  of  savors;  all  teas  have  a  common  taste,  and  so 
have  all  wines.  But  the  varieties  of  these  common 
tastes  are  so  numerous,  and  are  so  closely  related  to 
the  quality  of  the  articles,  that  the  great  merchants 
employ  professional  tea-tasters  and  wine-tasters. 

Organic  and  Vital  Sensations.  —  There  are  sen- 
sations which  are  purely  subjective,  and  have  no  direct 
connection  with  our  perception  of  the  external  world. 
The  organic  sensations  pertain  to  the  nutritive,  cir- 
culatory, and  other  organs  of  the  body.  In  health, 
they  are  hardly  cognizable,  except  as  we  have  a  gen- 
eral feeling  of  comfort ;  but,  in  disease,  they  are  some- 
times the  source  of  most  acute  torment.  The  vital 
sensations,  like  those  of  health  or  sickness,  rest  or 
fatigue,  etc. ,  have  much  to  do  with  our  comfort  or  dis- 
comfort. But,  as  they  afford  no  means  of  knowledge 
concerning  the  external  world,  and  as  they  have  little 
connection  with  the  mind's  operations,  except  incident- 
ally, it  does  not  seem  necessary  to  spend  many  words 
upon  them,  in  a  book  on  mental  science. 

Some  call  the  power  to  feel  these  sensations  a  sev- 
enth sense.  Some  also  regard  the  power  to  perceive 
heat  or  cold,  as  a  separate  sense;  but  it  .seems  hardly 
worth  while  to  spend  much  time  on  the.sc  di.stinctions. 

What  is  it  to  Perceive  through  Sense? — It  is 
to  get  direct  and  immediate  knowledge  of  the  external 

Psy.— 6. 


66  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

world.  What  we  get  directly  through  each  sense  is 
rudimentary  and  elemental ;  but,  by  combining  these 
several  elements,  and  by  testing  what  our  senses  give 
us  through  our  power  of  motion,  by  acting  upon  the 
external  world,  we  build  up  our  whole  fabric  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  Non-Ego, — so  vast,  and  varied,  and  useful. 

The  word  "  percept  "  is  used  with  some  lack  of  defi- 
niteness.  An  elemental  percept  is  just  that  item  of 
knowledge  that  one  sense  gives  during  its  exercise, — 
an  odor,  a  sound,  etc.  But  a  percept  of  an  object 
is  the  notion  we  get  of  that  object  by  our  senses,  at 
the  time  when  we  are  exercising  our  senses  upon  it. 
When  our  senses  have  ceased  to  act  upon  it,  the  no- 
tion that  persists  or  returns  is  a  concept  of  the  object. 

Our  Perceptions,  Intuitive.  —  Sense-perception 
acts  intuitively ;  that  is,  it  acts  immediately,  and  by 
no  roundabout  method.  This  is  the  case  with  all 
direct  perception ;  of  course,  the  case  is  different  with 
what  we  have  called  the  acquired  perceptions. 

Let  us  distinguish  three  uses  of  the  word  "  intuitive."  Our  per- 
ceptions are  intuitive,  as  just  explained.  Our  consciousness  is 
intuitive.  Our  knowledge  of  the  ideas  and  truths  given  us  by 
the  Intuitive  Power,  is  intuitive. 

THE    QUALITIES    OF    BODIES 

Two  Divisions.  —  Through  sense-perception,  we 
become  acquainted  with  the  qualities  of  bodies.  But 
there  are  some  differences  in  those  qualities  which  a 
book  on  mental  science  must  notice.  The  qualities 
of  bodies  are  broadly  divisible  into  two  classes,  called 
Primary  and  Secondary.  The  first  are  Jiecessarj  to  our 
conception  of  matter;  the  second  are  not. 


THE   PRESEXTATIVE   POWERS— CONCLUDED  6/ 

Their  distinctive  characteristics  may  be  given  in 
three  corresponding  statements,  as  follows: 

The  Primary  qualities  are:  (i)  Necessary  to  our 
conception  of  the  existence  of  matter;  (2)  They  are 
known  without  experience;  (3)  We  may  conceive  of 
them  as  belonging  to  empty  space,  —  as  existing,  even 
if  no  body  should  exhibit  them. 

The  Secondary  qualities  are :  (i)  Not  necessary  to 
our  conception  of  the  existence  of  matter;  (2)  They 
are  known  by  experience  only ;  (3)  They  can  not  be 
conceived  as  existing  apart  fro^m  some  body  to  exhibit 
them ;  that  is,  we  can  not  think  that  they  do  or  can 
exist  with  no  body  to  exhibit  them :  but  we  can  in 
thought  draw  them  away  from  that  body ;  this  we 
do  in  the  process  of  abstraction. 

Examples  of  Primary  qualities  are  extension  and 
divisibility ;  examples  of  Secondary  qualities  are  hard- 
ness, odor,  color,  etc.  If  we  are  told  that  a  body 
exists  in  the  moon,  we  know  it  must  have  extension 
and  divisibility,  but  we  know  nothing  of  its  Second- 
ary qualities. 

Primary  Qualities.  —  The  Primary  qualities  are 
extension,  impenetrability,  size,  divisibility,  incom- 
pressibility,  shape,  situation,  mobility.  Some  writers 
add  others.  We  can  not  think  of  matter  as  not  pos- 
sessing these  qualities,  because  our  ideas  of  these 
qualities  grow  out  of  two  necessary  conditions  of  our 
conception  of  matter. 

Two  Conditions.  —  These  conditions  are:  (i)  ICvcry 
body  must  occupy  space;  (2)  No  body  occupies  all 
space.  If  matter,  or  body,  must  occupy  space,  then 
it  must   have  extension,  for  that  is  the  property  by 


6S 


ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


virtue  of  which  it  occupies  space.  If  a  body  occupy 
space,  no  other  body  can  occupy  the  same  space ; 
hence,  impenetrabihty. 

Observe  that  the  word  "  occupy,"  means  tofiUx.o  the  excUi- 
sion  of  everything  else. 

If  a  body  occupy  space, — that  is,  if  it  is  not  a  mere 
point,  —  it  must  have  size.  If  it  have  size,  half  of  it 
will  have  half  the  size,  and  so  on ;  that  is,  it  can  be 
divided,  or  is  divisible.  If  it  must  occupy  space,  it 
can  not  be  compressed  so  as  to  occupy  no  space, — 
it  is  incompressible.  If  a  body  occupy  space,  but 
does  not  occupy  all  space,  then  it  must  have  limits; 
hence,  figure,  or  shape.  If  a  body  occupy  space,  but 
does  not  occupy  all  space,  then  it  must  have  a  place 
in  space,  or  situation.  If  it  does  not  occupy  all  space, 
then  it  may  be  moved  into  the  space  it  does  not  oc- 
cupy ;  hence,  it  has  mobility. 

A  Further  Division.  — The  Secondary  qualities 
may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  called  Mechanical 
and  Physiological.  Weight,  hardness,  toughness,  etc. , 
are  examples  of  the  mechanical  qualities;  and  odor, 
color,  savor,  etc.,  are  examples  of  the  physiological 
qualities.  The  first  have  a  real  existence  as  such,  in 
the  body,  whether  any  one  shall  deal  with  them  through 
sense  or  not.  The  second  have  no  existence  as  such  in 
the  body,  —  they  belong  only  to  our  subjective  expe- 
rience. For  instance,  what  we  call  sourness  in  an  ap- 
ple, is  the  name  of  a  peculiar  affection  of  the  gustatory 
nerve  when  we  taste  it,  the  name  of  an  effect  pro- 
duced on  our  physiological  system.  Hence,  the  qual- 
ity is  called  a  physiological  quality.  We  may  make  a 
similar  remark  about  odor,  color,  sound,  heat,  etc. 


THE   PRESEXTATIVE   POWERS— CONXLUDED         69 

It  is  usually  difficult  for  the  young  learner  to  realize  that  the 
physiological  qualities  have  no  existence  as  such  outside  of  our 
organism.  But  a  little  careful  attention  will  make  the  matter 
clear,  so  that  it  will  not  seem  strange  for  one  to  say  that,  strictly 
speaking,  bodies  have  no  color,  nor  odor,  nor  taste,  nor  sound, 
nor  heat. 

A)i  Unkiwivn  Something.  —  Of  cour.se,  there  is 
some  quality  in  the  body  which  produces  that  effect 
on  one's  nervous  system  that  we  call  color,  taste,  etc.; 
but  that  something  is  not  known  to  us :  at  least,  we  do 
not  conceive  it  to  be  the  same  thing  as  the  subjective 
effect  that  we  call  taste,  color,  etc.  The  name  we 
use  is  properly  the  name  of  the  effect  of  an  unknown 
quality  on  ourselves,  and  not  the  name  of  the  qualit}' 
itself.  But,  as  the  quality  is  unknown,  and  as  its  effect 
on  us  is  constant,  we  usually  give  the  .same  name  to 
the  quality  and  to  its  subjective  effect.  Hence,  wc 
say,  "The  apple  is  sour,"  instead  of  saying,  "The 
apple  possesses  that  unknown  quality  which  produces 
the  effect  on  us  that  we  call  sourness." 

Anoi/wr  Division. — Sir  William  Hamilton  divides  the  cui.il- 
ities  of  bodies  into  Primary,  Secundo-primary,  and  Secondary. 
His  Primary  is  the  same  as  ours  ;  his  Secundo-primary  and 
Secondary  correspond  respectively  to  our  mechanical  and 
physiological.     We  prefer  the  division  we  have  given. 

Can  we  Trust  our  Senses? — There  have  been 
philosophers  who  taught  that  all  which  sense  gives 
us  is  purely  subjective,  and  that  we  have  no  ground 
for  believing  that  there  is  anything  in  the  outer  world 
that  corresponds  to  these  affections  of  sense ;  in  fact, 
that  we  have  no  sure  ground  for  believing  that  there 
is  any  outside  world  to  be  known. 

In  answer  to  this,  it  may  be  said  thai  we  have  ii" 


JO  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

other  guides  but  our  senses,  that  if  we  use  them  wisely 
we  get  on  very  well,  and  that  these  very  philosophers, 
in  all  the  common  affairs  of  life,  use  and  trust  their 
senses  just  like  other  folk. 

Apparent  Deceptions. — But  certain  cases  are  often 
cited,  in  which  our  senses  are  said  to  deceive  us. 

\.  An  oar  partly  in  the  water  appears  to  be  broken, 
an  object  viewed  in  the  mirror  seems  to  be  behind 
the  mirror,  a  sound  seems  to  come  from  a  direction 
the  opposite  of  the  real  one,  the  mirage  in  the  desert 
misleads  the  traveler,  etc. 

2.  Again,  it  is  said  that  in  disease  we  experience 
sensations  that  are  known  to  have  no  real  outward 
cause.  We  hear  ringings  in  the  ears,  we  feel  prick- 
ings in  the  flesh,  we  see  strange  forms  and  colors  that 
belong  to  nothing  outward,  etc.  One  suffering  from 
delirium  tremens  sees  snakes  and  demons;  one  in  a 
fever  sees  ghosts  and  apparitions,  etc. 

3.  Again,  we  are  told  that  men  differ  in  their  judg- 
ment as  to  some  qualities;  what  one  calls  sour,  an- 
other calls  sweet.  One  will  assert  that  a  color  is  blue 
while  another  pronounces  it  green,  etc. 

Explanatio)i.  —  Now,  all  apparent  deceptions  of 
the  senses  can  be  thrown  into  three  classes,  as  those 
cited  above  are  grouped  in  the  numbered  paragraphs. 
It  may  be  said  of  the  first  group  that  there  is  no  false 
report  of  the  senses, — they  report  yz/^/  as  they  would 
if  tilings  were  as  they  seem  to  be.  The  rays  come  to 
the  eye  as  they  would  if  the  stick  were  broken,  if  the 
object  were  behind  the  glass,  etc.  The  reason  for 
these  misleading  movements  which  the  senses  report, 
is  to  be  sought  in  Natural  Philosophy.     Moreover,  we 


THE  PRESENTATIVE   POWERS— CONCLUDED  /I 

can  correct  the  apparent  deception  by  further  use  of 
the  senses  themselves;  we  can  remove  the  oar  from 
the  water,  or  remove  the  water  from  the  oar,  and 
sight  will  correct  itself. 

All  the  trouble  in  the  cases  in  the  second  group 
arises  from  a  disordered  organism.  And,  surely,  we 
must  not  hold  the  healthy  sense  responsible  for  the 
errors  and  weaknesses  arising  from  a  diseased  organ. 

The  differences  indicated  in  the  third  group  are  all 
in  respect  to  physiological  qualities  of  bodies.  As 
all  that  we  know  about  such  qualities  is  the  effect 
they  produce  on  the  nervous  organism,  and  as  nerv- 
ous organisms  are  not  all  alike,  it  is  not  strange  that 
men  should  differ  as  to  tastes,  sounds,  colors,  etc. 
Still  it  will  be  noticed  that  the  great  mass  agree  in 
respect  to  these  qualities;  hence,  we  must  suppose 
that,  when  one  differs  from  the  generality,  his  organ- 
ism is  in  some  way  peculiar. 

There  are  some  so-called  deceptions  of  sense  that  arc  pure 
hallucinations  ;  the  trouble  is  wholly  in  the  mind,  and  not  at 
all  in  the  senses.  For  instance,  the  moon  near  the  horizon 
seems  broader  than  when  on  the  meridian ;  but  it  is  easily 
shown  by  actual  measurement  that  the  eye  really  shows  it 
broader  when  on  the  meridian, — the  trouble  is  wholly  in  our 
interpretation  of  what  the  eye  gives  us. 

Theories  of  Perception. — There  is  an  inscrutable 
mystery  in  the  relations  of  mind  and  matter.  We 
may  study  the  nervous  system,  we  may  observe  how- 
objects  affect  or  stimulate  the  nerves,  we  may  trace 
this  affection  from  the  extremities  to  the  organ  of  the 
.sense,  or  to  the  brain,  we  may  even  determine  the 
time  that  elapses  from  the  application  of  the  stinuihis 
till  the  effect  appears  in  consciousness;  but  when  we 


72  ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

ask  Jioiv  the  effect  appears  in  consciousness,  we  ask  a 
question  that  no  one  can  answer, — we  have  reached 
a  bridgeless  chasm. 

When  men  begin  to  speculate  about  that  of  which 
they  know  nothing,  they  sometimes  reach  very  queer 
conchisions ;  and  they  are  hkely  to  be  the  more  dog- 
matic the  less  they  know.  So  men  have  put  forth 
very  varying  theories  as  to  the  process  of  perception. 
The  principal  theories  may  be  shown  in  a  Scheme,  as 
follows : 

The  Natural  Realists.* 


Theories 
of 


The  Idealists  {  \  RepSentative.  {  ^;  ^^^ 


TOlStlC. 

-Egoistic. 

The  doctrine  of  each  class  of  theorists  may  be 
briefly  stated  as  follows : 

The  Realists  believe  that  there  is  an  outside  world, 
that  we  take  direct  cognizance  of  it  through  the 
senses,  and  that  it  is  essentially  as  the  senses  report 
it  to  be.  They  make  no  attempt  to  show  Junv  we 
perceive,  —  that  is,  to  explain  the  process. 

The  Idealists  assert  that  the  mind  can  have  no  cog- 
nizance of  anything  outside  of  itself.  They  divide 
into  two  classes : 

The  Absolute  Idealists  assert  that  we  have  no  evi- 
dence that  there  is  an  outside  world  ;  and  even  if  we 
suppose  that  there  is  one,  we  have  no  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  it  really  is  as  it  seems  to  be. 

The  Representative  Idealists  assert  that  there  is  an 
outside  world,  and  that  it  is  truthfully  represented  in 


®The  words  Idealist  and  Realist  are  sometimes  used  in  different  senses' 
from  those  here  defined.  But  philosophers  have  taught  all  the  doctrines 
here  outlined,  and  some  writers  have  given  them  the  names  that  we  have 
found  it  convenient  to  use  as  we  have  done. 


THE  PRESENTATIVE  POWERS— CONCLUDED  Tl 

the  mind ;  but  that  we  are  cognizant  of  the  represen- 
tation only,  not  of  the  world  itself.  But  they  divide 
into  two  classes,  as  to  the  mode  of  representation. 

The  Egoistics  say  that  the  representation  is  a  mod- 
ification of  the  mind  itself. 

The  Non-Egoistics  say  that  the  outside  world  is 
represented  by  little  images,  or  "ideas,"  which  are 
not  exactly  mind  or  matter,  but  which  are  real,  ob- 
jective existences;  and  which,  as  a  sort  of  go-be- 
tween, enter  the  mind  and  there  represent  the  objects 
of  the  outside  world.  This  system  was  probably  sug- 
gested by  Plato's  doctrine  of  Ideas. 

Historically,  it  is  probable  that  the  last  class  arose 
first.  Attempting  to  speculate  upon  something  that 
no  one  can  understand,  and  assuming  that  mind  can 
take  knowledge  of  nothing  outside  of  itself,  they  in- 
vented the  doctrine  of  the  go-betweens,  or  ideas. 
Hence,  the  name  Idealist  came  to  be  applied  to  all 
who  deny  that  the  mind  can  know  anything  about 
what  is  outside  of  itself. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  however,  that,  beginning  with 
this  assumption,  there  is  no  logical  stopping  short  of 
Absolute  Idealism,  or  complete  skepticism. 

It  is  said  that  Dr.  Reid  of  Scotland  showed  this 
inevitable  tendency  of  Idealism  towards  the  absolute 
form,  and  that  he  answered  the  assumption  of  the 
Non-Egoistics  briefly  as  follows: 

1st.  He  showed  that  the  doctrine  of  the  lilllc  im- 
ages or  ideas  was  pure  assumption,  without  a  j)ar- 
ticle  of  proof  of  their  existence. 

2d.  He  showed  that  if  it  were  fully  established  it 
would  explain  nothing,  for  it  is  inconceivable  that  the 

Psy.-7. 


74  ELEMENTS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

images  could  be  neither  mind  nor  matter;  and  if  they 
are  mind  they  can  not  represent  matter ;  and  if  they 
are  matter  it  is  as  difficult  for  the  mind  to  cognize 
them  as  to  cognize  the  matter  that  they  represent. 

Many  modern  philosophers  take  the  ground  of  the  Natural 
Realists — do  not  attempt  to  explain  the  process  by  which  mind 
knows  about  matter.  Certainly,  the  facts  are  more  important 
for  practical  purposes  than  any  theories  to  explain  the  facts. 

Cultivation  of  the  Senses.  —  There  are  very  few 
people  whose  senses  are  cultivated  as  they  should  be. 
The  special  time  for  cultivating  sense-perception  is  in 
early  youth  ;  most  of  the  work  of  our  Primary  Schools 
should  be  in  this  direction. 

Mrs.  Barbauld's  story,  "  Eyes  and  No-eyes,"  shows  very  viv- 
idly how  differently  people  may  use  their  senses. 

What  the  Teacher  Can  Do. —  As  perception  is 
an  immediate,  an  intuitive,  process,  the  teacher's  work 
is  not  direct,  but  incidental.      He  can 

1st,  Arouse  an  interest  in  observing  objects,  among 
his  pupils ; 

2d,  He  can  direct  them  as  to  what  they  should 
perceive,  can  point  out  the  objects  to  be  observed ; 

3d,  He  can  explain  the  meaning  of  what  is  per- 
ceived, and  so  deepen  the  interest,  and  lead  to  greater 
attention  and  accuracy. 

It  is  generally  urged  by  all  the  best  writers  on  Edu- 
cation, that  the  training  of  the  pupil's  senses  should 
be  the  principal  work  during  the  first  years  of  his 
education.  This  training  will  consist  in  putting  hiin 
to  using  his  senses,  and  to  interpreting  properly  what 
the  senses  give  him. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   REPRESENTATIVE  POWERS — MEMORY 

HE  Representative  Powers  give  us  con- 
cepts of  absent  objects,  but  give  them 
in  two  ways ;  that  is,  as  they  are  or 
were,  and  as  they  might  be.  When  the 
concept  of  the  object  is  as  that  object  is 
or  was,  the  mental  act  is  called  reproduction.  If 
you  also  know  that  the  thing  reproduced  is  a  con- 
cept of  some  former  mental  possession,  you  rccog)iizc 
it ;  that  is,  you  know  it  again.  These  two  mental 
acts,  —  Reproduction  and  Recognition,  —  make  a  com- 
pleted act  called  Memory. 

Definition.  —  Meinoiy  is  that  Rcprcsoitatkr  Ptnvcr 
which  brings  before  the  mind  concepts  of  absent  objects 
as  they  are  or  were,  and  recognizes  them. 

Concepts  of  anything  the  mind  has  ever  possessed, 
— sights,  sounds,  tastes,  thoughts,  feelings,  former 
concepts,  etc., —  may  thus  come  before  the  mind  and 
be  recognized,  for  memory  can  bring  before  us  all 
these  things. 

It  is  probable  that  a  very  large  share  of  the  concepts  that  arc 
really  reproductions,  are  not  recognized ;  they  may  seem  to  iis 
to  be  original ;  often  we   question  when  a  thing  "  comes  info 

(7S) 


76  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

the  mind,"  whether  it  is  something  that  we  remember,  or  is 
really  a  new  thing.  Not  long  since,  a  certain  eminent  preacher 
was  accused  of  plagiarism.  It  seemed  to  be  clear  that  he  had 
used  in  his  sermon  whole  sentences  just  as  they  are  to  be 
found  in  a  book,  which  he  admitted  he  had  read.  His  de- 
fense was  that  his  mind  had  great  tenacity  in  retaining  words, 
and  that  these  words  were  not  recognized  when  they  were  re- 
produced. Whatever  the  fact  may  have  been,  his  defense  was, 
psychologically,  a  plausible  one. 

The  Word  ' '  Memory.  " — We  use  the  word  "mem- 
ory" in  three  distinct  senses: — First,  meaning  the  power 
to  remember,  as  when  we  say,  "  He  has  a  good  mem- 
ory"; second,  signifying  an  act  of  that  power,  as 
when  one  says,  "My  memory  of  the  affair  is  clear"  ; 
third,  signifying  the  product  of  that  power,  as  when 
one  says,  "  My  memories  of  the  occasion  are  pleasant. " 

Remembrance  and  Recollection.  —  For  the  sec- 
ond sense  here  given,  remembrance  or  recollection  is 
a  better  word  than  memory.  Remembrance  is  prop- 
erly a  generic  term,  meaning  any  act  of  memory  ;  rec- 
ollection is  properly  specific,  meaning  an  intentional 
act  of  memory.  It  may  be  defined  as  voluntary  re- 
membrance.    The  distinction  is  worth  observing. 

Conditions  of  Remembrance. —  In  order  that 
there  may  be  an  act  of  memory,  there  must  be  first, 
a  mind  capable  of  remembering ;  second,  that  mind 
must  have  had  an  experience  in  the  past ;  third,  there 
must  be  a  present  concept  of  that  past  experience ; 
fourth,  the  present  concept  must  be  recognized  as,a 
correct  representation  of  that  past  experience. 

The  word  "  experience"  is  here  used  with  reference  to  any  act 
or  state  of  the  mind.  Of  course,  we  can  remember  nothing  of 
which  the  mind  has  never  had  any  experience. 


THE  REPRESENTATIVE  POWERS— MEMORY  /J 

Two  Elements  in  Memory. — According  to  our 
definition,  an  act  of  memory  is  twofold.  It  includes 
reproduction  and  recognition.  When  a  concept  of 
some  former  mental  possession  is  before  any  mind, 
the  mind  may  recognize  it,  or  it  may  not;  that  is, 
it  may  or  may  not  know  it  as  a  concept  of  a  former 
mental  possession.  Mij^the  first  case,  there  is  a  com- 
plete act  of  memory ;  in  the  second,  there  is  only  re- 
production. It  is  probable  that  a  large  portion  of 
our  reproductions  are  not  recognized.  This  is  often 
true,  even  when  we  give  attention  to  the  matter.  We 
sometimes  say  to  ourselves  or  to  others,  "Is  this 
thing  now  in  my  mind  something  that  I  remember, 
or  is  it  something  new?" 

Time,  Place,  and  Circumstance. — In  such  a  case, 
the  doubt  may  be  resolved,  if  we  can  recall  the  at- 
tendant circumstances  of  place,  time,  etc.  But  it 
should  be  clearly  seen  that  a  recognition  of  time,  place, 
etc.,  is  not  essential  to  a  recognition  of  the  thing  in 
question,  although  it  may  be  helpful  to  such  recogni- 
tion in  some  cases.  If  we  clearly  know  that  the  thing 
now  before  the  mind  is  a  concept  of  something  that 
has  been  there  before,  we  remember  that  thing, 
whether  we  also  remember  the  attending  circumstances 
or  not. 

Other  Opinions.  —  Some  wTiters  regard  memory  as 
including  more  elements  than  the  two  we  have  named. 
One  very  eminent  writer  names  four  elements,  as  fol- 
lows: "Retention,  recollection,  representation,  and 
recognition."  If  we  understand  him,  he  uses  the 
word  recognition  to  mean  exactly  what  it  means  in 
the   definition  that  we  have  given.     And  wc   think 


78  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

that  his  two  words,  recollection  and  7'eprcsentation,  to- 
gether, cover  no  more  ground  than  our  single  word, 
reproduction.  We  might  ask,  How  can  a  thing  be 
recollected,  how  can  it  be  before  the  mind  at  all,  un- 
less it  is  represented  ?  The  distinction  seems  to  be 
founded  on  no  tangible  difference. 

Meaning  of  "Retain." — Retention  we  should  re- 
gard as  a  condition  of  memory,  rather  than  an  element 
in  memory.  But,  we  may  ask,  What  is  the  exact 
meaning  of  retention  ?  What  do  we  mean  by  the 
mind's  power  to  retain?  Has  the  mind  anything  to 
do  at  present  with  that  which  is  retained  but  is  not 
now  before  consciousness  ?  It  would  seem  that  we 
can  give  no  precise  meaning  to  the  mind's  power  to 
retain,  further  than  to  say  that  the  mind  has  the  power 
to  bring  into  consciousness  again  that  tuhich  has  been 
there  before,  but  has  now  passed  out  of  consciousness. 
The  mind  is  said  to  retain  that  which  it  can  so  re- 
call, but  it  is  not  easy  to  see  that  the  mind  performs 
any  action  in  retaining.  We  can  not  understand  how 
there  can  be  any  mental  action  of  which  one  is  un- 
conscious ;  we  are  not  conscious  of  what  we  retain. 

A  Puzzle. — There  is  an  apparent  puzzle  in  an  at- 
tempt to  recall  a  thing  to  mind,  which  may  be  pre- 
sented in  this  way.  We  want  to  recall  a  name,  for 
instance;  but,  it  maybe  said,  "You  either  know 
what  you  want  or  you  do  not ;  if  you  know,  it  is  re- 
called already  ;  if  you  do  not  know  it,  how  do  you 
know  what  to  try  to  recall?"  The  puzzle  is  in  the 
use  of  the  word  "  know"  ;  you  do  not  know  the  name 
at  this  moment,  but  you  do  know  enough  about  it  to 
know  what  you  want  to  recall.      But  what  can  you  do 


THE    REPRESENTATIVE  POWERS— MEMORY  79 

to  recall  anything  into  your  mind?  Briefly,  you  can 
hold  your  attention  to  it,  you  can  seize  upon  every 
available  thing  connected  with  it;  and,  usually,  per- 
sistent effort  in  this  way  will  bring  the  desired  result. 

Importance  of  Memory. —  A  moment's  reflection 
will  convince  us  that  no  power  of  mind  is  of  more 
value  than  memory.  Conceive  of  a  mind  deprived 
of  this  power — a  mind  to  which  that  which  is  past 
is  lost  forever — a  mind  having  power  to  deal  with 
nothing  but  the  immediate  present.  In  fact,  such  a 
mind  could  not  deal  with  the  present,  properly  speak- 
ing, for  there  is  something  of  the  past  necessary  to 
all  our  present  thinking.  In  short,  such  a  mind  would 
not  be  at  all  like  the  mind  we  have  now,  if,  indeed, 
it  could  be  a  mind  in  any  sense. 

Belief  in  What  We  Remember. — How  firmly 
may  we  trust  our  memories  ?  How  confident  may 
we  be  in  what  we  remember  ?  The  true  answer  is 
that  we  may  trust  our  memories  in  the  same  way,  and 
to  the  same  extent,  that  wc  may  trust  our  senses. 
When  we  know  that  our  senses  are  working  clearly 
and  correctly,  we  trust  them,  as  we  may  do  with  .safe- 
ty ;  and  in  the  same  way  we  ought  to  trust  mem- 
ory when  it  works  clearly.  In  fact,  this  is  the  way 
men  do  in  actual  life;  cases,  even  of  life  and  death, 
are  daily  decided  in  our  courts,  upon  testimony  whose 
value  rests  solely  upon  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
memories  of  the  witnesses. 

Two  Uses  of  Memory.— It  is  worthy  of  note,  that 
in  practical  life  we  have  occasion  to  use  memory  in 
two  widely  different  ways.  In  one  case,  wc  desire  to 
have  it  serve  us  for  all  time,  as  when  we  commit  to 


80  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

it  the  multiplication  table,  the  meaning  of  words,  etc. 
In  the  other  case,  it  is  our  desire  that  it  should  serve 
only  a  temporary  purpose,  as  with  a  lawyer  defending 
a  case  in  court.  While  the  case  is  pending,  it  is  im- 
portant that  he  should  have  all  the  facts  subject  to  a 
ready  recall  ;  but  as  soon  as  the  case  is  decided,  he 
wishes  to  dismiss  it  from  memory  completely,  to  make 
room  for  the  next.  A  similar  use  for  memory  will 
often  appear  in  common  affairs,  as  when  we  wish  to 
retain  the  items  of  an  errand  till  the  errand  is  done, 
etc.  The  trouble  with  the  careless  student — the  stu- 
dent who  "crams" — is  that  he  uses  his  memory  for  a 
temporary  purpose,  when  he  should  have  aimed  at  a 
permanent  purpose. 

Strong  Memory  and  a  Weak  Mind.  —  Because 
some  people  of  feeble  intellect  in  general,  like  "Blind 
Tom,"  for  instance,  have  shown  extraordinary  powers 
of  memory,  some  have  been  inclined  to  jump  to  the 
very  foolish  conclusion,  that  a  mind  having  a  strong 
power  to  remember  is  likely  to  be  weak  in  its  other 
intellectual  powers.  This  is  basing  a  rule  on  excep- 
tions. It  would  be  difficult,  we  think  impossible,  to 
find  in  all  history  a  person  of  strong  intellect  in  gen- 
eral, who  was  markedly  deficient  in  the  power  of  mem- 
ory. But  it  is  often  remarked  of  some  of  the  ablest 
men  the  world  has  known,  that  they  were  especially 
strong  in  the  power  to  remember.  Many  of  the 
books  on  mental  science  give  a  list  of  men  who  pos- 
sessed remarkable  memories,  among  the  most  noted 
of  whom  are  Cyrus  the  Great,  Themistocles,  the 
blind  Euler,  Napoleon,  and  others,  all  men  of  remark 
ably  strong  intellectual  powers. 


THE  REPRESENTATIVE   POWERS— MEMORY  8  I 

A  Panorama  of  Concepts. — A  little  reflection  will 
show  us  that,  in  every  conscious  moment,  from  the 
beginning  of  intelligent  activity  till  its  close,  there  is 
passing  "before"  the  mind,  or  "through"  the  mind, 
an  endless  procession  of  concepts.  This  is  equally 
true  whether  one  is  day-dreaming  or  studying,  whether 
he  is  in  joy  or  in  sorrow,  whether  he  is  using  his 
senses  or  is  reflecting  ;  it  is  equally  true  of  the  old  and 
the  young,  the  learned  and  the  ignorant,  the  good  and 
the  bad.  In  every  mind  the  endless  panorama  un- 
rolls, the  ceaseless  procession  marches.  Stop  it  we 
can  not,  if  we  would ;  only  in  profound  sleep  and  un- 
consciousness do  we  retire  from  our  position  as  spec- 
tator, as  it  were;  but,  when  we  awake,  or  "come  to 
ourselves,"  the  tireless  movement  of  varying  concepts 
is  resumed.  We  may  change  the  order  of  the  march 
accidentally  or  intentionally,  we  may  give  more  or 
less  earnest  heed  to  it;  but  the  march  goes  on,  one 
concept  follows  another  in  a  ceaseless  round. 

Laws  of  Suggestion. —  Now,  do  these  concepts 
succeed  each  other  in  a  haphazard  way;  docs  any 
one  of  them  ever  get  into  the  procession  by  chance? 
Or  is  the  order  of  movement  regulated  by  law;  is 
there  always  a  cause  for  one  thing  being  before  the 
mind  rather  than  another?  We  believe  the  answer 
clearly  is,  that  there  is  nothing  of  chance  or  hap-haz- 
ard  about  it.  If  a  certain  concept  is  before  the  mind 
at  this  moment,  there  is  a  rea.son  why  it  is  there.  It 
has  followed  in  the  train  of  some  concept  that  pre- 
ceded it,  or  it  has  been  suggested  by  some  sensation, 
percept,  emotion,  or  volition.  We  may  not  be  able 
in  every  case  to  determine  why  any  given  thing  is  be- 


82  ELEMENTS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

fore  the  mind  at  any  given  time ;  but  some  good 
reason  exists,  nevertheless.  There  are  no  interlopers 
in  the  mental  procession  ;  every  concept  in  the  line 
is  there  in  obedience  to  some  one  or  more  of  the  laivs 
of  mental  suggestion. 

Writers  on  Psychology  have  given  lists  of  these 
laws  of  suggestion.  They  have  sometimes  called 
them  "laws  of  memory,"  sometimes  "laws  of  asso- 
ciation," etc.  The  better  term  is  "laws  of  sugges- 
tion," inasmuch  as  they  account  for  the  ways  in  which 
concepts  are  suggested  to  the  mind  in  general.  The 
operation  of  these  laws  is  not  confined  to  things  that 
have  been  previously  associated,  nor  to  the  mind's 
working  in  the  act  of  memory  alone.  They  are  gen- 
eral laws  of  mental  activity ;  they  are  laws  of  memory, 
but  they  are  more  than  that. 

Primary  Laws. — As  commonly  given,  these  laws 
are  four  in  number : 

1 .  Similarity  or  resemblance.  — Any  percept,  concept, 
emotion,  sensation,  etc.,  tends  to  suggest  the  concept 
of  something  like  it. 

2.  Contrast.  —  The  sight  of  a  palace  may  suggest  a 
hovel ;  the  snow  of  winter,  a  hot  day  of  summer,  etc. 

3.  Contiguity  of  Time  or  Plaee.  — Things  associated  in 
time  or  place  are  likely  to  suggest,  the  one  the  other. 

4.  Cause  and  Effeet.  — A  wound  will  remind  one  of 
the  instrument  which  caused  it,  or  the  sight  of  a 
pistol  suggests  a  thought  of  the  effect  it  is  intended 
to  produce,  etc. 

From  Aristotle.  — Two  precepts  worth  remem- 
bering have  come  down  to  us  from  Aristotle.  The 
first    is    given   in    the  following  words:    "Thoughts 


THE    REPRESENTATIVE  POWERS—MEMORY  83 

which  have  at  any  time,  recent  or  remote,  stood  to 
each  other  in  the  relation  of  co-existence  or  immedi- 
ate consecution,  do,  when  severally  reproduced,  tend 
to  reproduce  each  other."  The  other  precept  sug- 
gests that  a  less  important,  or  less  interesting,  thing 
is  more  likely  to  suggest  one  more  important,  or  more 
interesting,  than  the  reverse.  For  instance,  a  knob 
will  suggest  a  door  sooner  than  a  door  the  knob ;  a 
name  will  suggest  its  owner  sooner  than  the  sight  of 
a  person  will  suggest  his  name. 

Let  the  student  present  numerous  examples  from  his  own  ex- 
perience, illustrating  these  laws  ;  and  other  examples  illus- 
trating Aristotle's  precepts,  also. 

One  ComprcJicnsive  Lazv.  —  Some  writers  have 
maintained  that  the  four  primary  laws  may  be  reduced 
to  one  general  principle,  which  may  be  expressed  by 
the  word  "contiguity."  Of  course,  this  requires 
that  we  give  the  word  contiguity  a  very  broad  mean- 
ing, but  not  broader  than  its  etymology  may  imply. 
Things  that  toncJi  each  other  in  any  way,  in  fact  or  in 
thought,  may  suggest  each  other.  Contiguity  may 
denote  all  such  relations  as  likeness,  contrast,  cause 
and  effect,  relative  position  in  time  or  place,  things 
and  their  names,  quantity  and  quality,  wholes  and 
their  parts, "etc. 

Secondary  Laws.  —  Of  these  there  are  eight,  at 
least ;  some  give  more : 

1.  Co7iti7mance  of  Attention.  —  The  longer  and  more 
earnestly  we  attend  to  a  matter,  the  more  likel)-  it  is 
to  be  suggested  to  the  mind  afterwards. 

2.  Vividness  of  Feeling.  —  The  more  our  feelings  arc 
aroused  when   a  matter  is  before  the  mind,  the  more 


84  ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

readily  we  recall  it.  This  is  true  whether  the  feeling 
be  one  of  interest  in  the  thing  itself,  or  simply  an  ex- 
altation of  feeling  in  general. 

3.  Frequency  of  Repetition.  —  The  more  frequently 
a  thing  is  called  to  mind,  the  more  ready  it  is  to  come 
when  called.  Every  school-boy  recognizes  this  when 
he  "  says  his  lesson  "  over  and  over. 

4.  Lapse  of  Time.  —  Other  things  being  equal,  that 
which  the  mind  has  recently  attended  to  is  more  easily 
recalled  than  those  things  which  were  attended  to 
long  ago. 

5.  Exclusiveness  of  Association.  —  When  two  things 
have  always  been  associated  together,  one  is  more 
likely  to  suggest  the  other  than  in  case  each  had  been 
associated  with  several  other  things.  For  instance, 
if  a  certain  kind  of  hat  has  always  been  seen  on  one 
person,  the  sight  of  that  hat,  or  one  like  it,  will  sug- 
gest that  person  sooner  than  it  would  if  many  wore  a 
hat  of  the  same  kind. 

6.  Original  Moital  Differences.— r^^rnds  differ  much 
naturally  in  the  readiness  with  which  they  observe 
suggestions.  Besides,  some  find  it  comparatively  easy 
to  recall  one  class  of  things,  and  some  to  recall  other 
things.  One  can  remember  numbers  readily  ;  another, 
faces;  another,  animals,   as  horses,  etc. 

7.  State  of  Mind. —  Every  one  knows  that  the  mind 
sometimes  is  much  more  responsive,  both  in  commit- 
ting and  in  recalling,  than  at  other  times.  Often  this 
is  due  to  the  condition  of  the  body  ;  but,  frequently, 
the  cause  seems  to  be  wholly  mental. 

8.  Professional  Habits. —  It  is  comparatively  easy 
for  any  one  to  remember  what  belongs  to  his  trade 


THE    REPRESENTATIVE   POWERS— MEMORY 


^S 


or  profession  ;  and  anything  that  he  observes  is  very 
Hkely  to  suggest  something  pertaining  to  his  daily 
business.  One  can  easily  guess  the  business  of  the 
man  who  exclaimed,  on  first  seeing  Niagara,  "  What  a 
place  to  wash  sheep  ! ' ' 

Recall  numerous  illustrations  of  each  of  these  laws,  from 
your  own  experience  or  observation. 

Objective  and  Subjective. —  It  will  be  noticed  that 
the  Primary  Laws  pertain  to  the  things  to  be  re- 
membered, or  suggested ;  hence,  they  may  be  termed 
objective :  while  the  Secondary  Laws  pertain  to  the 
person  remembering,  or  receiving  the  suggestion ; 
hence,  they  are  subjective.  The  law  of  exclusive  as- 
sociation seems  at  first  to  be  an  exception ;  but  if 
we  reflect  that  the  association  is  in  the  mind  of  the 
observer,  we  shall  see  that  the  exception  is  only 
apparent,  not  real. 


CHAPTER   IX 


MEMORY —  CONCLUDED 


EMORY  IN  THE  Aged. —  It  is  often  said 
Jgi  that  memory  is  one  of  the  first  of  the 
mental  powers  to  fail,  especially  in  recall- 
ing names,  etc.  And  yet  it  is  noticeable 
that  many  old  people,  who  can  not  re- 
member the  transactions  of  the  last  half-hour,  can  tell 
with  perfect  clearness  and  fullness  of  particulars,  what 
occurred  fifty  or  seventy  years  before.  This  seems 
to  be  contradictory  of  one  of  the  secondary  laws  of 
suggestion ;  viz. ,  that  the  lapse  of  time  weakens  the 
power  of  suggestion.  The  truth  is,  however,  that  this 
law  is  simply  outweighed  by  a  combination  of  two  or 
three  other  laws.  The  old  person's  senses  are  dulled  ; 
they  report  recent  things  less  clearly.  For  this  and 
other  reasons,  there  is  less  vividness  of  feeling  respect- 
ing recent  events.  Besides,  silently,  and  often  orally, 
the  things  of  the  long  past  have  been  frequently  re- 
viewed, until  they  have  become  firmly  fixed. 

Effects  of  Disease  on  Memory. —  Usually,  dis- 
ease weakens  memory,  as  it  usually  weakens  all  the 
powers  of  both  mind  and  body.  But  there  are  many 
instances  on  record  where  disease  has  had  the  effect 

(86) 


MEMORY— CONCLUDED  87 

of  quickening  the  memory.  Stories  are  told  of  per- 
sons who,  after  long  sickness,  when  near  their  deaths, 
have  spoken  and  prayed  in  the  language  of  childhood, 
although  they  had  spoken  exclusively  another  language 
for  many  years. 

Do  We  Completely  Forget? — Such  facts  as  those 
just  given  suggest  the  question  whether  the  mind  ever 
completely  loses  anything  it  has  once  possessed  ;  and 
there  are  numerous  other  facts  which  point  in  the  same 
direction.  Persons  who  have  come  near  death,  from 
drowning  and  otherwise,  have  often  told  that,  in  what 
seemed  their  last  moment,  the  whole  past  of  their 
lives  appeared  to  come  before  their  minds  as  in  a  flash. 
Every  one,  probably,  has  at  some  time  been  startled 
by  the  sudden  recurrence  to  memory  of  something 
not  thought  of  for  years.  These  facts  have  led  some 
to  conclude  that  nothing  is  ever  completely  forgotten  ; 
but  that  the  "book  of  remembrance,"  out  of  which 
man  shall  finally  be  judged,  is  neither  more  nor  less 
than  the  tablets  of  his  own  memory.  This  conclusion 
seems  to  be  plausible. 

But,  whatever  may  be  true  as  to  the  possibility  thai 
nothing  is  forgotten,  it  is  certain  that  one  who  lives  to 
old  age  will  find  his  life  largely  sweetened  or  embit 
tered  by  the  things  memory  will  surely  bring  before 
him;  he  is  daily  making  his  future  self 

Beneficent  Law  of  Memory.  —  Another  curious 
fact  about  memory  is  worthy  of  notice.  When  we  re- 
call things  that  were  both  pleasant  and  innocent,  we 
experience  a  new  pleasure,  sometimes  but  little  in- 
ferior to  that  of  first  experience;  but  when  wc  remein 
ber  unpleasant  or  sorrowful  things,  if  no  guilt  is  c(jn- 


88  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

nected  with  them,  they  have  lost  much  of  their  bit- 
terness. We  sometimes  laugh  at  the  remembrance 
of  that  which  was  anything  but  laughable  in  the  ex- 
perience. Time  assuages  even  our  sorrow  for  dearest 
friends.  This  beneficent  law  of  memory  seems  to  in- 
dicate that  our  Creator  intended  that  this  power  should 
be  a  source  of  happiness,  and  not  of  pain. 

Memory  Neglected.  —  It  is  often  charged  that  the 
cultivation  of  memory  is  neglected  in  modern  times. 
This  is  probably  true  ;  in  fact,  the  multiplicity  of  books 
has  rendered  it  less  necessary  to  commit  many  things 
to  memory  than  it  once  was.  Memory  serves  us  now, 
if  we  can  remember  where  a  thing  may  be  found  in 
books,  instead  of  remembering  the  thing  itself.  But 
we  think  that  in  many  of  our  schools,  at  the  present 
time,  there  is  a  very  harmful  neglect,  even  a  partial 
contempt,  of  memory.  It  is  probably  the  reaction 
from  the  abuse  which  formerly  prevailed,  when  mem- 
ory seemed  to  be  almost  the  only  faculty  that  was  used. 
The  present  neglect  has  gone  so  far,  in  many  cases, 
that  pupils  of  good  natural  abilities  find  it  next  to 
impossible  to  recall  anything  that  they  have  studied, 
readily  and  exactly.  In  this  matter  we  think  there 
should  be  a  reform,  and  that  more  should  be  done 
to  cultivate  memory  in  our  schools. 

Cultivating  the  Memory. —  But,  Jiozu  shall  we 
cultivate  memory?  Just  as  we  cultivate  any  other 
power,  that  is,  by  zuise  use.  If  we  would  cultivate 
memory,  we  must  lay  demands  upon  it,  and  make  it 
do  its  work  promptly  and  accurately.  This  is  not  dif- 
ficult, if  it  be  undertaken  at  the  right  time  of  life. 
The  child  remembers  with  ease  what  the  man  can  re- 


MEMORY— CONCLUDED  89 

member  only  with  the  greatest  labor.  Not  only  so, 
but  things  learned  early  in  life  are  held  more  tena- 
ciously. The  author  remembers  with  perfect  ease 
many  poems  and  other  compositions  which  he  learned 
in  childhood,  while  others  committed  with  much  labor 
later  in  life,  seem  to  have  disappeared  entirely.  It  is 
not  very  difficult  for  a  child  to  learn  the  spelling  of 
words,  the  paradigms  in  grammar,  etc. ,  but  such  work 
is  drudgery  of  the  hardest  sort  to  the  man.  Child- 
hood, then,  is  the  time  for  ".storing  the  mind"  with 
things  that  will  be  needed  in  after  life.  The  work  is 
then  comparatively  easy,  and  it  is  more  lasting. 

In  order  to  train  the  child's  memory,  he  must  be 
made  responsible  for  its  use.  He  must  be  held  to 
remember  what  he  is  told  in  the  way  of  command 
and  direction,  —  to  remember  it  exactly,  and  to  ob- 
serve it  accordingly.  He  must  be  held  to  remember 
the  instruction  given  to  him,  in  oral  form,  as  well 
as  that  gained  from  the  book.  So  tenacious  is  mem- 
ory at  this  period  that  it  easily  seizes  and  holds  mere 
words,  although  they  make  no  appeal  to  the  under- 
standing. Here  is  the  root  of  one  of  the  most  glar- 
ing evils  in  our  schools,  especially  with  careless  and 
ill-trained  teachers.  Mere  words  are  caught  and  re- 
peated by  the  pupils;  and  they  are  glibly  recited, 
giving  an  appearance  of  knowledge  when  none  exi.sts. 
Of  course,  this  evil  should  be  avoided  ;  but  the  oppo- 
site extreme  of  requiring  nothing  to  be  committed  in 
exact  form,  is  still  worse. 

Because  of  the  facility  with  which  mere  words  are 
retained  at  this  time,  it  is  not  unphilosoi)hical  to  re- 
quire  the   pupil    to  commit  to   memory  .some  useful 

Psv.— 8. 


go  ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

things  which  he  does  not  fully  understand.  The  recent 
movement  in  favor  of  memorizing  literary  "gems" 
is  worthy  of  all  commendation.  Nor  need  they  be 
fully  understood  at  present.  Who  can  not  recall  some- 
thing of  this  kind,  dropped  into  his  memory  h\  his 
childhood,  that  afterwards  became  a  most  profitable 
subject  of  rumination? 

It  is  a  curious  fact  that  certain  defects  sometimes  become 
objects  of  personal  vanity,  such  as  a  pale  skin,  defective  eye- 
sight requiring  spectacles,  etc.  It  is  thought  by  silly  young 
people  to  be  fashionable,  and  an  evidence  of  "high-tone,"  to 
have  these  defects.  On  this  ground  we  account  for  the  readi- 
ness with  which  many  people  declare  that  they  are  deficient  in 
the  power  of  memory.  Certain  it  is  that  no  one  possesses  a 
really  good  mind  if  his  memory  is  very  defective.  When  stu- 
dents have  come  to  the  author  pleading  complacently  this  de- 
fect as  a  reason  for  failing  to  retain  their  lessons,  he  has  some- 
times effectually  cut  off  a  repetition  of  the  excuse  by  fully  ac- 
cepting it,  suggesting,  perhaps,  that  he  had  long  suspected  that 
their  minds  were  not  quite  sound  ! 

There  is  no  need  to  commit  unnecessary  or  useless 
things,  simply  for  the  sake  of  exercising  the  memory. 
There  is  enough  that  will  be  of  lasting  pleasure  and 
value,  for  this.  Nor  is  it  necessary  that  the  child  fully 
understand  all  that  he  commits  to  memory.  Who  does  ' 
/ul/j'  understand  ? 

The  mind  will  ruminate  and  feed  upon  that  which 
it  remembers,  be  it  good  or  bad,  wheat  or  chaff;  but 
if  the  memory  be  well  filled  with  wheat,  there  is  little 
room  for  chaff.  And  the  value  of  what  is  good  in 
the  memory  will  appear  more  and  more,  the  more 
the  mind  reflects  upon  it. 

Rules  for  Committing. —  In  order  to  commit  to 
memory  successfully,  certain  rules  maybe  given:  — 


MEMORY— CONCLUDED  9 1 

1st,  Lay  rigid  demands  on  the  memory;  make  it 
do  its  work,  and  do  it  well. 

2d,  Give  close  attention  to  what  you  wish  to  re- 
member, and  examine  it  carefully. 

3d,  Thus  get  a  clear  conception  of  the  exact  thing, 
"  not  something  like  it  nor  something  about  it" — be- 
fore any  attempt  to  commit  at  all  is  made. 

4th,  Endeavor  to  arouse  the  greatest  possible  in- 
terest in  it. 

5th,  Observe  the  "  Laws  of  Suggestion  "  already 
given,  on  pages  81-85. 

6th,  Review,  Rcviezv,  Review. 

Attention,  Interest,  Repetition  form  the  key  to 
ready  and  exact  remembrance." 

It  may  be  well  for  the  student  who  has  a  lesson  to 
learn  from  a  text-book,  to  go  over  it  first,  simply  to 
see  that  he  understands  it,  making  no  attempt  to  com- 
mit it.  Then  let  him  go  over  it  again,  fixing  it,  slowly 
and  with  all  the  links  of  association  he  can  find;  after- 
wards, by  repetition  and  reviewing,  he  will  find  him- 
self master  of  it,  both  in  sense  and  in  form.  He  can 
recite  it  clearly,  readily,  exactly. 

Systems  of  Mnemonics. —  Many  attempts  have 
been  made  to  invent  artificial  systems  of  memory, 
usually  called  systems  of  "Mnemonics."  Some  of 
these  systems  are  very  ingenious,  but  all  are  utterly 
worthless.  Any  system  tiiat  attempts  to  aid  memory 
hy  forced  and  artificial  association  only,  may  be  termed 
a  system  of  "Mnemonics,"  such  as  we  have  declared 
to  be  worthless;  and  they  are  worthless,  from  the  sim- 
ple fact  that,  by  their  artificial  association,  lliey  add  a 
new  element  of  labor  to  those  necessarily  existing. 


92  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

Devices  to  Aid  Memory.  —  There  are,  however, 
many  devices  that  can  frequently  be  used,  which  are 
not  open  to  the  same  objections  as  the  systems  of 
"Mnemonics."     We  will  mention: 

1st,  The  use  of  the  senses  or  the  muscles.  A  class 
will  remember  the  order  of  the  bodies  in  the  solar 
system  better  if  one  child  stands  for  the  sun,  and 
others  revolve  around  him  at  the  proper  distances,  to 
represent  Mercury,  Venus,  and  the  rest.  A  child  will 
remember  the  number  three  better  by  taking  three 
steps,  making  three  jumps,  bringing  three  books,  etc. 
This  is  helping  memory  through  the  muscles.  On 
the  use  of  the  senses,  also,  depends  the  value  of  charts, 
tables,  diagrams,  genealogical  trees,  etc. 

2d,  The  use  of  rhyme  and  meter.  Who  has  not 
recognized  the  value  of 

"Thirty  days  hath  September,"  etc.? 

No  doubt  many  have  helped  to  fix  the  multiplication 
table  by  singing  it.  The  conjugations  of  the  Latin 
verbs  are  more  easily  held  on  account  of  the  jingle, 
''bam,  bas,  bat,''  etc. 

3d,  The  use  of  short,  pithy,  comprehensive  forms 
of  speech,  such  as  proverbs   and  formulae. 

4th,  Seizing  upon  any  fact  of  natural  association, 
however  accidental  it  may  be  ;  as  the  association  of 
Bacon's  Rebellion  in  1676,  with  the  Revolution  in 
1776,  and  the  Centennial  in  1876. 

It  may  be  noted,  also,  that  the  ' '  Laws  of  Sugges- 
tion," especially  the  Primary  Laws,  will  furnish  many 
forms  of  natural  association. 

Observations  on  Memory. — There  are,  doubtless, 
great  differences  in  minds  as  to  their  power  to  remem- 


MEMORY— CONCLUDED  93 

ber.  And  yet  the  absolute  amount  retained  by  each, 
probably,  does  not  vary  so  greatly  as  appears  at  first 
sight.  The  eminent  linguist,  historian,  or  man  of 
science,  carries  in  his  memory  a  vast  amount  of  matter 
pertaining  to  his  specialty;  but  his  mind  is  likely  to 
be  free  from  the  mass  of  gossip  and  triviality  which 
is  retained  by  his  illiterate  neighbor.  Those  who  are 
wont  to  complain  of  their  "poor  memories,"  often 
show  that  their  memories  are  fairly  well-stored  when 
exercised  upon  matters  that  interest  them. 

Without  doubt,  the  power  to  retain  can  be  im- 
proved, by  thorough  practice,  both  as  to  the  amount 
retained  and  the  accuracy  and  readiness  with  which 
it  may  be  recalled.  But,  as  Mr.  Bain  suggests,  there 
is  probably  in  every  individual  a  definite  limit  to  the 
power,  beyond  which  no  training  or  effort  can  carry 
him,  Mr.  Bain  also  holds  that  "committing"  to 
memory  consumes  more  mental  force  than  any  other 
form  of  mental  activity. 

Verbal  MemoTj.  —  Some  minds  have  great  facility 
in  recalling  and  reproducing  words  without  any  re- 
gard to  their  meaning;  this  is  a  characteristic  of  the 
memory  of  a  child,  in  most  cases.  The  man  of 
thought  and  of  culture  finds  such  a  use  of  memory 
difficult,  sometimes  almost  impossible.  He  needs  to 
see  the  meaning  and  the  logical  relations  of  what  he 
commits,  in  order  to  retain  it  well,  lulucation  should 
lead  from  the  childish  form  of  verbal  memory  to  that 
of  memory  by  reference  to  significance  and  relation. 

Committing  and  Rcmcmbcniig. —  Committing  is 
not  remembering,  but  it  is  clo.sely  related  to  it.  I  he 
success  of  memory  depends   very  largely  upon  care 


94  ELEMENTS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

in  committing;  hence,  the  rules  for  remembering,  or 
for  improving  the  memory,  must  include  rules  for  com- 
mitting. In  general,  probably,  the  mind  that  commits 
with  great  ease  does  not  retain  so  well  as  the  mind 
that  finds  more  difficulty  in  committing.  Such  a  mind 
is  easily  "crammed,"  but  does  not  hold  things  so  well 
permanently.  "  Lightly  come,  lightly  go, "  describes 
the  action. 

Nor  is  that  always  the  best  memory  that  is  most 
ready  in  recalling.  In  general,  the  memory  that  holds 
mere  words  is  more  ready  in  recalling  them  than  the 
memory  that  retains  by  an  observance  of  significance 
and  of  logical  relations. 

Instances  of  Remarkable  Memory.  —  As  a  mat- 
ter of  some  interest,  we  add  an  account  of  some  per- 
sons who  are  said  to  have  shown  remarkable  memo- 
ries. Some  of  these  stories  have  been  given  by  many 
authors  ;  we  quote  from  Dr.  Brooks : 

"  Historians,  and  writers  on  mental  philosophy  men- 
tion some  remarkable  examples  of  the  power  of  mem- 
ory. Cyrus,  it  is  said,  knew  the  names  of  all  his  of- 
ficers,—  Pliny  says,  of  all  his  soldiers.  Themistocles 
could  name  every  one  of  the  twenty  thousand  citizens 
of  Athens.  Hortensius,  after  sitting  4II  day  at  an  auc- 
tion, could  at  night  recall  every  article  sold,  the  pur- 
chaser, and  the  price.  Dr.  Wallis,  while  in  bed  in 
the  dark,  extracted  the  square  root  of  a  number  of 
fifty-three  places  to  twenty-seven  terms,  and  repeated 
the  result  twenty  days  afterwards.  Euler,  blind  from 
early  life,  carried  in  his  memory  a  table  of  the  first  six 
powers  of  the  series  of  natural  numbers  up  to  one 
hundred.       Two  of  his  pupils,  in    calculating  a  con- 


MEMORY— CONCLUDED  95 

verging  series,  found,  on  reaching  the  seventeenth 
term,  that  their  results  differed  by  a  unit  at  the  fiftieth 
figure;  and  to  decide  the  question  he  made  the  calcu- 
lation mentally,  and  his  result  was  found  to  be  correct. 
"Hamilton  tells  us  that  Muretus  saw  at  Padua  a 
young  Corsican,  who  could  repeat  thirty-six  thousand 
names,  in  the  order  in  which  they  were  given  to  liini, 
or  repeat  them  in  the  reverse  order,  or  begin  at  any 
point  in  the  list  and  repeat  both  ways.  The  cele 
brated  Magliabecchi,  Librarian  of  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Tuscany,  it  is  said,  could  name  all  the  authors  who 
had  written  upon  any  subject,  giving  the  name  of  the 
book,  the  words,  and  often  the  page.  A  gentleman 
of  Florence,  to  test  his  memory,  lent  him  a  manu- 
script to  read,  and  afterward,  pretending  to  have  lost 
it,  requested  him  to  endeavor  to  recall  it,  which  he 
did  with  great  exactness.  It  is  also  stated  that  upon 
being  asked  by  the  Grand  Duke  if  he  could  procure 
for  him  a  copy  of  a  certain  book,  he  replied,  '  No, 
sir,  it  is  impossible  ;  there  is  but  one  in  the  world : 
that  is  in  the  Grand  Seignior's  library  at  Constanti- 
nople, and  is  the  seventh  book,  on  the  seventh  shelf, 
on  the  right  hand  as  you  go  in.'" 


CHAPTER  X 

IMAGINATION,  AND    CONSTRUCTIVE    CONCEPTION 

EFINITION.  Imagination  is  tliat  Repre- 
sentative Poiver  zvhicli  gives  us  concepts 
of  absent  objects,  not  as  they  are  or  were, 
but  as  they  might  be. 
Illustrations. — You  turn  your  face  towards 
a  church  and  notice  carefully  how  it  looks;  you  are  now per- 
ceiving'iX.  by  sight.  You  turn  away,  and  before  your  "mind's 
eye  "  stands  the  same  form  as  clearly  as  before ;  the  Represen- 
tative Power  has  rtproduced  a  concept  of  what  was  perceived. 
You  know  that  your  concept  is  of  the  church  as  it  was.  So  you 
recognise  the  co7tcept, — you  remember  the  building. 

You  now  begin  to  play  with  this  concept;  you  replace  the 
brick  with  stone ;  you  give  it  extra  towers ;  you  elevate  the 
spire  to  twice  its  present  height,  etc.  You  are  now  conceiving 
of  the  absent  object  as  it  might  be.     Imagination  is  at  work. 

The  Word   "Imagination." — We  would  remark 

that  the  word   "imagination"  may  be  used  like  the 

word  "  memory, "  to  signify  a  power  of  the  mind,  or  it 

may  signify  an  act  or  a  product  of  that  power.     The 

grand  difference  between  imagination  and  memory  is, 

that  the  latter  gives  us  concepts  as  wholes  which  are 

true  to  previous  experience,  while  the  former  gives 

us  wholes  that  correspond,    not  to  fact,    but  to  our 

subjective  fancy. 
(96) 


IMAGINATION,  AND  CONSTRUCTIVE  CONCEPTION     9/ 

The  Occupation  of  Children.  —  Every  one  who 
is  at  all  familiar  with  the  ways  of  children,  knows 
that  imagination  begins  to  be  active  at  a  very  early 
age,  and  that  its  action,  or  "play,"  makes  up  a  large 
part  of  the  intellectual  activity  of  a  child's  life.  It  is 
for  the  mother  and  the  teacher  to  accept  this  fact, 
and  to  be  guided  by  it,  instead  of  foolishly  trying  to 
counteract  nature  in  this  respect.  There  is  no  end  to 
the  ways  in  which  the  imagination  of  the  child  may 
be  used  to  aid  in  all  his  school  tasks,  as  well  as  in  the 
training  of  his  w  ill,  and  in  the  building  of  his  char- 
acter. On  this  point  we  know  of  no  more  helpful 
book  than  Dr.  Jacob  Abbott's  "  Gentle  Measures  in 
Training  the  Young  "  ;  and  yet  there  is  room  for  other 
good  books  on  the  same  theme. 

W[LL  Training. — A  word  about  the  use  of  imagi- 
nation as  a  means  of  developing  the  child's  freedom 
of  wnll.  The  child  is  under  authority  as  to  his  be- 
havior; he  is  equally  under  authority  in  his  acquisi- 
tion of  a  knowledge  of  facts.  But  in  his  "play"  in 
his  imaginings,  he  is  his  own  master,  —  heisalawunto 
himself.  In  this  lies  a  large  part  of  the  charm  of  all 
his  play.  Let  some  superior  power  undertake  to  dic- 
tate how  he  shall  i)la)',  anrl  the  fun  is  over.  This 
consideration  shows  us  why  the  battered  rag  baby  is 
dearer  to  the  little  girl  than  her  fine  china  doll,  —  she 
can  do  what  she  pleases  with  it.  When  we  reniem 
ber  what  a  free  will  is  to  an  adult,  it  will  be  seen  that 
its  first  unfolding  and  proper  exercise  is  a  thing  of  no 
mean  importance. 

In  What  Sense,  Ckeati\e?  —  Imagination  is  often 
called  a  creative  facult}*,  but   it    is  crc.itivc  in  n  very 

P?y.— 9. 


98  eli:mexts  of  psychology 

limited  sense  only.  Sense-perception,  through  mem- 
ory, gives  all  the  original  material  with  which  imagi- 
nation builds.  This  material  may  be  used  without 
modification,  or  it  may  be  modified  and  then  used ; 
but,  in  either  case,  the  whole  that  is  constructed  from 
it  must  differ  from  any  whole  that  memory  gives — it 
may  be  a  kind  of  creation,  but  only  in  respect  to  the 
ideal  which  that  whole  bodies  forth. 

Four  Forms  of  Product. —  Imagination  may  be 
used  in  four  different  ways,  to  which  different  names 
have  been  given.  It  may  combine  the  elements  it 
uses,  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  a  result  that  is  weird, 
unearthly,  monstrous,  or  grotesque ;  it  is  then  called 
phantasy.  It  may  combine  them  so  as  to  give  a  whole 
that  is  light,  playful,  pleasing,  but  still  showing  noth- 
ing of  high  purpose  or  of  noble  and  cultivated  taste ; 
it  is  then  called  fancy.  Again,  it  may  combine  them 
so  as  to  give  a  whole  that  meets  the  demands  of  a 
high  purpose  or  a  noble  taste ;  this  is  a^iistic  imagi- 
nation. Or,  finally,  it  may  combine  according  to 
principles  of  fact,  of  science,  so  that  the  conception, 
when  realized  in  material  forms,  gives  us  the  steam 
engine,  the  telegraph,  the  sewing  machine,  etc.  ;  this 
is  inventive  imagination.      Find  ilhistrations . 

What  is  a  Fine  Art? — Imagination  lies  at  the 
basis  of  the  whole  realm  of  fine  art.  This  is  equally 
true  in  poetry,  fiction,  music,  architecture,  painting, 
sculpture,  or  any  other  fine  art,  if  there  be  another. 
There  is  one  aspect — an  essential  one — in  which  all 
these  arts  arc  alike;  viz.,  in  the  completed  work,  an 
ideal  of  its  author  is  so  bodied  forth,  or  symbolized, 
that  the  symbol — poem,  novel,  anthem,  temple,  pict- 


IMAGINATION,AXD  CONSTRUCTIVE  CONCEPTION     99 

ure,  or  statue — awakens  in  the  mind  of  another  an 
ideal,  kindred  to  that  from  which  it  sprung  in  the 
mind  of  the  author. 

Let  us  remark,  in  passing,  that  the  true  work  of  the  teacher 
belongs  among  the  fine  arts,  because  it  conforms  to  the  essen- 
tial of  all  fine  art,  in  that  it  attempts  to  realize  an  ideal  as  its 
result.  But  how  little  of  the  work  done  by  teachers  is  thus  ar- 
tistic or  true  work  ! 

Uses  of  Imagination. — All  admit  that  imagination 
is  important  in  the  realm  of  art,  but  some  seem  to  sup- 
pose that,  outside  of  art,  it  serves  little  or  no  good 
purpose.  Some  seem  even  to  doubt  whether  we  should 
not  be  better  without  this  power ;  but  let  us  name 
six  very  important  tises  of  this  power : 

1.  Pure  enjoyment.  —  To  child  and  man  the  play  of 
imagination,  both  in  building  its  castles  and  day-dreams 
and  in  responding  to  the  magic  touch  of  others,  often 
gives  great  enjoyment;  and  when  nothing  impure  or 
malicious  enters,  such  enjoyment  may  be  entirely  in- 
nocent if  indulged  moderately. 

2.  Imagination  may  lighten  life's  burdens. — A  little 
boy,  walking  with  his  grandfather,  complained  of  being 
tired,  and  aj^ked  his  grandfather  to  carry  him.  "No," 
said  the  grandfather,  "take  my  gold-headed  cane  and 
make  a  horse  of  it."  He  bestrode  the  cane,  and  gal- 
loped away  hap[)y.  Many  a  weary  man  at  his  daily 
toil  finds  his  task  less  heavy  when  imagination  jjoints 
to  the  comforts  which  that  toil  may  bring  to  wife  or 
child.  Many  a  poor,  tired  mother,  as,  late  at  night 
she  repairs  the  tattered  clothing  of  her  little  (^ics,  may 
find  the  task  .sweetened  as  she  pictures  the  jwssiblc 
future  of  those  objects  of  her  care  and  toil.    'I'lic  teacher 


lOO  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

may  well  imagine  what  her  troublesome  little  ones 
may  become.  Almost  every  cloud  has  its  "silver 
lining,"  but  imagination  must  find  it. 

3.  Imagination  gives  vividness  and  force  to  language. 
—  Without  the  touch  of  fancy,  and  poetry,  and  illus- 
tration— all  dependent  upon  imagination — what  a  dull 
and  fruitless  thing  were  language,  written  or  spoken ! 
On  this  point.  Dr.  Haven  happily  illustrates,  by  the 
language  he  uses,  the  very  thing  he  is  describing.  He 
says :  ' '  Imagination  gives  vividness  to  our  concep- 
tions, it  raises  the  tone  of  our  entire  mental  activity, 
it  adds  force  to  our  reasoning,  casts  the  light  of  fancy 
over  the  somber,  plodding  steps  of  judgment,  gilds 
the  recollections  of  the  past  and  the  anticipations  of 
the  future,  with  a  coloring  not  their  own.  It  lights 
up  the  horizon  of  thought,  as  the  sunrise  flashes  along 
the  mountain  tops  and  lights  up  the  world." 

Wit,  humor,  and  illustration  would  be  impossible  in 
speech  or  literaturcwithout  an  appeal  to  Imagination. 

4.  luiagination  is  essential  to  success  in  some  of  the 
most  practical  affairs  of  life.  —  Without  it,  the  lawyer 
could  not  construct  his  "theory,"  the  inventor  could 
not  make  his  discovery,  nor  the  pushing  man  of  busi- 
ness plan  those  "ventures"  which  result  in  foreign 
commerce,  transcontinental  railways,  and  great  manu- 
factories. In  fact,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  what  enter- 
prise, even  the  simplest,  could  be  conceived  or  carried 
forward  without  the  help  of  this  power. 

5.  Imagination  makes  possible  all  that  Art  gi7>es  ?(s,  doth 
of  enjoyment  and  of  culture.  —  We  have  already  said 
something  bearing  on  this  point.  As  the  creation  of 
works  of  Art  is  impossible  without  imagination,  so  it 


IMAGINATION, AND  CONSTRUCTIVE  CONCEPTION    Id 

is  impossible  that  they  should  produce  any  effect  ex- 
cept through  the  imagination  of  the  beholder. 

6.  Imagination  gives  the  idea  of  personal  cxcelhviee 
tozvards  which  zue  strive. — This  is  its  highest  and  no- 
blest use.  Without  such  ideals,  no  progress  is  pos- 
sible. Like  the  rainbow,  ever  moving  before  us  as 
we  follow,  they  lead  on  in  every  path  of  progress. 
When  one  no  longer  has  before  his  mind  an  ideal  of 
personal  excellence  towards  which  he  is  striving,  he 
would  better   die;  life  is  not  "worth  living"  to  him. 

It  is  clear,  we  think,  that  imagination  is  not  an  enemy  to  its 
possessor  ;  it  is  not  a  power  to  be  "  crushed  out."  It  is  to  be 
cultivated  and  put  to  a  good  use.  In  this  respect,  it  is  much 
like  all  the  other  powers  of  the  mind,  but  hardly  any  other  is 
more  useful,  on  the  one  hand,  or  more  dangerous  on  the  other. 

Abuses  of  Imagination. — For,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  mental  power  whose  abuse  can  work  more 
mischief.     And  the  abuses  lie  alongside  of  the  uses. 

1.  Too  great  indulgence  in  the  "play"  of  imagina- 
tion zuastes  time  and  weakens  the  mind,  even  whe?i 
nothing  impure  is  indulged  in.  —  This  is  the  danger  of 
the  day-dreamer  and  the  too-ardent  lover  of  fiction. 

2.  Imagination  may  add  to  lifes  burdens,  as  it  does 
in  the  case  of  those  zuho  habitually  ' '  look  on  the  dark 
side." — No  one  works  happily  when  he  looks  only  for 
failure  or  disaster  in  his  work. 

3.  Imagitiation  leads  one  astray,  if  he  mistakes  the 
ideal  for  the  real. — This  is  the  trouble  with  the  wild 
dreamer  or  the  "visionary";  his  imagination  seizes 
on  the  ideal,  and  he  thinks  it  real.  It  is,  also,  the 
temptation  of  the  reckless  speculator,  of  the  gambler, 
and  of  the  "sharper's"  dupe. 


I02  ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

4.  Vile  art  and  vile  iniagini}igs  are  both  the  parent 
and  the  product  of  debased  characters. —  Nothing  is 
more  harmful,  especially  to  the  young.  And  one  of 
the  saddest  things  is  that,  when  a  mind  has  been  once 
polluted  in  this  way,  the  evil  remains  even  against  the 
will.  Such  a  person  may  reform,  and  come  to  hate 
the  vile  thing  and  to  shrink  from  it,  and  yet  be  utterly 
unable  to  free  his  mind  wholly  from  it.  If  the  wound 
be  healed,  the  scar  and  disfigurement  remain.  Hence, 
it  is  doubly  important  that  the  minds  of  youth  should 
be  protected  against  corrupting  art,  literature,  and 
companionship. 

5.  As  Imagination  gives  high  a)id  holy  ideals  of  char- 
acter and  achievement,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  give 
those  that  debase  and  destroy. —  Here  is  the  danger  to 
boys,  of  all  highly  "sensational  "  literature, —  the 
"dime  novel,"  the  accounts  of  the  exploits  of  the 
"James  boys"  and  of  other  criminals.  Here  is  the 
danger  to  girls,  of  the  overwrought,  sensational  novel. 
One  grows  to  be  like  those  whom  he  chooses  for  his 
models,  —  and  he  is  likely  to  choose  for  a  model  some 
one  whose  character  and  career  he  admires. 

Special  Use  to  the  Teacher.  —  To  the  teacher, 
imagination  may  be  of  special  use  in  three  ways,  at 
least :  First,  It  may  help  him  in  imparting  knowledge. 
How  a  dull,  abstract  problem  in  arithmetic  may  glow 
with  interest  when  imagination  has  illustrated  the  dry 
relations  by  a  story !  What  a  tone  and  power  are 
given  to  reading,  when  imagination  has  prepared  the 
way  !  Second,  Imagination  may  assist  greatly  in  govern- 
ing, especially  in  the  case  of  small  children.  Let  us 
refer  again  to  Dr.  Abbott's  little  book,  for  excellent 


IMAGINATION,AND  CONSTRUCTIVE  CONCEPTION     IO3 

illustrations.  Third,  Successful  building  of  good  charac- 
ter is  not  possible  without  appeal  to  the  imagination. 
This  follows  from  what  was  said  of  its  sixth  use. 

Culture  of  Imagination.  —  The  same  means, — 
viz.,  wise  use, — serve  for  the  culture  of  Imagination, 
as  for  the  culture  of  all  the  other  faculties.  But  the 
sort  of  use  must  be  determined  by  the  constitution 
of  the  individual;  here,  as  everywhere,  the  teacher 
must  take  account  of  the  individuality  of  his  pupil. 
With  some,  the  power  needs  first  to  be  aroused, 
with  others,  it  needs  to  be  repressed ;  in  all  cases 
something  must  be  done  to  refine  and  chasten  it. 

For  definiteness,  we  may  say  that  this  power  may 
be  cultivated:  (i)  by  observations  of  natur-e,  (2)  by 
study  of  imaginative  literature,  (3)  by  exercise  in 
writing,  (4)  by  study  of  works  of  art. 

The  child's  imagination  readily  enough  sees  in  nat- 
ure more  than  the  natural,  as  in  the  case  of  the  little 
one  who  wanted  to  sit  on  the  summer  cloud.  It  is 
easy  for  the  loving  and  skillful  mother  or  teacher  to 
cultivate  this  tendency  until  the  common  aspects  of 
nature  shall  speak  to  the  soul  as  clearly  as  to  the 
sense.     The  one  of  whom  the  poet  said, 

"A  primrose  by  a  river's  brim 
A  yellow  primrose  was  to  him; 
And  it  was  nothintj  more," 

had  never  received  such  training,  we  are  sure. 

A  good  exercise  for  boys  and  girls  ' '  in  their  teens  " 
is  to  take  some  highly  imaginative  passage  in  litera- 
ture, and  attempt  to  rewrite  it,  in  .statements  devoid 
of  all  imagination.  For  this  purpose.  Dr.  Haven 
chooses  the  following  lines  from  Mrs.  Welby: 


I04  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

"  The  twilight  hours  hke  birds  flew  by. 
As  lightly  and  as  free  ; 
Ten  thousand  stars  were  in  the  sky, 

Ten  thousand  in  the  sea  ;   • 
For  every  wave  with  dimpled  cheek, 

That  leaped  upon  the  air, 
Had  caught  a  star  in  its  embrace, 

And  held  it,  trembling,  there." 

Had  the  poet  said:  "It  was  a  quiet,  pleasant  even- 
ing ;  there  were  many  stars  visible,  and  each  one  was 
reflected  in  the  sea,  which  was  slightly  agitated,"  it 
would  seem  that  all  the  ideas  would  have  been  ex- 
pressed in  plain  prose. 

Find  other  examples  in  your  own  reading  ;  show  in  what  ways 
there  is  an  expression  of  imagination  ;  then  rewrite  without 
any  imaginative  expression. 

Space  will  not  permit  us  to  take  up  the  study  of  art ;  but 
every  earnest  student,  in  these  times,  can  find  some  opportunity 
for  such  study,  and  some  books  that  will  aid  him. 

CONSTRUCTIVE   CONCEPTION 

What  is  It?  —  It  differs  from  simple  memory  in 
that  it  strives  to  give  its  possessor  a  whole  which  is 
new  to  him,  while  memory  strives  to  recall  his  former 
possessions  only.  When  one,  by  means  of  maps, 
models,  pictures,  and  words,  seeks  to  give  another  a 
correct  notion  of  some  object  in  nature  that  he  has 
not  seen — Niagara,  for  instance — the  appeal  is  made 
to  his  constructive  conception.  And  if  the  work  is 
successfully  done,  there  grows  up  in  his  mind  a  pict- 
ure that  would  be  realized  were  he  to  go  and  see  the 
object  for  himself. 


IMAGINATION.AND  CONSTRUCTIVE  CONCEPTION     IO5 

Mr.  Bain  says :  "  It  passes  above  memory,  as  being  an  ex- 
ercise of  constructiveness,  and  falls  below  imagination  proper, 
as  containing  no  originality  or  invention." 

Not  Imagination.  —  This  is  often  spoken  of,  im- 
properly, as  the  work  of  imagination ;  but,  unhke  im- 
agination, it  aims  to  produce  a  result  which  corre- 
sponds to  fact,  and  not  \.o  fancy.  Like  imagination, 
it  builds  with  material  that  memory  must  furnish  from 
the  stores  given  to  it  by  sense-perception.  No  de- 
scription could  ever  lead  one  born  blind  to  conceive 
of  the  colors  of  a  painting  or  a  landscape — he  has 
never  gained  a  knowledge  of  them  through  sense. 
Nor  would  description  be  any  more  successful  with 
one  who  knew  colors  in  his  youth,  if  he  has  since  be- 
come blind,  and  has  lost  his  memory  of  colors. 

Its  Use. — A  moment's  reflection  shows  that  this 
power  plays  a  large  part  in  our  intellectual  activity ; 
by  it  alone  are  we  able  to  form  just  notions,  through 
description  of  any  kind,  of  anything  beyond  our  ex- 
perience. Our  schools  should  carefully  train  this 
power  wisely  and  systematically. 

Unless  this  power  be  active,  reading  becomes  dull 
and  mechanical,  geography  is  a  collection  of  words 
without  meaning,  history  is  lifeless,  mathematics  a 
mere  form,  and  astronomy,  beyond  the  bare  aspect 
of  the  heavens,  is  impossible.  Illustrative  apparatus 
of  any  kind  has  a  value  just  in  proportion  to  the  aid 
it  furnishes  to  the  constructive  conception,  and  no 
whit  further.  By  this  power  only  can  illustrations  il- 
lustrate, for  it  is  the  nature  of  an  illustration  to  de- 
mand that  conception  should  give  the  meaning  to  it; 
that  is  the  very  purpose  for  which  it  is  used. 


I06  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

Use,  in  Relation  to  Words. — All  words  that 
have  any  meaning  are  at  first  symbols  of  the  concepts 
of  the  one  using  them  ;  but,  in  order  that  they  may 
serve  any  good  purpose,  they  must  awaken  similar 
concepts  in  him  who  hears  or  reads  them. 

Often  the  chief  difficulty  with  the  student  in  arith- 
metic is  that  he  has  not  properly  construed — conceived 
of — the  words  in  which  his  problem  was  stated.  The 
unprofitable  work  in  geography,  —  so  often  and  so 
justly  criticized,  by  saying  that  the  pupils  have  learned 
vicrc  ivords, — is  due  simply  to  the  fact  that  the  pu- 
pil's maps  and  text  have  failed  to  awaken  the  proper 
concepts  in  his  mind.  The  successful  student  of  his- 
tory sees,  in  his  "mind's  eye,"  the  movement  of  the 
army,  as  he  reads  the  description  in  his  text.  A 
large  part  of  the  unskillful  teacher's  effort  is  wasted  in 
the  fruitless  attempt  to  deal  with  concepts  in  the  pu- 
pil's mind,  which  have  not  been  correctly  built  up 
from  the  percepts  derived  through  sense-perception. 

Gaining  Concepts.  —  These  statements  will  show 
what  should  be  the  first  aim  of  the  teacher  in  these 
and  in  other  school  studies ;  viz. ,  helping  the  pupil  to 
gain  correct  concepts,  first  from  sense-perception,  and 
then  through  language.  The  main  purpose  of  all 
"language  lessons,"  as  the  phrase  has  come  to  be 
used,  should  be  the  just  fitting  of  words  to  the  concepts 
for  which  they  stand.  The  foundation  of  all  right 
concepts  is  laid  in  sense-perception  ;  hence,  the  first 
work  with  the  child, —  the  first  work  with  any  one 
who  takes  up  a  subject  in  natural  science, —  should 
be  the  getting  of  the  concepts  for  future  thinking, 
through  a  right  use  of  the  senses. 


IMAGINATIOX,AND  CONSTRUCTIVE  CON'CEPTION     lO/ 

Value  of  Right  Concepts.  —  It  is  apparent  that 
the  facts  of  nature,  the  words  of  a  speaker  or  writer, 
and  all  works  of  art,  mean  much  more  to  some  minds 
than  they  do  to  others.  The  difference  is  due  to  the 
mental  preparation  of  the  observer  or  hearer.  An 
active  mind  well  furnished  with  the  proper  concepts, 
which  arise  in  it  readily  on  occasion,  will  carry  away 
proportionally  more  from  any  speech,  book,  or  ob- 
servation of  nature. 

No  flower,  book,  sermon,  or  statue  can  have  any 
meaning  to  one  beyond  what  he  is  able  to  put  into 
it.  What  we  carry  to  the  field  or  the  forest,  the 
church,  library,  or  picture-gallery,  must  determine 
very  largely  what  we  shall  bring  away. 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE    REFLECTIVE    POWER,  —  CONCEPTS  AND  TERMS 


TS  Forms. — The  Reflective  Power  acts 
in  several  ways ;  writers  do  not  agree 
fully  in  respect  to  their  number.  We 
may  safely  indicate  five  of  these  ways 
of  acting;  viz.,  Comparing,  Abstracting, 
Judging,    Generalizing,    and  Reasoning. 

By  some,  the  Reflective  Power  is  called  the  Understanding ; 
by  others,  it  is  called  the  Elaborative  Faculty. 

Because  writers  on  Psychology  do  not  agree  as  to  the  exact 
number  of  forms  in  which  the  Reflective  Power  acts,  we  have 
placed  the  abbreviation  "  etc."  after  our  list,  in  the  Scheme. 

Comparing. — As  the  Reflective  Power  deals  with 
the  relations  of  things,  or  of  the  concepts  of  things, 
rather  than  with  the  things  themselves,  it  will  be  ob- 
vious that  much  of  its  action  must  be  in  the  form  of 
comparison.  It  notes  the  relations  of  size,  length, 
position,  density,  value,  purpose,  cause  and  effect, 
agreement,  and  a  multitude  of  others. 

Comparison  is  clearly  involved  in  abstracting,  judging,  gen- 
eralizing, reasoning,  etc.  ;  hence,  some  writers  regard  compari- 
son as  including  all  the  various  forms  of  the  Reflective  Power. 

Its  Products. —  The  products  of  the  Reflective 
Power  are  concepts  and  thoughts.      A  thought  is  a 


THE  REFLECTIVE  POWER,— CONCEPTS,  ETC        IO9 

logical  judgment.  Not  all  concepts  are  the  product 
of  the  Reflective  Power,  nor  are  all  judgments.  This 
power  gives  us  only  such  concepts  as  are  abstract  or 
general,  and  such  judgments  as  are  logical.  A  con- 
cept of  an  object  of  sense,  or  of  a  quality  in  connec- 
tion with  its  object,  is  not  a  product  of  the  Reflective 
Power,  nor  is  a  primitive  judgment,  such  as  is  nec- 
essary to  the  cognition  of  any  sensation  or  perception. 
See  page  22. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis.  —  Comparison  is  the  first 
step  in  an  act  of  this  power.  From  comparison,  we 
may  proceed  to  find  the  elements  of  any  object  of 
thought,  —  this  is  analysis.  Or,  we  may  proceed  to 
combine  certain  elements  which  we  judge  to  belong 
together, —  \\'\\'i\'~>  synthesis.  Frequently,  both  proc- 
esses are  combined  in  one  operation. 

Abstraction. — A  concept  of  a  quality  is  abstract 
when  that  quality  is  not  as.sociated  in  thought  with 
any  other  quality  nor  with  any  object  to  which  it  be- 
longs. Some  writers  consider  the  process  one  of  ab- 
straction when  the  attention  is  directed  to  one  of  the 
qualities  which  an  object  possesses,  as  when  looking 
at  a  rose  I  fasten  my  mental  activity  solely  on  its 
form.  But  this  is  not  abstraction,  —  the  quality  is 
not  "drawn  away"  from  the  object;  this  is  simply 
analytic  attention. 

It  is  seen  that  the  process  of  abstraction  is  a  very 
common  one,  when  we  observe  the  large  number  of 
abstract  terms  which  are  used  even  by  children  and 
uncultivated  people.  This  process  has  sometimes  been 
illustrated  in  this  way :  You  look  at  several  objects 
having  a  common   color,  as  a  red  ribbon,  a  red  book, 


no  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

a  red  necktie,  etc.  You  note  their  color  in  connection 
with  the  other  quaHties  of  those  objects.  You  now 
perceive  the  color  in  the  concrete.  You  turn  away  or 
shut  your  eyes,  and  think  of  what  you  have  just  seen  ; 
you  now  conceive  the  color  in  the  concrete.  Again, 
you  drop  out  of  thought  all  the  other  qualities  of  the 
several  objects,  but  still  think  of  the  color  in  connec- 
tion with  each  object ;  you  are  now  conceiving  of  the 
color  in  the  discrete.  Once  more  all  thought  of  the 
object  disappears,  and  you  think  of  the  color  only, 
apart  from  every  object  and  from  all  other  qualities. 
You  are  now  conceiving  of  redness  in  the  abstract,  — 
that  is,  drawn  away  from  everything  else.  It  is  proba- 
ble that  some  such  process  as  this  is  often  gone  through 
with  by  those  who  have  no  thought  of  the  peculiar 
form  of  mental  activity  they  are  exercising. 

Logical  Concepts.  —  These  are  concepts  not  of  ob- 
jects, nor  of  single  abstract  qualities,  but  of  a  group 
or  collection  of  qualities  which  belong  to  several  objects 
in  couinwn  ;  all  the  objects  possessing  these  common 
qualities  constitute  a  class.  The  expression  for  any  con- 
cept is  a  term.  The  term  for  a  logical  concept  is  said 
to  be  both  abstract  and  general;  it  is  abstract  because 
it  is  not  applied  to  any  individual  of  a  class,  and  it  is 
general  because  it  may  be  applied  to  any  individual  of 
the  class.  Recall  what  was  said  about  the  terms 
"man"  and  *'a  man,"  on  page  44. 

Steps  in  Forming  Logical  Concepts.  —  One  per- 
ceives a  large  number  of  animals,  including  horses, 
dogs,  etc.  ;  he  compares  them,  noting  their  resem- 
blances and  differences.  He  perceives,  for  instance, 
the  particulars  in  which  horses  differ  from  the  other 


THE  REFLECTIVE  POWER— CONCEPTS,  ETC        I  I  I 

animals;  dropping  out  the  points  in  which  the  indi- 
vidual horses  differ  from  one  another,  he  selects  the 
particulars  in  which  they  are  all  alike ;  these  particu- 
lars he  withdraws  from  the  individual  horses  and  com- 
bines them  into  a  whole,  which  is  a  logical  concept 
expressed  by  the  term  "  horse."  Here  we  note  four 
distinct  mental  operations.  The  first  is  attentive  per- 
ception ;  this  is  no  part  of  the  forming  of  a  logical 
concept,  but  is  preparatory  for  it.  The  next  step  is 
comparison,  resulting  in  a  discrimination  of  resem- 
blances and  differences.  The  third  step  is  the  process 
of  abstracting,  from  the  concepts  of  the  individual  ob- 
jects,— those  qualities  which  they  possess  in  common. 
The  last,  the  characteristic,  step,  is  the  synthesizing 
of  these  common  qualities  into  one  complex  concept, 
— the  logical  concept. 

Rarely,  if  ever,  does  the  mind  proceed  to  take  these 
steps  with  the  logical  distinctness  which  we  have  sup- 
posed ;  the  operations  are  more  or  less  involved  one 
with  another.  But  we  need  to  separate  them  thus,  in 
thought,  in  order  that  we  may  see  what  is  really  done. 

We  must  distinguish,  with  much  care,  tlie  concepts  from  the 
terms  which  express  them,  or  we  fail  to  mark  the  distinction 
between  things  and  their  symbols.  The  result  always  is  lack 
of  clearness,  or  confusion. 

Characterlstics  OF  CoN'CEFTS. — An  abstract,  gen- 
eral concept  may  embrace  few  elementary  concepts ; 
in  that  case,  it  is  said  to  be  "  broad,"  and  it  may  be 
individualized  in  a  large  number  of  objects.  y\nd 
the  class  to  which  such  a  concept  may  be  applied  is  a 
"high"  class.  Thus,  the  concept  expressed  by  the 
word  ' '  man  "  is  broader  than  the  concept  expressed  by 


112  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  word  "Caucasian";  and  the  class  to  which  it  may- 
be apphed  is  a  higher  class,  and  includes  more  indi- 
viduals.    So  Caucasian  is  higher  than  European. 

Higher  and  Lower  Classes.  —  Thus,  we  see  that 
broader  concepts  may  be  formed  from  narrower,  by 
dropping  out  some  of  the  elementary  concepts,  or 
"marks,"  which  they  contain.  And  the  class  to 
which  the  broader  concept  is  applied  is  the  higher 
class.  >  Thus  polygon  signifies  a  broader  concept  and 
a  higher  class  than  quadrilateral;  and  this  is  broader 
than  parallelogram,  etc. 

Genus  and  Species.  —  The  higher  class  is  a  genus, 
of  which  the  next  lower  class  is  a  species ;  and  a 
class  which  was  species  to  a  genus  may  become  a 
genus  to  a  lower  species.  Thus  polygon  is  a  genus 
of  which  quadrilateral  is  a  species  ;  but  qiiadrilateral 
is  a  genus  of  which  parallelogram  is  a  species. 

Clear  and  Obscure. — A  concept  is  clear  when  it 
is  sharply  distinguished  from  every  other  concept ; 
when  it  is  not  so  distinguished,   it  is  obscure. 

Distinct  and  Confused. — A  concept  is  distinct 
when  its  marks  are  clearly  seen;  thus,  A  quadrilateral 
is  a  polygon  bounded  by  four  straight  lines.  The 
concept  denoted  by  quadrilateral  is  distinct  when  we 
clearly  comprehend  the  two  parts  of  the  above  defini- 
tion. But  the  concept  is  still  inadequate,  unless  we 
see  clearly  all  the  "marks"  denoted  by  the  terms 
"polygon"  and  "four  straight  lines."  Thus,  it  will 
be  seen  that  a  concept  may  be  clear,  and  still  be  in- 
distinct; and  it  may  be  both  clear  and  distinct,  and 
yet  be  very  inadequate. 

It  should  here  be  noted,  that  our  concepts  become 


THE  REFLECTIVE  POWER,— CONCEPTS,  ETC        I  I  3 

more  and  more  adequate,  the  more  faithfully  we  study 
what  is  involved  in  them  ;  complete  knowledge  is  nec- 
essary to  a  perfectly  adequate  concept. 

Comprehension  and  Extension  of  Terms. — The 
comprehension  of  a  term  relates  to  the  number  of  ele- 
mentary concepts,  or  "marks,"  embraced  in  the  con- 
cept to  which  it  applies ;  thus,  the  term  quadrilateral 
has  a  greater  comprehension  than  the  term  polygon, 
the  term  European  than  the  term  Caucasian,  etc. 
The  extension  of  a  term  relates  to  the  number  of  ob- 
jects to  which  it  may  be  applied,  that  is,  to  the 
number  of  individuals  belonging  to  its  class ;  thus  poly- 
gon has  greater  extension  than  quadrilateral,  etc. 

The  comprehension  and  extension  of  a  term  always 
bear  an  inverse  ratio  to  each  other,  —  the  greater  the 
comprehension,  the  less  the  extension,  and  vice  versa. 

This  distinction  between  comprehension  and  extension  is 
very  important,  and  it  should  be  fully  comprehended  by  the 
student.  Let  him  name  terms  of  great  comprehension  and 
little  extension,  also  terms  of  little  comprehension  and  great 
extension.  See  if  you  can  find  a  term  which  has  less  exten- 
sion and  greater  comprehension  than  any  other,  or  the  reverse. 

Notative  and  Symbolic  Terms. — A  notative  term 
signifies,  by  its  form,  the  marks  of  the  concept  to 
which  it  applies;  such  terms  are  polygon,  quadru- 
ped, etc.  By  a  careful  study  of  the  literal  and  exact 
meaning  of  words,  many  terms  which  are  merely  sym- 
bolic at  first,  will  become  notative. 

Absolute  and  Relative. — A  term  is  relative  when 
it  implies  another  term  to  which  it  is  related  ;  thus, 
debtor  implies  creditor ;  master  implies  servant,  etc. 
An  absolute  term  suggests  no  other  as  corresponding 
to  it ;  such  terms  are  sun,  corn,  etc. 

Psy— lo. 


114  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

Positive,  Contrary,  and  Contradictory. — A  posi- 
tive term  may  be  opposed  by  a  contrary  term,  or  b)' 
a  contradictory  one.  It  is  very  important  that  these 
distinctions  be  understood.  A  contradictory  denies 
the  positive  merely,  but  a  contrary  asserts  the  oppo- 
site of  the  positive.  Thus,  the  contrary  of  good  is 
bad  ;  but  its  contradictory  is  not-good.  Often,  terms 
are  used  as  contrary  in  sense,  when  they  are  merely 
contradictory  in  form.  Thus,  the  term  unkind  is  only 
contradictory  in  form,  to  kind  ;  but  it  is  often  used  to 
signify  its  contrary,  cruel.  So,  unlearned  is  used  to 
mean  ignorant,  unwise,  foolish,  etc. 

It  is  important  to  notice  that  two  contradictory 
terms  always  include  the  universe  between  them ; 
thus,  everything  is  either  good  or  not-good,  either 
man  or  not-man,  either  Ego  or  Non-Ego,  etc.  There 
is  nothing  in  the  world  of  things  or  of  thought  that 
can  not  be  put  into  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  classes 
denoted  by  any  two  contradictories. 

Logical  Analysis.  —  This  is  analyzing  a  term  with 
respect  to  its  comprehension,  as  when  we  find  that 
surface  is  a  necessary  element  of  the  concept  expressed 
by  the  term  "polygon." 

Logical  Division. — This  is  analyzing  a  term  with 
respect  to  its  extension,  as  when  we  find  that  the 
quadrilateral  is  included  in  the  class  of  figures  de- 
noted by  the  term  "polygon." 

Distribution  of  a  Term. — A  term  is  "distrib- 
uted "  when  it  is  used  in  its  widest  extension  ;  thus, 
"all  men,"  or  "every  man,"  is  a  term  distributed,  be- 
cause it  includes  every  one  of  the  class  to  which  it 
may  be  applied. 


THE  REFLECTIVE  POWER— CONCEPTS,  ETC        115 

Logical  Definition.  —  In  defining  a  thing  logically, 
we  put  it  into  a  class,  and  then  point  out  the  differ- 
ence between  it  and  other  objects  in  the  same  class. 
Thus,  a  quadrilateral  is  a  polygon  having  four  sides. 
Here  quadrilateral  is  put  into  the  class  "  polygon  ";  it 
is  then  distinguished  from  other  polygons  by  its  hav- 
ing four  sides.  Every  such  definition,  therefore,  con- 
sists of  the  generic  part,  which  puts  the  object  into  a 
class ;  and  of  the  specific,  which  marks  it  off  from  oth- 
ers of  the  class.  In  the  given  definition,  "  polygon  "  is 
the  generic  part,  and  "having  four  sides, "  the  specific. 
The  specific  part  is  called  the  differentia. 

Importance  of  General  Concepts.  —  Without  gen- 
eral, or  logical,  concepts,  language  would  be  impos- 
sible. Most  substantives  are  general  terms,  and  the 
same  is  true  of  verbs,  adjectives,  and  adverbs. 

Nor  would  anything  like  science  be  possible  with- 
out the  power  to  classify ;  and  classification  depends 
upon  the  power  to  form  logical  concepts,  according 
to  which  objects  can  be  arranged  in  classes. 

Progress  of  Scientific  Classification.  —  In  all 
the  natural  sciences  there  is  a  marked  progress  from 
a  classification  that  is  more  or  less  loose,  towards  that 
which  is  more  truly  scientific.  This  progress  results 
from  a  knowledge  of  deeper  and  more  important  char- 
acteristics, which  are  discovered  by  closer  study.  In 
Zoology,  no  importance  is  now  attached  to  such  a 
class  as  quadrupeds,  for  it  is  found  that  the  fact  of 
having  four  feet  is  not  very  significant.  So,  in  other 
sciences,  progress  in  knowledge  often  leads  to  new 
classifications  on  a  more  scientific  basis, —  that  is,  on 
distinctions    that    have   a   more    profound    meaning. 


Il6  ELKMIiXTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Thus,  thought  in  its  progress  comes  more  and  more 
into  harmony  with  things ;  if  man  shall  ever  attain 
complete  knowledge,  the  harmony  will  be  perfect. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  classes,  as  such,  do 
not  exist  in  nature;  there  are  found  only  individ- 
ual objects,  with  their  peculiarities  and  qualities, 
some  of  which  are  obvious,  but  unimportant,  while 
others  may  be  profoundly  significant,  but  their  sig- 
nificance appears  onlj'  after  careful  study.  It  is  held 
by  some  that  these  significant  peculiarities  express  the 
profound  thought  of  the  Creator ;  and  that  classifica- 
tion is  the  more  scientific,  the  more  nearly  it  harmon- 
izes with  this  creative  thought. 

Generalizing. — According  to  some  writers,  the  word  "gener- 
alize" means  the  forming  of  logical  concepts.  Others  use  the 
term  to  signify  scientific  classification.  It  is  in  the  latter  sense 
that  we  have  used  it  as  designating  one  form  of  the  Reflect- 
ive Power. 

Significance  of  General  Terms.  —  Some  have 
maintained  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  logical 
concept,  such  as  we  have  defined  it ;  some  declare 
that  general  terms,  such  as  "man,"  are  empty  of 
meaning, — mere  names.  Those  who  take  this  posi- 
tion are,  therefore,  called  Nominalists.  One  branch 
of  the  Nominalists,  however,  claims  that,  when  the 
term  is  not  a  mere  name,  the  corresponding  concept 
is  a  concept  of  some  individual  of  the  class,  which  is 
a  type,  or  representative,  of  the  class.  On  the  other 
hand,  some  have  held  that  classes  have  a  real,  object- 
ive existence  as  such,  —  that  is,  that  there  is  a  real 
thing,  not  merely  a  product  of  thinking,  that  corre- 
sponds to  such  terms  as  "man,"  "horse,"  etc.  Fierce 
discussions  have  been  waged  over  these  questions. 


THE  REFLECTIVE  POWER, — CONCEPTS,  ETC    IIJ 

Answers. — Doubtless,  abstract,  general  terms  are 
often  used  as  mere  words,  and  sometimes  it  may  be 
that  ^  concept  of  an  individual  of  the  class  does  re- 
spond to  the  term.  But  many  know,  from  their  own 
consciousness,  that  such  words  do  awaken  in  their 
minds  concepts  that  are  real,  and  that  are  clear,  but 
which  are  not  concepts  of  any  individual, — which  are 
not  images  at  all.  The  Nominalists  seem  to  assume 
that  there  can  be  no  concepts  that  are  not  iviages. 
Further,  how  can  an  individual  represent  a  class,  if 
the  mind  can  not  conceive  of  a  class  for  it  to  repre- 
sent? The  concept  of  the  class,  however,  is  purely 
subjective, — it  is  a  product  of  the  mind  ;  classes,  as 
such,  have  no  objective  existence.  Only  individuals 
exist;  no  horse  can  be  found  that  is  not  "a  horse." 
The  notion  of  an  objective  existence  that  corresponds 
to  a  general  term,  is  kindred  to  that  notion  of  "ob- 
jective ideas,"  out  of  which  grew  the  "little  images" 
of  the  Non-Egoist  (page  ^i). 


CHAPTER  XII 

JUDGMENT,     PROPOSITION,    AND    REASONING 

UDGING. —  In  forming  a  logical  judg- 
ment, or  thought,  the  mind  holds  be- 
fore itself  two  concepts,  or  a  concept 
and  a  percept,  and  decides  that  these 
do,  or  do  not,  agree  ;  the  concepts  may- 
be simple  or  very  complex.  You  bring  before  your 
mind  a  concept  of  the  thing  called  snozv,  and  a  con- 
cept of  the  quality  tvJiitcncss ;  you  decide  that  they 
agree,  and  you  say,  "Snow  is  white."  You  bring 
before  your  mind  a  concept  of  the  act  called  murder, 
and  a  concept  of  the  quality  rigJitness ;  you  decide 
that  they  do  not  agree,  and  you  say,  "Murder  is  not 
right."  Every  judgment,  then,  involves  two  concepts, 
and  the  decision  respecting  them. 

Proposition. —  The  expression  of  a  judgment  is  a 
proposition. 

This  definition  is  often  expressed  in  a  false  form  by 
saying,  "A  proposition  is  a  judgment  expressed. "  We 
deny  that  a  proposition  is  a  judgment  expressed  or 
unexpressed ;  the  judgment  is  the  thing,  the  propo- 
sition is  its  symbol.  Here,  as  everywhere,  the  teacher 
can  not  afford  to  confound  a  thing  and  its  symbol. 


JUDGMENT,  PROPOSITION,  AND  REASONING        I  1 9 

As  a  judgment  involves  three  things,  so  a  proposi- 
tion must  have  three  parts;  these  we  call  subject,  at- 
tribute, and  copula.  The  subject  is  the  word  or  words 
denoting  the  principal  concept;  the  attribute  is  the 
word  or  words  denoting  the  related  concept ;  and  the 
copula  is  the  word  or  words  expressing  the  decision. 
Both  copula  and  attribute  may  be  expressed  by  a  single 
word,  as  in  the  proposition.  Water  flows.  The  sub- 
ject and  the  attribute  are  the  Avv/w  of  the  proposition. 
In  this  relation  of  judgment  and  proposition  is  the 
foundation  of  all  grammar.  All  complete  language  is 
in  the  form  of  propositions;  hence,  every  kind  of 
mental  activity  results  in  a  kind  of  judgment ;  if  it 
were  not  so,  all  language  would  not  take  this  form. 
Sense-perception  is  a  form  of  judgment  called  a  prim- 
itive judgment  (page  22).  Only  such  a  judgment  as 
we  have  defined  above  results  from  reflection. 

Kinds  of  Propositions. —  Every  proposition  must 
contain  two  terms,  a  subject  and  an  attribute.  With 
the  same  two  terms,  four  different  propositions  may 
be  made. 

By  the  quantity  of  a  proposition,  we  mean  its  char- 
acter as  universal  or  particular ;  if  its  subject  is  dis- 
tributed, it  is  universal,  otherwise  it  is  particular. 

By  the  quality  of  a  proposition,  we  mean  its  char- 
acter as  affirmative  or  negative  ;  this  is  determined  by 
its  copula. 

With  the  same  two  terms,  then,  wc  may  make  a 
universal  affirmative  proposition,  as,  All  A  is  II  This 
proposition  is  symbolized  by  the  letter  A. 

We  may  also  make  a  universal  negative,  as.  No  A 
is  B ;  this  is  represented  by  the  letter  E. 


I20  ELEMENTS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

We  may  make  a  particular  affirmative  proposition, 
as,  Some  A  is  B ;   this  is  represented  by  I. 

Finally,  we  may  make  a  particular  negative,  as.  Some 
A  is  not  B ;  this  is  represented  by  O. 

Distribution  of  Terms. —  In  a  universal  proposi- 
tion, the  subject  is  distributed,  for  this  is  what  marks 
it  as  universal ;  the  subject  is  not  distributed  in  a  par- 
ticular proposition.  Every  negative  proposition  dis- 
tributes the  attribute,  for  every  part  of  the  attribute 
must  be  denied  of  the  subject. 

Opposition.  — Any  two  of  the  four  propositions  made 
with  the  same  terms  are  in  opposition ;  but  different 
names  are  applied,  according  as  the  propositions  differ 
in  quantity  or  quality,  or  both. 

The  different  forms  of  opposition  are  clearly  shown 
and  named  in  the  accompanying  fig- 

A CONTRARIES E 

cr>  =.       ure. 

'^^D^'^'^  I,  the  particular,  corresponding  to 

co'^  ^^V,      A,  is  called  its  subaltern  ;  O  is  the 

I  ^SUB-CONTRARIES — O  ,        <  r     T^ 

subaltern  oi  E. 

Laws  of  Opposition.  —  Universal  and  Particular. — 
If  the  universal  is  true,  its  subaltern  is  true.  If  the 
particular  is  false,  its  universal  is  false. 

Co7itraries.  —  Two  contraries  can  not  both  be  true; 
both  may  be  false. 

Snb- Contraries. —  Two  sub-contraries  can  not  both 
be  false ;  both  may  be  true. 

Contradictories.  —  Of  two  contradictories,  one  is  al- 
ways true,  and  one  is  false. 

Let  the  student  be  prepared  to  give  the  reasons  for  these 
laws.  Let  him  take  two  terms,  make  the  four  propositions, 
A  E  I  O,  with  them,  and  illustrate  the  Laws. 


JUDGMENT,  PROPOSITION,  AND  REASONING         I  2  I 

Conversion  of  Propositions. — A  proposition  is 
said  to  be  converted  when  its  terms  are  exchanged. 
The  original  proposition  is  then  called  the  convcrtend ; 
the  new  proposition  is  called  the  cotivcrse.  The  con- 
version is  improper  unless  the  converse  is  a  logical 
inference  from  the  convertend.  This  is  the  rule  of 
conversion  :  No  term  must  be  distributed  in  the  converse 
that  zuas  not  distributed  in  the  convcrtend. 

There  are  three  kinds  of  conversion  ;  viz. ,  Simple, 
by  Limitation,  by  Negation.  In  simple  conversion, 
the  terms  are  exchanged  without  modifying  them.  In 
conversion  by  limitation,  the  quantity  of  the  proposi- 
tion is  changed  from  universal  to  particular.  In  con- 
version by  negation,  the  (Quality  is  first  changed  from 
negative  to  affirmative,  by  removing  the  negative  par- 
ticle from  the  copula  and  joining  it  to  the  attribute: 
then  the  terms  are  exchanged  by  simple  conversion. 

How  Converted. — A  is  converted  by  limitation. 
The  attribute  of  A  is  not  distributed  ;  hence,  it  can 
not  become  the  subject  of  a  universal,  therefore  A 
must  be  converted  into  I.  Example:  All  birds  have 
wings;  converted,  it  becomes.  Some  (creatures)  hav- 
ing wings  are  birds. 

E  is  converted  simply,  into  I'^.  For,  as  it  is  uni- 
versal and  negative,  both  its  terms  arc  distributed. 
Example:  No  men  are  dogs;  converted,  it  becomes. 
No  dogs  are  men. 

A  substitutive  proposition  may  be  converted  simply, 
also;  for  both  of  its  terms  have  the  same  comprehen- 
sion and  extension  ;  any  h^gical  definition  is  an  example 
of  a  substitutive  |)rr)position. 

I  is  converted  simi)ly,  intf)  I.      I'or,  as  it  is  particu- 

I'sy,—  II. 


122  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

lar  and  affirmative,  neither  of  its  terins  is  distributed. 
Example:  Some  sheep  are  black;  converted,  it  be- 
comes, Some  black  (creatures)  are  sheep. 

O  is  converted  by  negation;  it  is  first  changed  to 
its  equivalent  I,  and  then  that  is  converted,  simply. 
Example :  Some  trees  are  not  oaks,  is  first  changed  to 
the  equivalent  I  as  follows :  Some  trees  are  not-oaks  ; 
then,  by  simple  conversion,  it  becomes.  Some  (things) 
not-oaks  are  trees.  If  you  recall  what  was  said  about 
contradictory  terms,  such  as  oaks  and  not-oaks,  you 
will  readily  understand  how  O  may  be  thus  changed 
to  its  equivalent  I  (see  page  114,  second  paragraph). 
Every  tree  must  be  oak  or  not-oak. 

If  the  student  will  carefully  reflect  upon  these  Laws  of  Oppo- 
sition and  Laws  of  Conversion,  he  will  soon  see  that  he  can  not 
make  the  simplest  assertion  of  any  kind  without,  at  the  same 
time,  saying  several  other  things  by  logical  inference.  For  in- 
stance, if  one  asserts  A,  he  asserts  its  subaltern,  and  denies  E 
and  O  in  the  same  breath  ;  if  he  asserts  O,  and  in  so  doing 
speaks  falsely,  then  A  and  I  must  be  true,  and  E  must  be 
false.     Every  proposition  asserts  its  converse. 

REASONING 

Inference  and  Reasoning. —  One  truth  may  be 
drawn  from  another  by  inference ;  as,  when  the  truth 
of  one  proposition  is  seen,  the  falsity  of  its  contradict- 
ory may  be  known  by  inference  ;  or  when  an  animal 
is  found  having  no  eyes,  it  may  be  inferred  that  such 
an  animal  can  not  see. 

But  true  reasoning  establishes  a  relation  between  two 
concepts,  through  a  comparison  of  each  with  a  third ; 
thus,  A  equals  B,  and  B  equals  C  ;  hence,  A  equals  C. 


JUDGMENT,  PROPOSITION,  AND  REASONING         I  23 

The  Syllogism.  —  When  a  process  of  reasoning  is 
reduced  to  a  systematic  form,  it  appears  as  a  syllogism, 
or  a  chain  of  syllogisms. 

Not  that  all  reasoning  is  put  into  the  syllogistic 
form  ;  in  fact,  it  is  not  generally  in  this  form.  But 
all  reasoning  may  be  put  into  the  form  of  a  syllogism  ; 
and  this  it  is  well  to  do,  when  we  would  test  its  va- 
lidity. A  syllogism  consists  of  three  propositions  so 
related  that  one  necessarily  follows  from  the  other  two. 

Of  course,  as  a  syllogism  contains  three  proposi- 
tions, it  must  contain  six  terms.  But,  as  each  term 
appears  twice  in  the  syllogism,  only  three  separate 
terms  are  used ;  they  are  known  as  major,  minor,  and 
middle  terms. 

The  major  term  is  the  attribute  of  the  conclnsion ; 
the  minor  term  is  the  subject  of  the  conclusion;  the 
middle  term  is  the  one  with  which  the  other  two  terms 
are  compared,  —  it  does  not  appear  in  the  conclusion. 

The  major  premise  compares  the  major  term  with 
the  middle;  the  minor  premise  compares  the  minor 
term  with  the  middle. 

The  order  of  the  propositions  in  a  syllogism  is  im- 
material ;  any  one  of  them  may  occupy  the  first,  sec- 
ond, or  third  place.      For  instance: 

Socrates  is  a  man  ; 
Therefore  he  is  mortal. 
For  all  men  are  mortal ; 

Or,  All  men  are  mortal ; 

Therefore,  Socrates  is  mortal. 
Because  he  is  a  man,  etc. 

Two  Kinds  of  Syllogisms. —  By  one  process  of 
reasoning,  we  derive  a  particular  truth  from  a  general 


124  ELEM?:XTS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

truth;  this  process  is  called  ^/rc/z/r/zc;/.  It  is  based  upon 
the  principle  that  what  is  true  of  a  whole,  is  also  true 
of  its  constituent  parts. 

The  formula  for  a  deductive  syllogism  is  this :  a  is 
b,  c  \s  a;  therefore  c  is  b. 

By  another  process  of  reasoning,  we  derive  a  general 
truth  from  several  particular  truths ;  this  process  is 
called  induction.  It  is  based  upon  the  principle  that 
what  is  true  of  the  constituent  parts,  is  true  of  the  whole. 

The  formula  for  induction  is  this:  a,  b,  c,  etc.,  are 
X ;  a,  b,  c,  etc.,  represent  js'  therefore j/  is  x. 

These  abstract  formulas  should  be  thoroughly  learned ;  and 
then,  in  any  given  case,  the  student  should  fix  the  value  of 
each  term,  and  then  fill  the  syllogism. 

The  Deductive  Syllogism. -^Taking  the  "stock" 
example  to  illustrate  the  deductive  syllogism,  let  a 
equal  man  ;  let  /;  equal  mortality  or  certainty  of  death ; 
let  c  equal  Socrates.  Our  abstract  syllogism  now  be- 
comes, 

All  men  are  mortal; 

Socrates  is  a  man  ; 

Hence,  Socrates  is  mortal. 

Such  a  syllogism  is  made  in  this  way :  We  take  the 
logical  concept  denoted  by  the  term '  'man,  "and  we  find 
by  logical  analysis  that  mortality  is  one  of  the  ' '  marks  " 
or  elements  of  that  concept ;  hence,  we  make  the  first 
statement.  By  logical  division,  we  find  that  Socrates 
is  one  of  the  class  to  whom  the  term  "man  "  applies  ; 
hence,  we  make  the  second  statement.  From  these 
two  statements,  we  derive  the  conclusion,  on  the  prin- 
ciple already  stated,  that  what  is  true  of  the  whole  is 
true  of  each  constituent  part. 


JUDGMENT,  PROPOSITION,  AND   REASONING        I  25 

When  a  Conclusion  May  Be  Trusted. —  Before 
a  conclusion  can  be  trusted,  we  must  be  sure  of  two 
things :  First,  we  must  be  certain  that  our  premises 
are  true ;  Second,  we  must  be  sure  that  the  conchision 
necessarily  follows  from  the  premises.  The  syllogism 
itself  gives  us  no  power  to  test  the  truth  of  the  prem- 
ises ;  this  must  be  done  in  some  other  way.  But  the 
validity  or  conclusiveness  of  the  syllogism  must  be 
determined  b}^  observing  whether  it  conforms  to  all 
the  "  Laws  of  the  Syllogism." 

Not  all  syllogisms  are  sound  or  valid,  as  we  shall 
see  by  a  study  of  the  Laws  of  the  Syllogism.  Every 
conclusive  syllogism  is  sound ;  that  is,  the  soundness 
or  validity  of  a  syllogism  depends  solely  on  its  conclu- 
siveness. But,  if  the  premises  are  one  or  both  false, 
the  conclusion  from  a  sound  syllogism  is  untrustworthy  ; 
it  may  be  true  or  false ;  our  reasoning  gives  us  no  ground 
of  knowledge  as  to  its  truth,  although  we  may  be  sure 
that  our  syllogism  is  valid.      For  instance,  take  this: 

Every  tyrant  is  a  good  man; 

Washington  was  a  tyrant ; 

Therefore,  Washington  was  a  good  man. 

Here  we  know,  from  other  sources,  that  the  conclusion 
is  true  ;  we  also  know  that  the  syllogism  is  valid.  But, 
as  the  premises  are  false,  the  truth  of  the  conclusion 
does  not  follow  from  our  reasoning  at  all. 


CHAPTER   XIII 


REASONING,   CONCLUDED 


]AWS  OF  THE  Syllogism.  —  In  order  that 
we  may  determine  the  vaHdity  of  a  syl- 
logism, the  following  laws  are  given : 

I.  The  Middle  Term  Distributed.  —  The 
middle  term  must  be  distributed,  in  one 
of  the  premises,  at  least.  Otherwise,  the  major  term 
may  be  compared  with  one  part  of  the  middle,  and 
the  minor  with  another  part,  and  so  no  conclusion 
follows.      Example : 

Oaks  are  trees ; 
Maples  are  trees  ; 
Therefore,  oaks  are  maples. 

2.  TJie  Middle  Term  Unequivocal.  —  If  the  middH 
term  is  equivocal,  it  may  have  one  meaning  in  one 
premise  and  another  meaning  in  the  other,  in  which 
case  it  would  be  no  true  middle,  but  such  in  appear- 
ance only.     Example: 

All  light  bodies  are  easily  Hfted ; 
The  sun  is  a  light  body  ; 
Hence,  the  sun  is  easily  lifted. 

3.  Distribution  in  the  Conclusion.  —  No  term  must  be 

distributed  in  the  conclusion  that  was  not  distributed 
(126) 


REASONING— CONCLUDED  I  2/ 

ill  the  premise.      Otherwise,  the  conclusion  would  as- 
sert more  than  the  premises  would  warrant.   Example : 

All  birds  breathe  air ; 

No  dog  is  a  bird  ; 

Hence,  no  dog  breathes  air. 

4.  Affirmative  Premises.  —  If  both  premises  are  af- 
firmative, only  an  affirmative  conclusion  can  be  drawn. 
For  the  premises  have  asserted  agreement  of  minor 
and  major  terms  w  ith  the  middle  ;  hence,  the  conclu- 
sion must  assert  agreement  between  major  and  minor 
terms,  if  it  assert  anything. 

5.  Negative  Premises.  —  If  both  premises  are  nega- 
tive, there  is  no  conclusion.  For  the  premises  having 
asserted,  merely,  that  both  the  minor  and  the  major 
terms  do  not  agree  with  the  middle,  of  course  we 
know  nothing  about  their  agreement  with  each  other, 
from  such  assertion. 

6.  Negative  Conclusion. —  A  negative  conclusion  re- 
quires one  negative  premise.  For  the  agreement  of 
one  term  of  the  conclusion  with  the  middle  term  must 
have  been  asserted,  and  the  non-agreement  of  the 
other,  in  order  that  we  may  assert  their  non-agree- 
ment with  each  other  in  the  conclusion. 

7.  Particular  Premises. —  If  both  premises  are  par- 
ticular, there  is  no  conclusion.  If  both  arc  /,  there 
is  no  conclusion,  by  Law  i.  If  both  are  0,  there  is 
no  conclusion,  by  Law  5.  If  one  is  /  and  the  other 
0,  then  the  conclusion,  if  any,  must  be  negative,  by 
Law  6.  But  this  negative  conclusion  would  distrib- 
ute at  least  one  term  ;  by  Law  3,  this  term  must  be 
distributed  in  the  premise;  and  by  Law   1,  the  mid- 


128  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOCiY 

die  term  must  be  distributed ;  this  would  require  the 
distribution  of  two  terms  in  the  premises,  which  is 
impossible  if  the  premises  are  /  and  0. 

8.  Universal  Conclusion.— \\\  order  that  the  conclu- 
sion may  be  universal,  both  premises  must  be  universal. 
If  the  conclusion  be  A,  both  premises  must  be  affirma- 
tive, by  Law  4;  the  conclusion  A  distributes  one 
term  ;  hence,  two  terms  must  be  distributed  in  the 
premises;  these  affirmative  premises  must  both  be  A, 
in  order  to  distribute  the  terms. 

If  the  conclusion  be  E,  both  of  its  terms  are  distrib- 
uted ;  hence,  three  terms  must  be  distributed  in  the 
premises ;  but,  as  one  premise  must  be  affirmative,  by 
Law  5,  no  premises  but  A  and  E  will  distribute  three 
terms.  Therefore  both  premises  must  be  universal, 
in  order  to  have  any  universal  conclusion. 

The  Inductive  Syllogism. —  Returning  to  the  ab- 
stract inductive  syllogism,  let  us  give  value  to  its 
terms,  and  then  fill  the  syllogism. 

Let  a,  b,  c,  etc.,  stand  for  all  bodies  whose  ex- 
pansibility we  have  tested  ;  let  x  stand  for  the  quality 
of  expansibility  by  heat ;  let  y  stand  for  all  bodies, 
including  a,  b,  c,  etc.     Then  the  syllogism  will  read  : 

All  bodies,  as  iron,  lead,  etc.,  that  I  have  tried  as 
to  their  expansibility  by  heat,  are  expanded  by  heat. 

But  these  bodies  represent  all  bodies;  hence,  all 
bodies  are  expanded  by  heat. 

The  word  "  represent"  here  must  be  taken  to  mean 
just  like,  ill  respect  to  the  thing  in  question. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  first  premise  states  the 
result  of  observations  ;  the  second  premise  states  an 
assumption.      Hence,  the  first  premise  may  be  false, 


REASONING— CONCLUDED  I  29 

if  our  observations  have  not  been  carefully  made  ;  and 
we  can  never  be  absolutely  sure  that  the  assumption  in 
the  second  premise  is  not  false.  The  only  possibility 
of  absolute  certainty  in  the  second  premise  would  be 
to  make  a,  b,  c,  etc.,  equal  to  y,  that  is,  to  try  the 
experiment  with  every  one  of  the  class.  But  in 
that  case  there  would  be  no  induction  at  all;  the 
conclusion  would  be  identical  with  the  first  premise, 
and  both  would  merely  state  a  truth  discovered  by 
observation. 

We  do  Trust  the  Assumption. — Although  we 
can  never  be  absolutely  certain  that  the  several  cases 
examined  do  represent  the  class,  in  the  sense  in  which 
we  have  defined  the  word  "  represent "  as  used  in  an 
Induction,  yet  the  human  mind  is  so  constituted  that 
we  do  constantly  trust  this  assumption,  and  make  our 
inductions.  And,  in  many  cases,  we  find  it  perfectly 
safe  to  do  so.  Most  of  the  laws  of  Natural  Science 
are  established  by  induction. 

For  instance,  the  law  that  all  horned  and  cloven-footed  ani- 
mals ruminate,  that  all  metals  are  expanded  by  heat,  that  all 
magnets  attract  iron,  etc.  Let  the  student  see  if  he  can  take 
the  abstract  formula  for  induction,  and  so  fill  the  terms  as  to 
make  these  inductions. 

The  conclusion  of  an  induction  may  become  the 
major   premise   for   a   deduction.       For   instance : 

All  horned  and  cloven-footed  animals  ruminate  ; 
The  cow  is  a  horned  and  cloven-footed  animal  ; 
Hence,  the  cow  ruminates. 

The  major  premise  of  a  deduction  is  usually  the  result 
of  an  inductio7i;  or  it  is  a  necessary  truth,  to  be  de- 
fined hereafter. 


130  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

Not  Always  Safe  to  Do  So. —  But  some  induc- 
tions are  found  to  be  false,  because  the  assumption  of 
the  meaning  of  "represent"  is  unwarranted.  Some- 
times the  reason  is  tliat  not  enough  cases  are  exam- 
ined before  the  assumption  is  made ;  then  the  induc- 
tion is  said  to  be  too  narrow.  Sometimes  circum- 
stances prevent  us  from  examining  such  cases  as  would 
show  the  falsity  of  the  assumption.  It  is  said  that  a 
traveler  from  a  cold  country  once  told  the  King  of 
Siam  some  very  strange  and  improbable  stories  about 
things  in  his  own  country.  However,  the  King  be- 
lieved all  that  he  said  until  the  traveler  told  him  that 
sometimes  in  his  country  water  became  hard  like  a 
rock.  This  was  too  much  for  the  King's  credence. 
Why  did  he  reject  it?  Because  he  had  made  an  in- 
duction with  which  it  was  in  conflict. 

Many  superstitions,  as  that  Friday  is  an  unlucky 
day,  Thirteen  is  an  unlucky  number,  etc.,  and  many 
of  the  so-called  "signs,"  as  that  a  certain  position  of 
the  horns  of  the  new  moon  indicates  a  wet  month, 
are  the  result  of  careless  or  false  inductions. 

Let  the  student  see  if  he  can  put  the  King  of  Siam's  induction, 
or  any  of  the  others,  into  the  formula. 

The  Enthymeme.  — An  argument  in  which  one  of 
the  premises  is  suppressed,  is  called  an   enthymeme. 

This  is  often  done  in  the  deductive  argument ;  and 
usually  the  suppressed  premise  is  the  major,  —  it  may 
be  supposed  to  be  so  well  understood  as  to  need  no 
statement.  Four  pencils  cost  txvelve  cents  because  one 
pencil  costs  three  cents,  is  an  enthymeme  of  this  kind, 
the  suppressed  premise  being  that  four  pencils  cost 
four  times  as  many  cents  as  one  pencil. 


REASONIXG— CONCLUDED  13  I 

Often  an  enthymcme  which  seems  plausible  will  be 
seen  to  be  faulty  if  the  suppressed  premise  is  supplied. 
For  instance,  some  one  shows  you  that  a  certain  habit 
or  opinion  is  working  great  evil  among  men,  therefore 
he  urges  that  it  is  your  duty  to  give  your  whole  time 
and  energy  to  the  overthrow  of  this  habit  or  opin- 
ion. His  argument  is  an  enthymeme,  the  suppressed 
premise  being  that  it  is  your  duty  to  give  your  whole 
time  and  energy  to  the  overthrow  of  bad  habits  and 
opinions  among  your  fellows.  A  sophistical  advocate 
will  sometimes  put  his  argument  in  the  form  of  an 
enthymeme  purposely,  because  the  statement  of  the 
suppressed  premise  would  show  the  misleading  nature 
of  his  argument. 

Hypothetical  Reasoning.  — This  is"of  two  forms, 
conditional  and  disjunctive,  represented  as  follows : 
If  A  is  B,  C  is  D;  but  A  can  be  shown  to  be  B; 
hence,  C  is  D;  or,  Either  A  is  B,  or  C  is  D;  but  it 
can  be  shown  that  A  is  not  B;  hence,  C  is  D.  These 
are  not,  properly,  forms  of  reasoning  at  all,  because 
there  is  no  middle  term  ;  they  are,  rather,  forms  for 
drawing  an  immediate  inference. 

Let  the  student  be  careful  that  he  does  not  assume  that,  in 
tlie  first  of  these  cases,  Cis  not  D,  when  it  can  be  shown  that 
A  is  not  .5/  the  condition  gives  no  ground  for  this  conclusion. 
Nor  does  it  follow,  in  the  hypothetical  form,  that  C  is  not  Z>, 
when  A  is  found  to  be  //. 

Two  Kinds  of  Truth.  —  There  are  two  kinds  of 
truth;  viz.,  necessary  ^\\(\  contitigent.  Necessary  truth 
is  independent  of  time  and  place ;  and  its  contradict- 
ory is  unthinkable  or  absurd.  Such  truths  belong 
mostly  to  Mathematics  and  Logic  (page  48). 


132  KLEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

Contingent  truth  is  no  less  truth  than  the  other,  but 
it  is  dependent  on  time,  place,  and  circumstance ;  nor 
is  its  contradictory  unthinkable.  Napoleon  zvas  Em- 
peror of  France,  is  a  contingent  truth ;  so  is  the  truth 
that  The  Nile  floivs  northward.  The  sum  of  the  three 
angles  of  a  triangle  equals  tzvo  right  angles,  is  a  neces- 
sary truth. 

Two  Kinds  OF  Reasoning. —  Reasoning  upon  nec- 
essary truth  \s demonstrative  reasoning  ;  reasoning  upon 
contingent  truth  is  probable  reasoning.  It  is  not  meant, 
however,  that  probable  reasoning  may  not  lead  to  re- 
sults that  are  just  as  certain  as  those  reached  by  de- 
monstrative reasoning.  But  the  results  of  demonstra- 
tive reasoning  are  always  certain,  or  they  are  worth- 
less ;  while  the  results  of  probable  reasoning  may  range 
from  certainty  down  to  the  barest  possibility. 

Demonstrative  Argument,  Peculiar. —  Demon- 
strative arguments  have  two  peculiar  characteristics: 
First,  every  argument  is  perfect,  or  it  is  worthless; 
Second,  one  conclusive  argument  is  as  good  as  an- 
other, and  one  is  as  good  as  a  thousand.  It  is  not  meant 
that  all  arguments  are  equally  neat,  or  concise,  or  in- 
genious ;  but  an  argument  is  conclusive,  or  it  has 
no  force ;  and  all  conclusive  arguments  are  equally 
strong,  and  one  is  sufficient. 

Direct  and  Indirect  Demonstration.  —  In  demonstra- 
tive reasoning,  there  are  two  modes  of  procedure ; 
one  shows  the  truth  of  a  proposition  directly,  and 
the  other  shows  its  truth  by  proving  that  no  in- 
consistent proposition  can  be  true.  For  instance, 
if  a  geometer  wants  to  prove  that  the  line  a  is  equal 
to  the  line  b,  he  may  be  able  to  show  that  each  -is 


REASONING— CONCLUDED  133 

equal  to  the  line  c,  and  hence  they  are  equal  to  each 
other ;  this  is  direct  reasoning.  Or,  he  may  show 
that  if  he  supposes  a  to  be  either  longer  or  shorter 
than  b,  such  a  supposition  will  lead  to  an  absurdity. 
If,  therefore,  a  can  not  be  longer  nor  shorter  than  b, 
they  must  be  equal  in  length ;  this  reasoning  is  indi- 
rect.     Both  are  equally  conclusive. 

Probable  Reasoning.  —  Reasoning  concerning  con- 
tingent truth  is  probable  reasoning.  In  this  kind  of 
reasoning,  different  arguments  may  carry  different  de- 
grees of  weight,  and  the  more  arguments  tending  to 
the  same  conclusion,  the  stronger  becomes  our  confi- 
dence in  the  truth  of  that  conclusion.  Sometimes 
we  may  trust  the  conclusion  as  implicitly  as  we  trust 
the  result  of  a  mathematical  demonstration.  From 
this  certainty,  the  degree  of  probability  established  by 
this  kind  of  reasoning  may  diminish  to  a  conclusion 
that  is  simply  possible. 

The  sources  of  evidence  in  probable  reasoning  are 
three;  viz.,  Tcstiinonj,  Observation  or  Experience,  and 
Analogy. 

Testimony. —  It  is  natural  for  men  to  put  confidence 
in  the  testimony  of  others ;  and  it  is  reasonable  to  do 
so.  For  men  tell  the  truth  much  oftener  than  they 
tell  falsehoods;  if  it  were  not  so,  society  could  not 
be  held  together.  Even  the  worst  liars  speak  the 
truth  more  than  they  lie. 

Weighing  Testimony. — Nevertheless,  men  do  often 
tell  untruths,  sometimes  by  mistake,  and  sometimes 
from  purpose;  hence,  it  becomes  us  to  weigh  testi- 
mony. The  value  of  testimony  is  determined  by  the 
following  considerations :  The  number  of  the  witnesses, 


134  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

their  competence,  and  their  honesty,  the  independence 
of  their  statements,  the  degree  in  which  their  state- 
ments concur,  and  the  question  whether  the  witnesses 
have  any  motive  to  falsify.  All  these  points  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  deciding  how  fully  we  are  to 
receive  what  is  told  us.  Nor  must  the  one  who  weighs 
testimony  forget  that  if  he  has  any  bias  in  his  own 
mind,  any  leaning  towards  one  side  rather  than  the 
other,  he  is  likely  to  be  misled ;  he  is  in  danger  of 
receiving  too  readily  that  testimony  which  accords 
with  his  bias,  and  of  unreasonably  rejecting  the  testi- 
mony opposed  to  it. 

Degree  of  Probability.  —  We  must  believe,  if  we 
are  reasonable,  what  rests  upon  the  testimony  of  a 
sufficient  number  of  competent,  honest,  independent, 
concurrent  witnesses.  It  is  said  that  an  eminent  math- 
ematician has  demonstrated  that  a  sufficient  amount 
of  such  testimony  should  cause  us  to  believe  any  story, 
no  matter  how  improbable  it  may  be  ;  in  other  words, 
it  is  mathematically  more  improbable  that  a  certain 
amount  of  such  testimony  should  be  false  than  any 
possible  improbability  in  the  story  told. 

Fact  and  Inference. — A  careful  distinction,  how- 
ever, must  be  made  between  the  testimony  of  a  wit- 
ness as  to /"err/,  and  the  statement  of  his  info'oices  from 
that  fact.  If  a  sufficient  number  of  witnesses  say  that 
they  have  seen  a  ghost  in  a  grave-yard,  we  are  bound 
to  believe  that  they  have  seen  something;  but  that 
does  not  bind  us  to  receive  their  inference  that  it  was 
a  ghost.  Witnesses  in  court  are  often  cautioned  to  state 
only  facts,  and  not  their  opinions  concerning  those  facts, 
— to  tell  what  they  know,  not  what  they  tliink. 


REASONING— CONCLUDED  135 

A  few  years  ago,  a  story  was  started  that  a  farmer  in  eastern 
Illinois,  being  in  his  field  one  day,  cursed  the  Almighty,  be- 
cause of  the  drought  or  something  else;  and  that  he  was  struck 
dead,  and  his  body  stood  there  for  days  after,  with  a  constant 
stream  of  fire  issuing  from  his  mouth  and  nostrils.  It  was  said 
that  many  different  persons  had  seen  the  body  standing  thus. 
Now,  should  we  be  justified  in  believing  such  a  story?  Un- 
doubtedly we  should  believe  the  story  as  to  the  body,  if  it  was 
supported  by  Sufficient  evidence  ;  but  that  would  not  oblige  us 
to  believe  the  inference  that  the  man's  death  was  a  judgment 
inflicted  by  the  Almighty,  for  his  blasphemy. 

Observation  or  Experience.  —  The  evidence  of 
our  own  senses  is  observation,  and  it  may  be  trusted 
under  fair  conditions.  But  we  are  guided  in  respect 
to  the  present  and  the  future,  largely  by  knowledge 
derived  from  past  experience.  This  knowledge  is  al- 
most entirely  in  the  form  of  inductions  which  we  have 
made  from  that  experience ;  and  often  they  have  al- 
most the  force  of  intuitions. 

Analogy.  —  By  analogy  we  mean  the  inference  that, 
because  two  things  are  alike  in  certain  particulars, 
therefore  they  are  alike  in  some  other  particular.  Of 
course,  the  more  known  points  of  resemblance,  the 
stronger  the  analogy.  But  analogy  is  very  untrust- 
worthy as  an  argument  when  taken  alone ;  joined  to 
other  arguments,  it  strengthens  the  case  more  or  less. 
For  instance,  our  observation  that  some  of  the  other 
planets  are  flattened  at  the  poles,  adds  to  the  force 
of  other  arguments  for  believing  that  the  earth  is 
flattened  at  the  poles. 

Analogy  as  a  Defense. — But,  while  analogy  weighs 
but  little  in  support  of  a  proposition,  it  may  be  a  most 
powerful  instrument  in  destroying  the  argument  of  an 


136 


ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


opponent.  For  instance,  if  the  opponent  has  built  up 
a  plausible  argument  in  support  of  a  certain  position, 
and  we  can  make  another  argument  just  like  it,  but 
which  leads  to  a  palpably  false  conclusion,  we  have 
destroyed  the  force  of  his  argument.  The  original 
question  remains  as  it  was  before. 

Example. —  Some  years  ago,  a  skeptical  writer  con- 
structed a  famous  argument  to  show  that  the  miracles 
of  the  New  Testament  are  incredible.  He  was  an- 
swered by  an  argument  precisely  similar,  showing  that 
it  is  incredible  that  such  a  man  as  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte ever  lived. 

Much  of  what  we  have  said  here  concerning  the  Reflective 
Power,  strictly  belongs  to  Logic  ;  but  it  claims  a  place  in  Psy- 
chology because  it  has  to  do  with  the  necessary  action  of  the 
human  mind. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE    SENSIBILITY, GENERAL    STATEMENTS 

NTERACTION  of  Powers.  — The  hu- 
man being  is  a  unit.  We  may  divide 
Man's  powers  into  physical  and  psychic- 
al ;  again,  we  may  divide  the  latter  in- 
to Intellect,  Sensibility,  and  Will,  —  we 
may  subdivide  still  further.  In  thought,  we  may  dis- 
tinguish these  different  activities  and  states ;  some- 
times, in  fact,  one  or  more  of  them  may  be  especially 
prominent,  while  the  others  are  comparatively  quiet  or 
unnoticed.  But  after  all,  it  is  the  one  Ego,  the  one 
indivisible  human  being,  that  knows  and  feels  and 
acts,  —  body  and  mind  both  concerned  in  it  all.  And 
each  of  the  powers  and  susceptibilities  interacts  with 
all  the  rest,  and  influences  them  all. 

Studying,  in  different  chapters  and  under  different 
heads,  the  several  powers,  susceptibilities,  and  activi- 
ties of  man,  there  is  danger  that  we  shall  forget  or 
overlook  his  unity,  and  the  interdependence  and  in- 
teraction of  all  with  each,  and  of  each  with  all.  So, 
as  we  take  up  the  study  of  the  Sensibility,  we  must 
remember  that  we  have  not  passed  over  into  a  foreign 
realm,  independent  of  the  one  we  have  left,  and  un- 

Psy.— 12.  (  >37) 


138  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

connected  with  it.  We  have  simply  brought  under 
consideration  another  part  of  the  same  mind's  activi- 
ties and  susceptibilities,  blended  in  actual  life  with  all 
the  rest,  —  acting  upon  them  all  and  modified  by  their 
action  in  return.  "The  action  of  the  soul  in  feeling 
depends  more  or  less  upon  its  action  in  knowing  and 
willing ;  its  action  in  knowing  depends  on  its  action 
in  feeling  and  willing;  and  its  action  in  willing  de- 
pends on  its  action  in  feeling  and  knowing." 

The  teacher,  especially  the  young  and  inexperienced  teacher, 
is  in  great  danger  of  forgetting  the  essential  unity  of  the  child, 
— unity  in  all  his  bodily  powers  and  capacities,  together  with 
all  the  distinct  but  dependent  capacities  and  activities  of  his 
mind.  Only  as  all  are  duly  regarded  in  their  relation  to  one 
another  and  to  the  sum  total  which  makes  the  individual  pupil, 
can  education  be  truly  symmetrical. 

Not  Definable.  —  We  can  not  define  Sensibility, 
or  Feeling  in  general.  Professor  Bowne  says:  "  We 
can  only  identify  and  name  it."  It  is  one  of  the 
primary  things  in  human  experience,  —  easily  distin- 
guished from  all  others  by  its  subject,  readily  ex- 
pressed by  tone,  sign,  or  word.  But,  as  in  the  case 
of  all  first  things,  we  have  nothing  simpler  on  which 
we  can  frame  a  definition.  We  know  when  we  feel, 
we  distinguish  the  peculiarities  of  the  experience  ;  but 
that  is  the  end  of  it,  —  we  can  not  define  it. 

Nor  is  there  any  certain  test  by  which  we  can  be 
absolutely  sure  that  the  experience  is  the  same  to 
others  that  it  is  to  ourselves,  although  there  are  many 
reasons  for  inferring  that  it  is  so.  Least  of  all,  is 
there  any  sure  measure  of  the  relative  intensity  of  our 
feelings  as  compared  with  those  of  others.      Nothing 


THE  SENSIBILITY— GENERAL  STATEMENTS         139 

seems  more  certain  than  that  many  who  are  the  most 
vehement  in  expressing  their  feeUngs, are  most  shallow 
in  their  experience  of  them. 

Sensibility  Begins  Where? — The  lowest  form  of 
Sensibility  is  found  in  what  we  have  known  as  a  sen- 
sation, that  is,  a  cognized  affection  of  the  nerves ; 
but  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  nerves  do  not 
feel,  the  mind  feels  through  the  nerves.  No  matter 
how  great  the  stimulus  to  the  nerves,  if  the  mind  is 
not  affected  by  it,  there  is  no  sensation.  Hence, 
what  is  sometimes  called  physical  feeling  is  really  a 
psychical  affection.  And  it  is  quite  certain  that  the 
first  movements  of  mental  activity  in  the  babe  begin 
in  the  cognition  of  these  nervous  affections.  From 
this  lowest  form  of  Sensibility,  its  range  extends  to 
the  highest  flights  of  sublimity,  duty,  and  adoration. 

We  have  noted  that  all  our  terms  in  Psychology  are  borrowed 
from  sense ;  notice  such  terms  as  tasteful,  loathsome,  disgust- 
ing, sweet,  fragrant,  insipid,  etc.  All  have  a  secondary  mean- 
ing which  has  no  reference  to  sense,  although  all  are  borrowed 
from  sense.  Again,  conscience  is  said  to  prick  us,  or  to  buffet 
us  ;  joy  elates  us  ;  grief  depresses  us  ;  love  warms  us,  etc.  We 
use  the  term  "  warmth  "  to  apply  to  fullness  of  feeling  in  general ; 
and  coldness  signifies  lack  of  feeling.  From  the  lower  forms 
of  Sensibility,  then,  we  borrow  terms  for  the  higher. 

Two  Classes.  —  In  a  very  true  sense,  any  move- 
ment or  form  of  Sensibility  is  psychical ;  but  it  is 
easy  to  draw  a  distinction  between  two  well-marked 
forms.  The  first  is  the  feeling  that  arises  solely  from 
the  condition  or  functions  of  the  nerves  of  the  body, 
as  in  the  sensations.  This  we  may  call  physical  feel- 
ing ;  and  it  is  the  ground  of  a  large  part  of  our  com- 
fort or  discomfort. 


I40  ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

The  feelings  which  have  a  purely  mental  source  are 
much  more  numerous  and  important.  These  do  not 
arise  from  the  organic  functions,  but  from  some  '  'con- 
ception or  mental  state."  Such  are  psychical  feelings 
proper ;  but  it  may  be  observed  that  physical  sensa- 
tions may  be  their  remote  cause,  as  when  the  hearing 
of  a  noble  piece  of  music  gives  rise  to  exalted  emo- 
tions. We  must  note,  however,  that  in  proper 
psychical  feeling  some  act  of  the  intellect  is  the  immedi- 
ate cause.  We  feel  sorrow,  or  joy,  or  anger,  or  pity, 
because  of  something  we  know,  or  think  we  know.  The 
feeling  of  the  ludicrous  arises  from  the  juxtaposition 
of  incongruous  concepts ;  take  away  the  concepts,  and 
the  feeling  passes.  If  one  insult  us  never  so  grossly, 
we  feel  no  anger  if  he  speak  in  an  unknown  tongue, 
— there  is  no  act  of  the  intellect  to  give  rise  to  anger. 

All  Feeling,  Pleasurable  or  Painful.  —  Dr. 
Haven  says  :  ' '  One  general  distinction  lies  at  the  out- 
set, patent  and  obvious,  running  through  all  the  forms 
and  modes  of  Sensibility;  namely,  the  difference  of 
agreeable  and  disagreeable.''  The  quality  of  pleasure 
or  pain  may  exist  in  almost  infinite  degrees ;  some 
feelings  may  even  partake  of  both  characteristics. 
But  perhaps  we  can  not  conceive  of  any  feeling  that 
should  be  strictly  indifferent;  as  Dr.  Haven  says: 
' '  The  state  of  indifference  is  not  an  exercise  of  Sen- 
sibility, but  a  simple  zuant  of  it,  as  the  very  name  de- 
notes by  which  we  most  appropriately  express  this 
state  of  mind,  i.  e.,  apathy.'"  Professor  Bowne  says: 
' '  We  might  define  feeling  as  the  state  of  consciousness 
which  consists  in  some  form  of  pleasure  or  pain,  like 
or  dislike,    satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction.       Of  course 


THE  SENSIBILITY— GENERAL  STATEMENTS  I4I 

this  is  not  a  definition,  but  only  an  identification. 
What  the  terms  mean  can  be  known  only  in  experi- 
ence." 

We  may  notice  that  painful  feelinjjs  —  fear,  dread,  suffering, 
are  always  costly  ;  they  diminish  the  vigor  and  efficiency  of  the 
mind.  Hence,  such  feelings  should  be  used,  or  appealed  to, 
as  motives  only  when  nothing  better  can  be  done.  This  fact 
has  an  important  bearing  in  reference  to  a  government  by  force 
and  punishment. 

Source  of  all  Jov  and  Sorrow. —  It  is  not  in 
knowing  or  willing  that  we  find  our  happiness  or  un- 
happiness,  our  pleasure  or  our  pain ;  these  belong  to 
our  feelings  alone,  or  rather,  they  are  our  feelings. 
For,  as  has  been  said,  all  feeling  has  one  or  the  other 
of  these  characteristics,  which  are  not  found  any- 
where else.  To  be  sure,  the  feeling  may  arise  in  con- 
sequence of  knowing  or  willing  in  a  certain  way ;  but 
the  joy  or  sorrow,  the  pleasure  or  the  pain,  is  not  iii 
the  knowing  or  the  willing.  For  this  reason,  it  may 
even  be  said  that  feeling  is  more  vital  to  us,  concerns 
us  more,  as  it  were,  than  any  other  form  of  mental 
state  or  movement.  So  far  as  our  personal  interest  is 
involved,  it  may  perhaps  be  .said  that  the  chief  reason 
why  we  should  know  rightly,  and  choose  and  act 
rightly,  is  because  in  that  way  alone  we  shall  secure 
to  ourselves  a  feeling  of  happiness.  Neither  know- 
ing nor  willing  has  come  to  fruition  as  to  its  subject 
till  it  has  been  followed  by  the  appropriate  feeling. 

Motives  to  Action.  —  Not  only  arc  our  feelings  the 
source,  or  seat,  of  all  our  happiness  or  unhappiness, 
but  they  furnish  the  motives  in  view  of  which  we  choose 
and  act.  "The  springs  of  human  action  lie  lierc. 
Here  we  find  the  motives  which  set  the  busy  world 


142  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

in  action,  the  causes  which  go  to  make  men  what  they 
are  in  the  busy  and  everchanging  scene  of  Hfe's  great 
drama."  It  seems  possible  that  knowledge  alone 
might  lead  us  to  will  and  to  act ;  but  it  seems  certain 
that  it  never  does.  It  is  only  when  desire  or  aversion 
has  arisen  in  consequence  of  w^hat  we  know,  that  there 
is  anything  affecting  the  will,  soliciting  it  to  act. 
Many  know  well  enough  in  respect  to  right  behavior, 
whose  feelings  in  respect  to  the  right  are  too  slug- 
gish to  urge  the  will  effectually. 

Professor  Bowne  says:  "The  desires  and  their  opposites 
form  the  transition  from  knowing  to  willing.  In  knowing  and 
feeling,  we  have  the  conditions  of  desire  ;  and  in  desire  we 
have  the  condition  of  proper  volition.  Our  feelings  and  inter- 
ests are  the  deepest  things  in  us.  Will  and  understanding 
have  no  significance  except  as  instruments  of  this  throbbing 
and  aspiring  sensitive  life." 

In  common  language,  "the  heart"  is  the  term  to  express  the 
sum  total  of  our  feelings ;  hence,  we  see  the  philosophic  cor- 
rectness of  the  Wise  Man  when  he  says,  "  Keep  thy  heart  with 
all  diligence,  for  out  of  it  are  the  issues  of  life." 

Close  Relation  to  the  Body.  —  The  relation  of 
the  Sensibility  to  the  body,  if  we  may  say  so,  is  more 
intimate  than  that  of  the  intellect  or  the  \\ill.  Its  lowest 
form  arises  simply  from  the  affections  of  the  nerves. 
In  their  reaction,  our  feelings  have  an  astonishing  ef- 
fect on  the  vital  functions  of  the  organism.  Shame 
reddens  the  cheek,  joy  quickens  the  pulse,  fear  some- 
times paralyzes  the  muscles.  Not  unfrequently  ex- 
cessive feeling  has  been  fatal  in  its  results. 

We  have  noted  before,  that  nearly  or  quite  all 
forms  of  mental  activity  have  an  appropriate  bodily 
expression;  but,  while  this  is  true,  it  will  be  found 


THE  SEN'SIBILITY— GENERAL  STATEMENTS         143 

that  the  bodily  expression  of  the  feelings  is  far  more 
striking  than  any  expression  of  the  intellect  or  the 
will.  Many  of  the  bodily  expressions  of  feeling  are 
common  to  man  and  brute. 

Expression  and  Repression. — A  feeling  is  often 
induced,  or  at  least  intensified,  by  indulging  in  its  ex- 
pression. Hence  the  wisdom  of  restraining  the  ex- 
pression of  unlovely  feelings.  One  may  not  be  able 
to  overcome  his  anger  at  once;  but  it  will  help  him 
to  do  so,  if  he  refrains  from  showing  the  feeling.  De- 
sirable feelings,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  induced 
or  strengthened  by  their  free  expression. 

However,  sad  and  depressing  feelings  are  sometimes 
prolonged  if  their  expression  is  repressed;  while  a  full 
expression  is  found  to  be  a  relief.  This  is  seen  in  the 
benefit  sometimes  found  in  a  "good  cry."  The  tend- 
ency to  deepen  a  feeling  by  restraining  its  expression 
is  also  seen  in  the  case  of  one  moved  to  mirth  in  a 
place  where  laughter  would  be  unseemly.  In  such  a 
case,  that  is  sometimes  found  to  be  irresistibly  funny, 
which  in  other  circumstances  would  be  only  slightly 
diverting.  Teachers  will  generally  do  better  to  let 
pupils  indulge  in  a  reasonable  laugh  when  there  is  any 
cause  for  it,  instead  of  trying  wholly  to  suppress  it. 

Sensibility  and  Intellect.  —  We  have  seen  that 
cognition  is  necessary  to  the  lowest  form  of  physical 
feeling  ;  also,  we  have  seen  that  knowledge,  or  a  move- 
ment of  the  intellect,  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the 
higher  forms  of  psychical  feeling.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  intellect  does  its  best  work  only  when  it  is  favored 
by  helpful  feeling.  Conditions  of  bodily  comfort,  in- 
terest in  what  is  attempted,    a  buoyant  and  hopeful 


144  ELEMENTS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

frame  of  mind,  arc  necessary  to  the  best  accomplish- 
ment of  any  intellectual  task.  Such  work  is  greatly 
aided,  also,  by  love  for  one  whom  it  will  please,  or 
by  the  hope  of  applause  or  reward.  All  these  and 
similar  facts  have  great  significance  for  the  teacher. 

In  order,  however,  that  feeling  should  be  helpful  to 
intellect,  it  must  be  moderate  in  degree ;  a  mind  per- 
turbed by  feeling  of  any  kind  can  not  think  well.  In 
such  a  case.  Intellect  and  Sensibility  may  be  said  to 
be  opposed  to  each  other,  or  to  ' '  exist  in  an  inverse 
ratio."  It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  highest  intel- 
lectual power  is  not  found  in  persons  susceptible  to 
the  most  intense  feeling.  Probably,  however,  the 
opposite  is  generally  true ;  the  great  intellect  and  the 
keen  sensibility  usually  go  together,  but  such  persons 
are  rarely  the  most  demonstrative  of  their  feelings. 

Temperaments. —  Much  has  been  written,  both  in 
ancient  and  in  modern  times,  about  the  so-called  tem- 
peraments. Not  a  little  of  what  has  been  said  is 
purely  fanciful ;  but  marked  differences  do  exist  among 
men  in  those  respects  which  the  word  has  been  used 
to  designate.  The  word  itself  seems  to  refer  to  the 
tempering  of  the  man  by  the  proportionate  blending 
of  the  several  parts  which  go  to  make  up  his  nature 
or  disposition.  These  differences  of  temperament  are 
seen  conspicuously  in  the  feelings. 

Many  names  have  been  applied  to  the  different  tem- 
peraments ;  but  perhaps  the  most  common  are  :  First, 
the  bilious  or  choleric  ;  Second,  the  sanguine  or  nerv- 
ous ;  Third,  the  melanchoHc ;  and  Fourth,  the  phleg- 
matic or  lymphatic.  There  are  certain  physical  char- 
acteristics which  are  said  to  indicate   these  different 


THE  SENSIBILITY— GENERAL  STATEMENTS        MS 

temperaments  ;  and  these  are  accompanied  by  cor- 
responding mental  characteristics.  It  is  said  that  com- 
paratively few  pure  and  unmixed  types  of  tempera- 
ment exist;  but  that  in  most  people  two  or  more 
types  are  blended. 

We  have  not  space  to  dwell  on  this  topic,  concerning  which 
there  is  much  confusion ;  but  it  appears  to  be  worth  mention, 
because  it  is  clear  to  every  observer  that  differences  do  exist  in 
human  constitutions,  corresponding  more  or  less  fully  to  what 
these  names  of  the  temperaments  have  been  held  to  express. 
And  any  one  who  has  to  attempt  the  management  of  human 
beings  would  do  well  to  remember  that  different  temperaments 
require  different  treatment.  Hence,  this  is  a  matter  worthy  of 
the  careful  attention  of  the  teacher. 

Moods. —  Every  one  who  has  observed  much  of 
his  own  mental  states,  or  those  of  others,  knows  that 
they  are  not  uniform.  At  one  time  he  feels  a  special 
tendency  to  be  joyful,  at  another  to  be  sad.  No  ap- 
parent reason  may  be  known ;  like  Antonio,  he  may 
have  to  say,  "  I  know  not  why  I  am  so  sad."  He  may 
be  in  a  jubilant  frame  of  mind,  or  in  a  peaceful,  se- 
rene state,  with  just  as  little  knowledge  of  the  cause. 
Doubtless,  in  many  cases  the  mood  depends  upon  the 
physical  condition  ;  but  often  no  complete  reason  can 
be  found  here. 

Some  people  are  much  more  subject  to  varying 
moods  than  others;  but  probably  no  one  is  wholly 
free  from  their  influence.  A  teacher  should  recognize 
this  fact,  and  watch  Avith  great  care  both  his  own 
moods  and  those  of  his  pupils.  In  this  way,  very 
much  friction  may  be  avoided,  and  fewer  causes  for 
subsequent  regret  will  arise. 


Psy. 


CHAPTER  XV 


SPECIFIC    FEELINGS 


NALYSIS,  Not  Exhaustive. — A  recent 
writer  says  :  ' '  The  doctrine  of  the  feel- 
ings is  the  most  confused  part  of  Psy- 
chology, and  has  been  least  developed." 
One  reason  is  that  the  subject  itself  is 
very  complex ;  the  feelings  are  many  and  of  many 
kinds,  and  they  are  intermingled  almost  inextricably. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  make  a  complete  list  of  them, 
and  much  more  difficult  to  make  a  complete  classifi- 
cation, if  the  list  were  made. 

One  attempt  to  classify  the  feelings  results  as  fol- 
lows :  First,  the  Ego-feelings ;  Second,  the  social  feel- 
ings; Third,  the  impersonal  feelings, — embracing  the 
aesthetic,  the  ethical,  and  the  religious.  The  ground 
of  this  classification  is  clear  enough ;  but  it  would  be 
very  difficult  to  arrange  all  the  feelings  properly  under 
these  heads.  We  shall  not  attempt  an  exhaustive 
analysis  nor  a  complete  list,  still  less,  a  perfect  classi- 
fication. We  shall  speak  only  of  such  of  the  feelings 
as  it  concerns  the  teacher  especially  to  regard. 

The  Usual  Classification.  —  The  feelings  are  com- 
monly divided  into  three  classes  ;  viz. ,  Evwtions,  A/- 
(146) 


SPECIFIC  FEELINGS  147 

fcctions,  and  Desires.  The  emotions  are  simple  feel- 
ings, as  comfort,  joy,  etc.  The  affections  are  feelings 
that  go  out  towards  an  object,  as  love,  etc.  The  de- 
sires go  out  towards  an  object  with  the  wish  of  pos- 
session, as  a  desire  for  food,  money,  etc. 

Each  of  these  classes  has  its  two  poles,  as  they  may 
be  called;  the  emotions  range  from  bliss,  joy,  happi- 
ness, down  to  sadness,  sorrow,  misery.  The  affec- 
tions extend  from  profound  love  to  the  deepest  hate ; 
and  the  desires,  from  a  passionate  wish  to  possess,  to 
a  mortal  aversion  or  dread. 

In  each  class,  too,  there  is  the  feeling  that  results 
immediately  from  sense,  and  the  higher  feelings  based 
on  ideality,  knowledge,  or  thought.  We  experience 
the  satisfaction  that  attends  the  simple  gratification  of 
any  of  the  senses,  and  the  delight  that  follows  the 
contemplation  of  beauty,  truth,  and  goodness.  Love 
reaches  from  the  low  plane  of  a  mere  liking  for  some 
object  of  bodily  appetite,  to  the  most  absorbing  love 
for  the  Highest.  Desire  may  have  for  its  object  some- 
thing that  will  gratify  a  bodily  craving, —  perhaps  a 
base  one, — or  it  may  earnestly  seek  the  best  good  of 
others,  or  the  perfection  of  one's  own  personal  char- 
acter in  its  noblest  form. 

Affections  and  Desires.  —  The  affections  are  often 
classified  as  benevolent  or  malevolent ;  but  this  seems 
to  be  a  bad  use  of  terms.  We  have  noticed  the  two 
poles  of  the  affections,  which  may  be  named,  compre- 
hensively, love  and  hate  ;  but  love  does  not  necessa- 
rily and  always  imply  good  will,  or  goodness  in  any 
form  :  so  there  may  be  a  hate  which  is  entirely  proper, 
and  has  no  mixture  of  ill-will. 


148  ELEMEXTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

There  is  a  logical  order  in  this  arrangement  of  the 
three  classes  of  feelings;  enjoyment,  preference,  de- 
sire,— these  words  express  the  natural  order  of  the 
movement  of  the  feelings.  That  which  gives  us  pleas- 
ure, we  come  to  like  ;  and  we  desire  to  possess  it 
more  fully.  Hence,  desire  is  a  secondary  feeling,  in 
that  it  is  preceded  by-  another  feeling,  enjoyment, 
or  liking  re-enforced  by  the  knowledge  of  previous 
experience.  One  would  not  be  expected  to  desire 
anything  which  he  has  never  experienced  as  a  gratifi- 
cation, or  source  of  enjoyment;  but  often  imagination 
may  be  found  in  place  of  actual  experience,  as  leading 
to  desire.  In  this  way  we  can  explain  why  desire, 
not  seldom,  turns  to  its  opposite,  aversion,  after  the 
object  of  desire  has  been  gained. 

Passions.  —  When  the  affections  or  the  desires  be- 
come violent,  taking  possession  of  the  mind,  as  it 
were,  spurning  the  control  of  reason  and  conscience, 
they  are  called  passions.  The  exhibition  of  passion 
does  not  betoken  strength,  as  it  is  sometimes  supposed  ; 
the  passionate  man  is  not  the  strong  man,  but  the  suf- 
fering man,  as  the  word  "passion"  clearly  implies. 

Motives. —  In  the  form  of  affection  or  desire,  the 
Sensibility  furnishes  the  motives,  soliciting  the  will  to 
act  in  conformity  with  the  feeling.  In  this  fact  lies 
the  great  importance  of  a  knowledge  and  control  of 
the  feelings,  both  in  one  who  wishes  to  shape  his  own 
conduct  aright,  and  in  one  who  wishes  to  influence  or 
guide  the  conduct  of  others. 

Work  of  the  Teacher. — The  teacher's  success 
or  failure  in  the  most  valuable  part  of  his  work  will 
be  largely  determined  by  his  power  or  weakness  in 


SPECIFIC  FEELINGS  149 

dealing  with  the  sensibihty  of  his  pupils, — not  solely, 
nor  chiefly,  in  dealing  with  their  intellect,  as  many 
seem  to  think.  The  Sensibility,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
the  seat  of  happiness  or  its  opposite ;  here,  also,  mo- 
tives to  action  are  found,  and  from  motives  and  actions, 
character  results.  Intellectual  success,  too,  is  impos- 
sible unless  the  Sensibility  is  enlisted  in  behalf  of  the 
work  attempted.  No  child  is  likely  to  make  much 
progress  in  a  study  which  he  thoroughly  dislikes,  es- 
pecially if  he  dislike  his  teacher  at  the  same  time. 
Even  the  mature  man  finds  his  intellect  will  work  with 
redoubled  power  and  success  when  the  glow  of  emo- 
tion accompanies  its  action. 

We  will  now  note  some  of  the  forms  of  Sensibility 
that  demand  the  teacher's  careful  attention.  (See 
Scheme,  page  28), 

Love  of  Self.  —  This  is  a  feeling  altogether  natural 
and  proper.  St.  Paul  says:  "No  man  ever  yet  hated 
his  own  flesh"  ;  nor  is  it  his  duty  to  do  so,  notwith- 
standing all  that  is  truly  said  in  decrying  selfishness. 
For  true  self-love  is  not  selfishness.  Selfishness  is 
either  a  regard  for  self  to  the  injury  of  the  rights  or 
the  feelings  of  others,  or  it  is  the  purblind  wish  to 
gratify  some  present  personal  desire  at  the  expense 
of  personal  good  in  the  future.  In  either  case,  it  is 
opposed  to  the  truest  self-love.  We  hear  much  of 
the  virtue  of  self-denial ;  it  is  a  virtue  of  a  noble  kind, 
when  some  present  demand  for  self  is  denied,  in  order 
for  a  higher  good,  either  for  self  or  for  others.  But, 
in  itself  alone,  self-denial  is  no  virtue  ;  there  is  no 
merit  in  mere  self-tormenting.  An  appeal  to  self-love, 
then,  is  entirely  proper,  whether  the  purpose  be  phi- 


150  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

lanthropic,  or  the  acquisition  of  some  worthy  good  for 
one's  self.  Self-love,  rightly  viewed  and  directed,  is 
a  powerful  aid  in  building  a  desirable  character. 

Love  of  Others.  —  Genuine  love  for  others, — even 
unworthy  persons,  or  animals, — is  one  of  the  noblest 
virtues  ;  and  it  is  significant  that  the  "  Golden  Rule  " 
makes  self-love  the  measure  of  love  for  others. 

Love  of  Country. —  In  a  greater  or  less  degree, 
a  love  of  country  seems  to  be  natural  to  every  nor- 
mally constituted  human  being ;  and,  strangely  enough, 
it  is  often  exceptionally  strong  in  those  whose  native 
land  would  have  few  attractions  for  a  stranger.  There 
are  abundant  reasons  why  this  feeling  should  be  es- 
pecially strong  in  the  people  of  our  country ;  and 
there  are  special  reasons  why  our  young  people  should 
be  carefully  taught  to  do  well  their  part  in  promoting 
the  well-being  of  our  country,  for  under  our  institu- 
tions the  well-being  of  the  country  depends  upon  the 
right  actions  of  its  citizens. 

Love  of  Beauty,  Truth,  and  Right. — The  first 
of  these  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  aesthetic  culture ; 
the  second,  at  the  foundation  of  all  right  thinking  ;  and 
the  third,  at  the  foundation  of  all  right  behavior. 
Hence,  to  the  teachers  of  the  young,  all  these  feelings 
appeal  for  development  and  guidance  ;  nor  can  teachers 
do  more  important  work. 

Training  the  Pupil's  Love. — The  child's  love  for 
good  things,  for  his  fellows,  and  for  his  teacher,  must 
be  carefully  trained  and  strengthened.  Here  is  a 
worthy  field  for  the  power  of  the  teacher  with  the 
wisest  head  and  the  noblest  heart.  But  it  is  no  place 
for  pretense  or  sham ;  all  work  here  must  be  genuine. 


SPECIFIC  FEELINGS  15  I 

If  you  wish  to  arouse  a  child's  love  for  anything,  or 
for  any  person,  your  efforts  will  be  successful  only  as 
you  show  a  genuine  love  in  the  same  direction.  If 
you  wish  to  awaken  the  child's  love  for  yourself,  ex- 
pect it  only  in  return  for  genuine  love  for  him.  Stage 
smiles  and  honeyed  words,  with  no  heart  back  of 
them,  will  not  serve.  It  is  easier  to  deceive  a  grown 
person  than  a  child  in  this  respect.  In  the  old  poem, 
the  child  says : 

"  I  do  not  love  thee,  Doctor  Fell ; 
The  reason  why,  I  can  not  tell." 

No  doubt,  there  was  a  good  reason  which  the  child 
felt,  although  she  could  not  tell  it.  And  we  think 
that  an  equally  good  reason  generally  exists  for  the 
child's  personal  likes  and  dislikes. 

But  perhaps  some  teacher  is  ready  to  say:  "Well, 
it  is  of  no  use ;  I  never  did  love  children,  and  I  can 
not;  at  least,  I  can  not  love  uninteresting  and  dis- 
agreeable children."  Then,  we  say,  you  ought  to  do 
one  of  two  things :  either  set  about  acquiring  this 
power  at  once,  or  forever  forego  any  attempt  to  teach 
children.  One  of  the  surest  ways  to  develop  a  love 
for  any  person  or  thing  is  to  make  that  person  or 
thing  the  object  of  your  special  care,  interest,  and  ef- 
fort. If  persistence  in  such  a  course  will  not  beget  a 
love  for  its  object,  wc  think  the  case  is  hopeless. 

The  Feeling  of  Hate. — But  the  child's  capacity 
to  hate  or  dislike  needs  attention,  as  well  as  its  oppo- 
site. Wc  remember  with  what  earnestness  and  effect 
an  old  associate  of  ours  used  to  say  to  his  pupils, 
"  Boys,  hate  mean  tilings.''  That  they  have  not  been 
trained  to  hate  mean  things  is  the  trouble  of  to-day 


152  ELEMENTS   OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

w  ith  too  many  of  our  boys,  and  girls  as  well.  But 
the  child  should  be  carefully  shown  that  the  hatred 
of  mean  thiJigs  must  not  be  allowed  to  pass  over  into 
a  hatred  of  the  persons  who  do  them.  He  should  be 
taught  that  hatred  tozvanis  persons  is  never  right. 

The  Appetites. — Such  desires  as  are  bodily  crav- 
ings, we  commonly  call  appetites.  Little  ever  needs  to 
be  done  to  strengthen  them  ;  but  young  people  need 
careful  training  as  to  their  regulation  and  control.  We 
believe  these  appetites  are  given  us,  not  only  for  the 
purpose  of  sustaining  life  and  propagating  the  race, 
but  that  they  are  intended  to  be  a  source  of  inno- 
cent enjoyment, — as  they  are  always  found  to  be  when- 
ever they  are  not  abused. 

Desire  of  Society.  —  This  is  a  very  strong  pro- 
pensity; it  is  often  called  an  instinctive  feeling,  and 
this  seems  reasonable  when  we  reflect  that  most  ani- 
mals share  it  with  man.  But  it  is  more  than  an  in- 
stinct, for  the  more  a  person  grows  in  knowledge, 
the  more  he  realizes  both  the  necessity  and  the  pleas- 
ure of  companionship.  But,  because  of  the  moment- 
ous interests  and  influences  that  inevitably  pertain  to 
society,  pupils  need  special  care  and  instruction  that 
they  may  both  receive  and  impart  nothing  but  good  in 
their  social  relations. 

Desire  of  Power.  —  This  desire  seems  to  be  uni- 
versal. And,  when  properly  guarded  and  controlled, 
it  is  most  fruitful  in  usefulness  and  happiness,  although 
its  abuse  may  lead  to  the  gravest  evils. 

Desire  of  Approbation. —  Much  the  same  may  be 
said  of  the  desire  of  approbation  that  was  said  of  the 
desire  of  power;  and,  because  both  its  use  and  its 


SPECIFIC  FEELINGS  153 

danger  are  so  great,  the  teacher  needs  to  use  all  his 
wisdom  and  tact  in  dealing  with  it. 

Curiosity.  —  This  feeling  is  a  compound  of  a  desire 
for  novelty  and  a  desire  for  knowledge.  Both  these 
desires  are  proper  to  a  well-constituted  mind,  and 
both  are  combined  in  what  we  call  curiosity,  although 
their  relative  proportions  vary  in  different  cases.  Not 
unfrequently,  the  pupil's  curiosity  is  the  teacher's 
greatest  annoyance ;  but  it  should  be  his  greatest  friend 
and  helper.  Woe  to  the  unwise  teacher  who  attempts 
to  crush  it,  instead  of  stimulating  and  directing  it.  In 
every  true  sense,  such  a  teacher  is  a  complete  and 
predestined  failure,  whatever  literary  or  scholarly  qual- 
ihcations   he  may  possess. 

Hope  and  Dread. —  Hope  is  compounded  of  de- 
sire and  some  degree  of  expectation  ;  while  its  oppo- 
site, dread,  is  a  compound  of  aversion  and  expecta- 
tion. Hope  and  dread  maintain  a  kind  of  warfare, 
perhaps  in  nearly  all  minds;  but,  in  some  minds,  hope 
seems  to  be  generally  in  the  ascendant,  while  dread 
is  quite  as  predominant  in  others.  The  result  is  a 
radical  difference  as  to  the  happiness  or  unhappiness 
of  the  individuals;  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  a  cause 
of  great  difference  in  their  power  and  usefulness.  Both 
these  feelings  are  powerful  motives  to  action ;  but  one 
is  buoyant  and  helpful  in  its  influence,  while  the  other 
has  a  depressing  effect.  Remember  that  dread  or 
fear  is  a  painful  feeling,  and  that  all  pain  is  costly. 

Interest.  —  This  word  is  not  easy  to  define,  but  it 
is  seldom  misunderstood.  It  always  involves  a  more 
or  less  conscious  recognition  of  some  relation  to  self. 
Interest  is  essential  to  the  best  success  of  any  mental 


154  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

effort ;  and,  other  things  being  equal,  that  is  always 
the  best  teacher  who  can  best  arouse,  hold,  and  direct 
the  interest  of  his  pupils. 

Admiration. — The  word  "adnniration"  wasformerly 
nearly  synonymous  with  wonder.  It  retains  some- 
thing of  the  same  meaning  still,  but  there  is  added  to 
wonder  a  feeling  of  approbation,  as  well.  As  we  now 
use  the  word,  we  admire  that  which  seems  to  us  won- 
derful and  pleasing  at  the  same  time. 

The  child's  power  of  admiration,  and  his  tendency 
to  admire,  demand  careful  attention.  Owing  to  the 
activity  of  imagination  in  children,  the  persons  that 
seem  to  them  admirable  are  thought  to  be  perfect. 
Children  are  born  hero-worshipers.  And  the  things 
that  they  admire  are  likely  to  be  thought  ' '  altogether 
lovely."  There  is  a  psychological  reason  why,  in  the 
vocabulary  of  young  persons,  "  splendid  "  and  "  hor- 
rid "  exhaust  the  list  of  descriptive  adjectives  so  often. 
Now,  because  admiration  always  contains  the  element 
of  approval,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  one's  character  is 
indicated  by  the  persons  and  things  he  admires ;  not 
only  is  his  present  character  indicated  in  this  way,  but 
his  future  character  is  largely  determined  as  well.  In 
the  admiration  that  boys  conceive  for  the  characters 
depicted  in  the  robbers  and  Indian  killers  of  the 
wretched  "dime"  literature  of  the  day,  lies  the  chief 
danger  of  the  poisonous  stuff.  And  the  young  girl's 
admiration  of  the  vain,  vapid  character  of  the  heroine 
in  the  trashy  novel  she  reads,  is  likely  to  work  lasting 
injury  to  her,  for  the  same  reason.  There  is  little 
danger  threatening  the  character  of  any  young  per- 
son whose  admiration   is   thoroughly  fixed  only  on 


SPECIFIC  FEELINGS  155 

such  people  as  are  noble,  and  such  things  as  are 
"pure,  honest,  lovely,  and  of  good  report." 

Reverence. —  By  reverence,  we  mean  a  profound 
regard  for  what  is  great  or  good,  or  both.  When  the 
feeling  becomes  intense,  we  call  it  veneration. 

There  is  special  need  in  this  country,  and  in  this 
age,  that  the  reverence  of  children  should  be  culti- 
vated and  thoroughly  trained.  In  the  abounding  life 
and  freedom  of  this  new  country,  we  seem  to  forget, 
to  a  great  extent,  that  there  is  anything  to  be  treated 
with  reverence  and  respect.  And  it  is  a  serious  ques- 
tion whether  this  tendency  is  not  on  the  increase. 
Much  of  the  flippant  nonsense  in  our  newspapers  that 
passes  for  wit, would  lose  all  its  point  if  the  irreverence 
were  taken  out  of  it.  And  the  children  and  youth  are 
not  slow  to  imitate  the  example  of  their  elders.  The 
"old  man,"  or  "  the  governor,"  is  the  boy's  frequent 
appellation  for  his  father,  nor  does  the  "old  woman" 
signify  the  mother  much  less  frequently.  Similar  dis- 
respectful terms  are  ready  to  apply  to  men  and  women 
who,  by  age,  or  character,  or  position,  should  be 
treated  with  special  respect. 

The  reverent  attitude  of  mind  or  speech,  towards 
God  or  man,  seems  to  be  very  unpopular  just  now. 
This  fact  does  not  augur  well  for  the  future  of  our 
people ;  and  the  best  efforts  of  our  schools  should  be 
turned  to  its  correction. 

Sympathy. — This  word  literally  means  fellow-feel- 
ing, or  feeling  7vi//i  another.  It  is  often  mistakenly 
used  as  synonymous  with  pity ;  nor  is  commiseration 
much  nearer  to  its  meaning.  For,  by  sympathy,  we 
may  enter  into  any  feeling  which  another  has. 


156  ELEMENTS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

Like  the  desire  for  society,  sympathy  is  both  in- 
stinctive and  rational ;  in  its  lower  forms,  it  is  possessed 
by  the  brutes.  Young  children  are  especially  suscept- 
ible to  sympathy;  and  it  is  an  element  so  essential  to 
successful  dealing  with  them  that  one  who  wholly  lacks 
it  may  as  well  make  no  attempt  to  teach  or  to  guide 
them.  Nor  does  it  cease  to  be  very  important  to  any 
one  who  attempts  to  teach  or  to  guide,  no  matter  what 
age  or  class  he  may  work  with.  One  with  quick  sym- 
pathies can  readily  "put  himself  in  another's  place, " 
— a  thing  that  must  always  be  done  before  the  most 
efficient  help  can  be  given. 

The  heart  that  will  not  respond  to  real  sympathy 
in  any  of  its  exhibitions,  is  rarely  found;  its  possessor 
lacks  an  almost  essential  element  of  humanity.  Through . 
the  magic  power  of  sympathy,  the  show  of  any  feel- 
ing is  likely  to  be  met  by  a  similar  feeling  in  the  be- 
holder. No  teacher  should  fail  to  recognize,  at  all 
times,  this  grand  principle  of  human  nature  :  That  the 
exhibition  of  any  feeling  is  likely  to  awaken  the  same 
feeling  in  another. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CONSCIENCE    AND    MORALITY 

^OT  Well  Defined.  —  Few  topics  have 
been  discussed  more  than  conscience,  and 
its  relation  to  hfe  and  conduct ;  but  the 
discussions  are  rarely  or  never  clear  and 
consistent.  The  difficulty  seems  to  be 
the  want  of  a  clear  and  consistent  definition  of  con- 
science, —  a  definition  in  which  all  will  agree,  and  to 
which  all  will  adhere. 

Mr.  Bain  would  make  conscience  only  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  claims  of  custom  and  law  ;  he  says  :  ' '  Duty 
is  the  line  chalked  out  by  public  authority  or  law, 
and  indicated  by  penalty  or  punishment."  Others 
seem  to  regard  conscience  as  the  everpresent  and  in- 
fallible voice  of  God  in  every  human  soul,  both  in- 
structing and  urging  in  regard  to  duty.  However, 
such  a  conception  is  usually  intimated  in  a  vague  and 
loose  way,  rather  than  clearly  stated.  In  fact,  we  have 
observed  that  vague  and  loose  statements  about  con- 
science seem  to  be  the  rule,  even  with  writers  of  ability. 
An  Instance. — A  celebrated  writer  on  education 
says:    "Conscience,  that  inherent,  instinctive  sense  of 

right  and  wrong."     What  does  he  mean?     Does  he 

(157) 


I5S  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

mean  the  intuitive  notion  that  there  is  such  a  distinc- 
tion as  right  and  wrong?  But  is  that  conscience? 
Does  he  mean  an  inherent,  instinctive  sense  which 
knows  riglit  from  wrong  in  every  case  ?  Is  there  such 
a  sense?  If  so,  why  do  conscientious  men  differ  re- 
specting right  and  wrong?  Does  he  mean  a  feehng 
of  personal  obhgation,  or  onghtucss,  in  regard  to  the 
choice  between  right  and  wrong  ?  Or,  does  he  mean 
two  or  more  of  these,  or  something  different  from 
any  one  of  them?  In  fine,  is  there  evidence  that  he 
had  any  clear  meaning  to  express? 

A  Feeling. — Amid  all  the  clashing  opinions  of  psy- 
chologists, there  is  almost  universal  agreement  in  teach- 
ing that  mental  activity  has  the  three  distinct  forms 
of  knowing,  feeling,  and  willing ;  and  that  these  are 
all.  Now,  in  which  class  shall  we  put  that  form  of 
activity  called  conscience  ?  We  unhesitatingly  put  it 
among  the  feelings,  and  restrict  it  to  the  feelings.  It 
is  certain  that  in  every  act  of  conscience  as  treated  by 
any  writer,  a  feeling  is  involved.  We  believe  that 
feeling  to  be  all  that  should  receive  the  name  of  con- 
science. If,  however,  one  chooses  to  make  the  term 
cover  the  intellectual  action  that  goes  with  the  feeling, 
the  question  is  simply  one  of  terminology.  But  we 
think  obscurity  is  the  consequence. 

Definition.— We  offer  the  following  definition: 
Conscience  is  that  feeling  which  prompts  us  to  do  zvhat 
tve  believe  to  be  right,  and  to  shun  zvhat  zve  believe  to  be 
zvrong;  zvhich  commends  21s  zvhen  we  obey  it,  and  con- 
demns us  when  we  disobey  it. 

This  definition  contains  all  that  we  think  should  be 
covered  by  the  term  ' '  conscience  ";  and,  if  it  were  gen- 


CONSCIENCE  AND   MORALITY  159 

erally  accepted  and  adhered  to,  it  would  settle  many- 
disputes,  and  simplify  others. 

The  definition  indicates  a  double  act  of  conscience, 
— an  act  of  prompting  before  a  choice  is  made,  or  a 
volition  is  put  forth  ;  and  an  act  of  commendation  or 
condemnation  following  the  choice  or  volition.  Does 
not  every  rational  human  being  recognize  in  his  own 
consciousness  a  feeling  that  acts  thus  ?  This  feeling  we 
mean  by  the  term  "conscience,"  and  we  mean  noth- 
ing more  nor  less  by  the  word. 

Relation  to  Judgment. — Like  every  other  rational 
feeling,  conscience  requires  an  intellectual  basis ;  a  ra- 
tional feeling  arises  in  consequence  of  something  we 
know,  or  think  we  know ;  that  is,  a  judgment  always 
precedes  a  rational  feeling  and  forms  its  basis.  The 
judgment  that  gives  rise  to  the  feeling  of  conscience 
is  a  judgment  that  a  certain  thing  is  right  or  wrong, 
and  that  we  have  a  duty  in  regard  to  it.  As  soon  as 
this  judgment  is  pronounced,  conscience  responds  with 
its  imperious  "  You  ought." 

Judgments  Differ. —  In  respect  to  judgments  of 
this  kind,  men  differ  widely  ;  not  seldom  they  are  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  each  other.  Education,  habit, 
and  custom  have  much  to  do  in  determining  such 
judgments ;  bias  arising  from  desire  or  inclination,  often 
clouds  one's  view  in  relation  to  the  ethical  character 
of  a  choice  or  course  of  action.  In  such  a  case,  too 
often  "the  wish  is  father  to  the  thought." 

Yet,  in  respect  to  the  right  or  wrong  of  many  things, 
the  judgments  of  men  almost  universally  agree;  this 
is  true  in  respect  to  truth,  honesty,  kindness,  good- 
will, oppression,  injustice,  cruelty,  murder^  etc. 


l60  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Universal  and  Identical. — We  believe  conscience 
to  be  a  universal  feeling  among  men ;  otherwise,  we 
can  not  account  for  the  feeling  of  guilt  or  ill-desert, 
which  we  suppose  every  one  has  felt,  at  some  time  in 
his  life,  at  least.  And  history  intimates  very  clearly 
that  this  feeling  has  always  been  common  to  human- 
ity, in  every  age  and  every  stage  of  culture.  The 
strength  of  conscientious  feeling  varies  greatly  with 
different  men,  and  at  different  periods  in  the  lives  of 
the  same  men.  With  some,  it  is  a  ruling  power  ha- 
bitually; others  seem  to  regard  it  as  little  more  than 
an  impertinence  more  or  less  troublesome. 

Moreover,  it  is  very  important  to  notice  that  the 
action  of  conscience  is  always  the  same,  in  all  men 
and  at  all  times.  This  imperious  and  imperial  feeling, 
which  is  within  us  and  yet  hardly  seems  to  be  of  us, 
which  assumes  supreme  authority  to  guide  and  then 
to  reward  or  to  punish,  ne\'er  changes  the  nature  nor 
the  direction  of  its  action. 

We  often  hear  that  the  Hindoo  woman  conscien- 
tiously throws  her  babe  into  the  Ganges,  while  the 
Christian  woman  as  conscientiously  preserves  and  cher- 
ishes her  offspring.  This  is  the  ' '  stock  "  illustration  to 
show  that  conscience  acts  differently  in  different  peo- 
ple. Looked  at  carefully,  it  illustrates  exactly  the 
opposite.  Both  women  do  what  they  believe  to  be 
right ;  they  differ  in  their  judgments,  but  agree  per- 
fectly in  their  consciences. 

A  Safe  Guide?  —  If  conscience  rests  upon  judg- 
ment, and  judgment  is  fallible,  is  conscience  a  safe 
and  sufficient  guide  ?  Will  it  always  lead  us  aright  ? 
Of  course  not;  if  the  judgment  is  wrong,  conscience 


CONSCIENCE  AND  MORALITY  l6l 

must  necessarily  urge  us  towards  the  wrong.  Many 
men  have  been  wrong-headed  and  exceedingly  con- 
scientious; and  such  men  are  among  the  most  mis- 
chievous and  the  most  intractable.  No  amount  of 
sincerity  can  make  that  right  which  is  inherently  wrong. 

But  is  a  person  who  conscientiously  does  wrong,  to 
be  blamed?  Or,  to  put  the  question  in  another  way, 
ought  one  to  follow  his  conscience  at  all  times?  It  is 
inconceivable  that  it  should  be  one's  duty  to  violate 
his  Gonscience ;  nor,  strictly  speaking,  can  we  believe 
that  one  is  ever  to  be  blamed  for  obeying  his  con- 
science. But,  if  his  judgment  is  wrong  through  any 
neglect  or  perverseness  of  his  own,  he  is  to  be  blamed 
for  his  wrong  judgment  ivitJi  all  its  consequences. 

What  is  Morality?  —  With  some,  morality  seems 
to  be  only  some  form  of  refined  self-interest, — pru- 
dence, for  example.  With  others,  like  Mr.  Bain,  it 
seems  to  be  nothing  more  than  conformity  to  custom 
or  law.  It  is  restricted  to  its  literal  signification,  as 
derived  from  the  Latin  mores,  or  manners.  We  be- 
lieve that  morality  in  the  full  meaning  of  the  term 
signifies  a  supreme  regard  for  the  right ;  hence,  it  rests 
upon  a  habitual  conformity  to  conscience.  In  order 
to  train  one,  then,  in  ways  of  morality,  it  is  necessary 
to  cultivate  his  judgment  and  conscience. 

How  Cultivated?  —  But  how  shall  conscience  be 
cultivated  and  made  stiDnger?  In  the  same  way  that 
every  other  power  is  cultivated  and  strengthened, — 
by  zvise  nse.  Every  time  that  the  voice  of  conscience 
is  heard  and  heeded,  it  gains  strength  to  speak  with 
more  clearness  next  time.  Every  time  it  is  disre- 
garded, it  is  shorn  of  some  of  its  power;  this  may  be 
Psy.^14. 


I  62  ELEMEXTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

continued  until  conscience  will  sleep  quietly  while  one 
does  things  that  would  once  have  caused  the  keenest 
anguish.  Thus,  conscience  becomes  "seared  as  with 
a  hot  iron",  —  it  withers  and  decays  like  an  unused 
muscle.  And  yet,  sometimes,  it  wakes  after  a  long 
slumber,  with  a  fearful  power,  and  stings  like  a  scor- 
pion. This  is  remorse.  An  educated  conscience, 
then,  is  a  conscience  that  is  habitually  obeyed ;  but  it 
must  follow  a  judgment  rightly  educated,  if  the  result 
is  to  be  a  high  type  of  morality. 

Four  Elements.  —  The  psychological  elements  of 
morality  are  four  in  number,  and  four  only.  These 
are :  First,  the  intuitive  idea  that  there  is  such  a  dis- 
tinction as  that  of  right  and  wrong ;  Second,  the 
judgDieiit  that  decides  whether  any  particular  thing  is 
right  or  wrong ;  Third,  the  conscience  which  moves  us 
towards  the  right  and  away  from  the  wrong ;  and 
Fourth,  the  ivill  that  chooses  or  refuses  the  right. 
All  true  moral  training  must  regard  all  these;  it  must 
recognize  the  underlying  idea;  it  must  develop  and 
train  the  judgment ;  it  must  appeal  to  the  conscience ; 
and  it  must  lead  the  will  to  a  proper  choice. 

With  Young  Children. —  With  quite  young  chil- 
dren frequent  appeal  to  conscience  is  the  proper  way 
to  awaken  and  strengthen  it.  Let  the  parent  and 
teacher  assume  that  the  child  has  a  conscience;  — 
press  upon  him  the  word  ought  in  all  the  fullness  of 
its  meaning.  If  there  is  any  doubt  as  to  whether  one 
ought,  or  ought  not,  to  do  a  certain  thing,  the  only 
safe  way  is  to  give  conscience  "the  benefit  of  the 
doubt."  A  very  young  child  understands  such  an 
appeal,  for  conscience  begins  its  work  almost  as  soon 


COXSCIEN'CE  AND  MORALITY  163 

as  the  earliest  perceptive  powers.  "  Is  it  right?" 
"Then  ought  you  to  do  it?"  These  are  questions 
that  he  will  appreciate  ;  and  it  is  sad  that  such  ques- 
tions so  often  give  place  to  mere  appeals  to  expedi- , 
ency,  or  self-interest,  or  pride,  or  custom.  In  view  of 
r-  [this  fact,  it  is  not  strange  that  so  few  grown  persons 
are  able  to  stand  boldly  for  what  they  believe  to 
be  right,  even  if  they  have  to  stand  alone.  How 
can  the  moral  fiber  be  otherwise  than  flabby  if  it  has 
never  been  strengthened  ? 

With  Older  People.  — The  same  method  should 
continue  with  older  persons.  But  little  good  will 
follow  lessons  on  morals,  or  the  learning  of  moral 
precepts,  or  the  reading  of  books  on  the  subject,  un- 
less some  course  is  taken  to  lead  the  student  to  in- 
dividual action  in  conscientious  behavior,  or  into  the 
formation  of  moral  habits.  Every  act  has  its  moral 
significance  when  viewed  rightly,  for  we  arc  .so  bound 
together  that  every  act  of  ours  has  an  influence  to 
benefit  or  to  harm  others  directly,  or  through  its  in- 
fluence upon  ourselves.  There  is  an  ethical  value  in 
the  smallest  and  most  trivial  actions ;  for  instance, 
the  cleaning  of  one's  shoes  on  the  scraper  and  mat. 
If  one  neglects  this  small  thing,  he  defiles  the  house  ; 
and  some  one  must  perform  additional  and  need- 
less labor  on  his  account.  So  of  other  matters  which 
we  commonly  regard  as  insignificant ;  some  of  them 
are  right  or  wrong  in  themselves,  and  some  have 
this  quality  by  virtue  of  their  relation  to  other  things 
or  to  other  persons.  As  we  learn  to  put  conscience  in- 
to evcrytliing  we  say  or  do,  we  shall  make  real  advance- 
ment in  a  true  morality. 


164 


ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 


Force  of  Habit. —  Here  we  see  the  pedagogical 
value  of  habit ;  for,  by  constant  attention  to  the  eth 
ical  quality  of  all  our  words  and  actions, —  even 
those  commonly  thought  insignificant,  —  we  form  the 
habit  of  obeying  conscience  in  all  things.  Nothing 
more  is  wanting  to  a  perfect  morality,  except  that 
judgment  shall  be  trained  to  decide  correctly  as  to  the 
ethical  quality. 

Every  student  will  notice  the  resemblance  of  the  words  con- 
science and  consciousness  ;  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are 
derived  from  the  same  roots.  By  some  old  writers,  one  is  some- 
times used  for  the  other ;  but  modern  writers  make  a  distinc- 
tion which  should  never  be  disregarded. 

We  have  insisted  thus  strongly  on  the  supremacy  of  con- 
science, because,  unless  its  promptings  are  obeyed,  correct 
behavior  will  not  follow,  however  clear  the  judgment  may  be. 
But,  as  is  intimated  in  the  first  paragraph  on  page  162,  judg- 
ment must  decide  rightly  and  conscience  must  be  obeyed,  in 
order  that  the  man  may  be  right. 


.,^v/;;«J 


LOa  AJ 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE    WILL 


EFINITION. —  The  ivill  is  the  power  by 
li'hich  we  choose  and  execute. 

Or,  we  may  perhaps  better  say,  The 
will  is  the  mind,  or  soul,  or  Ego,  choos- 
ing and  putting  forth  effort,  or  force,  to 
xecute  its  choices.  A  completed  act  of  the  will  in- 
ludes  both  the  choice  of  an  aim  or  object  and  the 
putting-forth  of  energy  to  accomplish  that  aim,  or  to 
attain  that  object.  To  expend  energy  in  executing 
without  any  choice  would  show  will  no  more  than  a 
machine  shows  will.  But  if  wc  choose  without  mak- 
ing any  effort  in  the  line  of  that  choice,  that  is  no  act 
of  the  will ;  it  is  a  mere  preference,  or  zuish.  Dr. 
Samuel  Harris  says:  "A  choice  is  not  a  mere  prefer- 
ence of  one  thing  to  another,  but  it  is  the  choice  of 
an  object  to  ivhicJi  the  activity  is  to  be  directed.''' 

That  which  makes  the  human  animal  a  man,  is  his 
power  to  select  an  object  of  choice,  in  view  of  delib- 
erate judgment  and  in  the  presence  of  motives,  and 
then  to  exert  force  in  the  line  of  the  choice  thus  made. 
In  these  acts,  or  in  the  power  to  do  these  acts,  re- 
side man's  personality  and  his  responsibility. 

('65) 


1 66  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  the  process  of  knowing,   man   has  no   choice  5ur 
True,  he  may  elect  to  put  himself  in  the  proper  rela  wt 
tions  in  order  that  he  may  know,  or  he  may  deliberp 
ately  refuse  to  do  so.      But  this  election  is  not  an  ac 
of  knowing ;  if  he  puts  himself  into  the  proper  rela  tin 
tions,  knowing  follows  in  accordance  with  unchange  loi 
able  laws.      So  the  feelings  come  and  go  in  obedience 
to  fixed   laws,  although   it  is  not  always  possible 
trace  these  laws  perfectly  ;  the  will  has  even  less  power 
in  respect  to  feeling  than  in  respect  to  knowing,  be- 
cause we  have  less  power  to  control  our  relations  here 
But,  in  the  act  of  willing,  man  becomes  a  law  unto 
himself.      Hence,  in  this  act  alone,  man  shows  himself 
a  personal,  responsible  agent. 

Man,  a  Cause. —  In  exercising  his  power  to  choose 
and  to  execute,  man  shows  himself  to  be  a  cause. 
Whatever  may  be  his  intellectual  judgments,  or  his 
desires  and  motives,  in  view  of  which  he  makes  his 
choices  and  puts  forth  his  volitions,  these  judgments 
and  desires  do  not  cause  his  will  to  act  as  it  does.  In 
thus  acting,  he  is  himself  a  cause,  and  the  results 
which  follow,  he  causes  to  be  different  from  what  they 
would  have  been  had  his  will  acted  otherwise. 

' '  The  will  (or  the  Ego  willing)  is  the  cause  of  its 
own  determinations."  "The  will  is  the  source  of 
its  own  actions,  and  thus  the  cause  of  its  own  ac- 
tions." "In  knowing  himself  as  possessed  of  will, 
man  must  know  himself  as  a  cause ;  and  whenever 
he  sees  causation  exerted  in  connection  with  evi- 
dence of  intelligence,  he  naturally  attributes  it  to 
mind."  "  Here  is  a  being  capable  of  interposing  his 
own  free  choice  and  his  power  of  volition,  and  thus 


THE   WILL  167 


in  act 


lurposely  causing  that  to  be  which,  but  for  him,  would 
ot  have  been."      "A   free  act  has  a  cause  as  much 
s  any  other.      Its  cause  is  the  free  spirit." 
Spontaneity,  Not  Will. —  It  is  important  to  dis- 
rela-inguish  will  from  some  things  which  have  been  con- 
inje-jounded  with  it,  even  by  eminent  writers. 

Many  of  our  acts  are  performed  spontaneously,  as 
he  foot  kicks  when  it  is  tickled,  or  the  thirsty  man 
ushes  instinctively  to  the  water.  Perhaps  all  the  acts 
)f  brutes  which  seem  to  be  the  result  of  will,  are  of 
:his  nature.  But  human  will — rational  will — always 
icts  from  judgment  and  motive.  The  judgment  reaches 
certain  conclusions,  motives  are  present  in  the  form 
of  desires,  and  then  the  mind  freely  chooses,  in  the 
se  presence  of  these  judgments  and  motives.  Will  stands 
above  spontaneity,  and  watches  over  and  controls  it. 
The  thirsty  man  may  believe  that  drinking  water  at 
this  time  would  injure  his  health;  and  so,  however 
much  he  may  desire  it,  prompted  by  a  regard  for  his 
health,  he  wills  to  refrain  from  drinking. 

Desire  itself  has  sometimes  been  confounded  with 
will.  But  this  is  a  mistake ;  one  never  wills  a  thing 
until  he  chooses  it,  no  matter  how  much  he  may  de- 
sire it.  Doubtless  he  may  be  led  to  a  final  choice  of 
the  thing  itself  by  first  choosing  to  harbor  the  desire 
for  it;  this  is  the  danger  of  one  who  permits  himself 
to  dally  with  temptation.  Otherwise  than  in  choos- 
ing to  entertain  or  to  reject  his  desires,  one  has  little 
or  no  control  over  them  directly.  But,  through  sheer 
force  of  his  will,  he  may  deny  himself  that  which  he 
desires  most  ardently;  his  will  is  his  own, — it  is  the 
exhibition  of  his  deepest  selfhood. 


l6<S  ELKMRXTS   OF    PSYCHOLOGY 

Fkek  Will.  —  The  discussions  about  freedom  of  the 
will  arc  endless ;  nor  need  wc  wonder  at  it,  for  no 
question  is  more  fundamental  as  respects  human  ac- 
tion, character,  and  destiny.  We  hold  that  the  hu- 
man will  is  free;  but  it  is  very  important  that  we  con- 
ceive clearly  just  what  we  mean  by  freedom  of  the 
will.  When  we  say  that  man's  will  is  free,  we  mean 
that,  having  in  his  consciousness  certain  decisions  of 
the  intelligence  and  certain  motives  in  the  form  of  de- 
sires, he  is  able  to  select  for  himself  his  own  course 
of  action  and  to  put  forth  force  or  effort  for  the  exe- 
cution of  the  course  he  has  chosen.  For  illustration : 
One  may  be  conscious  of  some  desire  of  sense  prompt- 
ing him  to  act  for  its  gratification  ;  at  the  same  time 
he  may  be  moved  to  some  different  act  by  the  known 
preference  of  a  friend  and  by  his  desire  to  please  that 
friend;  furthermore,  his  reason  and  conscience  may, 
at  the  same  time,  urge  him  to  do  something  still  dif- 
ferent. In  this  state  of  things,  because  his  will  is 
free,  he  is  able  to  choose  any  one  of  the  three  courses. 
Or  he  may  arbitrarily  refuse  them  all,  and  decide  to  i 
do  something  quite  different  from  any  one  of  them. 

Evidences  of  Freedom. — We  have  evidence  of 
this  freedom  in  that  most  trustworthy  of  all  witnesses, 
our  own  consciousness.  Every  man  is  conscious  that 
he  makes  a  free  choice  and  acts  accordingly,  scores 
of  times,  every  day  of  his  life.  For  this  reason- he 
holds  himself  responsible  for  his  actions,  and  blames 
or  praises  himself  accordingly.  If  one  believes  that 
there  was  no  alternative  for  his  action,  that  he  could 
not  have  done  otherwise  than  he  did,  no  power  can 
awaken  in  him  any  feeling  of  responsibility  for  the  act. 


THE  WILL  169 

lel  Furthermore,  the  universal  consciousness  testifies  to 
lolthe  same  fact.  We  hold  others  responsible  for  their 
c-lacts,  and  we  praise  or  blame  them  accordingly,  bc- 
j|  cause  we  believe  their  acts  are  the  results  of  their  own 
free  choices.  On  this  ground  rest  all  law,  all  notion 
of  desert  of  any  kind,  and  all  punishment.  Here, 
too,  is  the  ground  for  the  reasonableness  of  any  ex- 
hortation, or  argument,  or  appeal  designed  to  influ- 
ence another's  conduct. 

To  blame  a  machine,  or  a  stick,  or  any  inanimate 
object  for  an  undesirable  result,  is  well  regarded  as  an 
act  of  supreme  childishness,  or  folly.  Xerxes  has  been 
held  up  to  the  ridicule  of  the  ages  for  chastising  the 
sea  because  it  wrecked  his  fleet ;  but  every  magistriite 
who  punishes  a  criminal  is  equally  ridiculous,  and  far 
more  blameworthy,  if  that  criminal  has  no  free  will. 
If  man  is  a  machine,  his  responsibility  is  at  an  end, 
or  never  existed.  But  the  fact  that  men  everywhere, 
and  in  all  ages  and  in  all  states  of  society,  hold  them- 
selves and  others  responsible,  is  proof  positive  that  man 
has  free  will ;  because  it  is  a  fact  sustained  by  the  uni- 
versal consciousness  of  the  race.  In  truth,  there  is 
little  doubt  that  any  philosopher  whose  system  denies 
free  will  to  man,  would  blame  the  thief  who  should 
steal  his  purse. 

Two  Sides. —  Our  definition  recognizes  two  parts, 
or  two  sides,  in  every  completed  act  of  the  will;  viz., 
the  choice  and  the  volition, — which  is  the  putting- 
forth  of  force  or  energy  in  tlie  line  of  that  choice. 
Both  choice  and  volition  are  self (Jctcrmin.itions. 
hut,  as  has  been  well  said,  "Choice  is  self  direction  ; 
volition  is  self-exertion  or  self-restraint." 

Psy.-i5. 


170  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  the  clement  of  choice  man  has  perfect  freedom, 
nor  can  such  freedom  be  destroyed  and  the  man  re- 
main. But  in  voHtion,  or  the  outward  act,  he  is  only 
partially  or  relatively  free.  To  accomplish  our  choices 
we  must  work  in  accordance  with  the  fixed  laws  of 
nature.  For  instance,  one  may  choose  to  have  the 
force  of  gravitation  ^rind  his  corn.  But,  in  order  to 
make  his  choice  effective,  he  must  select  a  stream  of 
water  which  has  a  suitable  fall,  he  must  construct  his 
dam  properly,  he  must  put  his  wheel  in  the  right  place, 
he  must  arrange  his  machinery  according  to  the  laws 
of  physics,  and  he  must  turn  on  the  power  at  the 
proper  time.  If  he  fail  in  any  of  these  respects,  he 
will  fail  to  realize  his  choice,  however  ardently  he 
may  desire  to  do  so.  Or  he  may  be  prevented  from 
executing  his  volitions  by  human  interference,  by  the 
conflict  of  some  stronger  will  opposing  his  own.  But, 
so  far  as  the  clioice  extends,  he  is  subject  to  no  limi- 
tations,— here  he  is  autocrat. 

Dr.  Hopkins  well  says  of  choice  and  volition :  • '  The 
one  is  absolute,  and  so  belongs  to  us,  that  to  be  de- 
prived of  it  we  must  be  destroyed.  The  other  is  con- 
tingent, and  we  can  be  deprived  of  it  by  accident,  or 
disease,  or  by  the  will  of  others.  The  one  is  the  es- 
sential element  of  freedom  manifesting  itself  in  the 
spiritual  realm,  and  is  the  immediate  object  of  the 
divine  government;  the  other  is  simply  instrumental 
and  executive,  and  is  that  of  which  human  govern- 
ments chiefly  take  cognizance." 

When  a  man  proves  to  be  what  we  commonly  term  "a  fail- 
ure in  life,"  the  reason  for  his  failure  can  generally  be  found 
in  lack  or  misdirection  of  his  will-power.     Not  many  fail  solely 


THE  WILL  171 

because  circumstances  are  against  them;  fewer  succeed  by 
sheer  good  fortune,  or  a  combination  of  fortuitous  circumstances. 
"Good  luck"  is  largely  a  myth.  Often  the  trouble  is  a  want  of  a 
well-considered,  fixed  choice  or  dominant  purpose  in  life.  Such 
a  person  labors  in  one  direction  to-day  and  in  another  to-mor- 
row. We  say  he  has  no  aim  in  life ;  often  the  reason  he  has 
no  aim  worthy  of  the  name,  is  that  he  has  too  many  aims. 
"Unstable  as  water,  he  shall  not  excel." 

But  some  fail  who  have  a  worthy  choice  firmly  adhered  to, 
because  they  lack  will-power  on  the  volition  side.  They  arc 
feeble,  or  wavering,  or  unreasonable  in  their  attempts  to  ac- 
complish their  choices  ;  opposing  circumstances  appal  and  de- 
feat them,  where  a  stronger  will  would  readily  have  overcome 
these  very  opposing  circumstances,  or  would  have  changed 
them  into  helpers.  No  man  ever  accomplished  much  in  this 
world  who  had  not  a  strong  will  on  both  sides  of  its  manifesta- 
tion. We  should  add,  also,  that  this  strong  will  needs  the  aid 
of  a  sound  judgment  in  all  cases. 

Motives.  —  The  will,  especially  in  its  choices,  is 
perfectly  free ;  but  it  never  acts  without  some  motive 
to  prompt  its  action.  These  motives  are  always  in 
the  form  of  desires  of  some  sort,  soliciting  the  will  to 
act.  No  conclusion  of  the  judgment  or  reason,  noth- 
ing purely  intellectual,  is  a  motive  till  it  has  been  fol- 
lowed by  a  feeling  of  desire.  Nothing  from  without 
can  prompt  to  a  choice  or  an  act  of  the  will,  till  it  has 
awakened  a  desire  within. 

The  will  is  often  solicited  by  opposing  desires,  in 
various  degrees  of  conflict.  But  these  desires  do  not 
move  the  will  one  way  or  the  other,  as  the  heavier 
weights  draw  down  their  arm  of  the  scales.  The  will 
is  no  such  inert  thing  as  that  implies ;  the  process  of 
willing  is  not  a  mechanical  obedience  to  the  strongest 
force.  The  motives  simply  solicit  or  influence  the 
will,  which,  in  its  regal  capacity,  freely  determines  for 


\J2  ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

itself  to  which  of  the  opposing  motives  it  will  yield, 
with  which  it  will  put  itself  in  accord.  There  are 
philosophers  who  deny  this  freedom  of  the  will,  and 
declare  that  it  obeys  the  strongest  motives. 

"The  determinations  of  will  are  always  made  under 
the  influence  of  motives";  but  the  motives  do  not 
determine,  the  will  does  not  obcj^  But,  under  the 
influence  of  motives,  the  will  freely  chooses ;  and  it 
often  chooses  in  defiance  of  what  seem  to  be  the 
strongest  impulses.  Here  is,  probably,  the  difference 
between  the  human  will  and  the  will  of  the  brute ; 
the  brute  always  yields  to  the  strongest  impulse,  and 
the  only  way  to  change  his  action  is  to  induce  in  him 
a  stronger  impulse  than  the  one  he  now  obeys.  But 
man,  endowed  with  reason  and  conscience,  has  the 
power  to  put  any  impulse  or  desire  under  his  feet, 
and  to  choose  freely. 

We  think  that  any  one  who  will  examine  the  move- 
ments of  his  own  mind,  in  the  light  of  consciousness, 
ought  to  see  the  truth  of  what  has  been  said.  He  is 
conscious  of  the  actions  and  judgments  of  the  intel- 
lect, he  is  conscious  of  the  awakening  of  desires  seek- 
ing gratification,  he  is  conscious  of  the  appeals  of  con- 
.scicnce,  and  he  is  conscious  of  a  free  choice ;  and, 
furthermore,  he  is  conscious  that  every  one  of  these 
differs  from  all  the  others. 

Choices  Give  Ch.aracter.— Because  man  is  per- 
fectly free  as  to  his  choices,  it  is  his  choices  that  deter- 
mine the  moral  quality  of  all  his  actions.  Without 
this  freedom  our  actions  could  have  no  moral  quality 
whatever  ;  and  to  this  fact  of  our  constitution  alone,  is 
due  all  responsibility,  and  all  character  so  far  as  it  re- 


THE  WILL  1/3 

spects  morality.  Yet  choice  alone, —  that  is,  as  indi- 
cating mere  preference, —  is  far  from  working  out  a 
character  in  harmony  with  itself.  It  must  be  a  choice 
followed  by  volition,  making  a  complete  act  of  the 
will.  To  be  moved  again  and  again  towards  a  worthy 
choice,  to  choose  so  far  as  simply  to  approve,  but  noth- 
ing more,  is  a  weakening  and  a  deadening  process  as 
regards  the  forming  of  a  worthy  character.  For  this 
is  the  very  thing  we  mean  by  that  properly  contempt- 
uous word,  scntiuientalisni. 

It  is  by  his  choices  and  volitions  that  man  builds  his 
character  as  a  moral  being.  A  supreme  choice  is  fol- 
lowed by  a  multitude  of  subordinate  choices  in  line 
with  itself.  And,  out  of  these  repeated  and  continued 
acts  of  the  will,  grow  habits.  So  our  subsequent 
choices  are  influenced  by  those  we  have  already  made. 
Furthermore,  these  choices  bias  our  judgments,  and 
largely  give  rise  to  motives  that  influence  our  wills  to 
future  choices.  Hence,  by  the  very  freedom  of  his 
will,  man  comes  to  limit  it.  "The  outcome  of  voli- 
tional action  is  habit,  fixed  disposition,  settled  char- 
acter. Freedom  may  choose  the  seed,  but  it  can 
neither  determine  nor  escape  the  harvest." 

True  Freedom.  — We  have  used  the  word '  'freedom" 
to  mean  man's  ability  to  choose  freely,  even  though 
his  choice  should  be  a  choice  of  wrong,  or  should  be 
purely  arbitrary.  But,  as  we  have  just  seen,  the  wrong 
exercise  of  this  freedom  may  result  in  bitter  bondage. 
One  has  attained  to  true  freedom  only  when  his  free 
choices  are  habitually  in  accord  with  the  right,  or  the 
highest  reason.  "Real  freedom  exists  only  in  the 
complete  harmony  of  the  rational  and  natural  motives 


174  ELEMENTS  OF   PSYCHOLOGY 

with  one  another  and  with  reason."  This  is  a  will 
acting  in  "self-conscious  freedom";  its  outcome  is  a 
righteous  character,  in  which  the  soul  is  in  peace.  In 
so  far  as  a  man  reaches  this  stage,  in  so  far  he  is  really 
free.  He  is  no  longer  under  the  law,  for  he  has  be- 
come a  law  unto  himself;  and  this  law  is  no  bond,  for 
he  is  in  harmony  with  it.  He  has  realized  the  divine 
words,  "The  truth  shall  make  you  free." 

Training  the  Will. — Like  all  the  rest  of  our  pow- 
ers, the  will  is  rightly  trained  by  right  use.  Nothing 
is  more  desirable  than  a  strong  will,  if  only  it  is  rightly 
used.  A  man  with  a  weak  will  is  a  pitiable  object. 
It  is  the  will  which  gives  one  his  moving  force  ;  that 
makes  him  a  power  rather  than  a  mere  helpless  thing. 
One  who  lacks  will-power  is  like  a  log  floating  at  the 
mercy  of  the  current ;  while  one  with  a  strong  will 
is  like  a  steamboat,  that  can  not  only  stem  the  cur- 
rent, but  can  make  headway  against  it.  There  is  no 
danger  that  one  will  have  too  much  will,  if  only  it  is 
joined  with  right  motives  and  sound  judgment.  The 
man  of  strong  will  is  not  necessarily  willful  in  the  bad 
use  of  that  word.  A  man  of  strong  will  need  not  be 
mulish. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  of  the  question 
whether  a  child's  "will  should  be  broken  ?  "  The  an- 
swer turns  wholly  upon  what  is  meant  by  "  breaking" 
the  will.  If  by  this  is  meant  simply  that  the  child 
must  be  taught  to  bend  his  will  to  rightful  authority, 
then  it  is  one  of  the  first  lessons  to  be  learned ;  it  is 
an  act  of  the  greatest  kindness  to  the  child  to  break 
his  will  in  this  sense.  But  if,  by  breaking  the  will, 
we  mean  to  destroy  its  power,  or  to  diminish  it,  then 


THE  WILL  175 

it  is  a  heinous  crime  to  do  it.  For,  one  with  his  will 
broken,  in  this  sense,  is  like  a  watch  with  the  main- 
spring broken.  Instead  of  this,  special  effort  should 
be  made  to  strengthen  the  child's  will-power.  Use 
all  reasonable  means  to  lead  him  to  cease  saying  "I 
can't,"  and  to  cultivate  the  habit  of  saying  "  I  can" 
and  "I  will."  Of  course  he  should  be  taught  to  judge 
rightly  as  to  whether  a  thing  ought  to  be  done,  before 
he  says  "I  will  do  it."  Even  kindly  ridicule  or  gen- 
tle sarcasm  may  be  used  with  good  effect  here,  and 
sometimes  resort  may  well  be  had  to  something  a  little 
more  vigorous. 

Give  the  child  the  opportunity  to  exercise  his  will 
within  all  reasonable  limits,  and  then  hold  him  to  the 
responsibility  that  belongs  to  a  free  will.  Above  all 
things,  never  thwart  or  cross  a  child's  will  unless  there 
is  a  very  good  reason  for  it.  Many  a  well-disposed 
child  has  had  his  will  wantonly  denied,  or  needlessly 
thwarted,  by  a  thoughtless  or  tyrannical  parent  or 
teacher  until  the  result  has  been  deplorable  weakness 
or  a  settled  perversity. 

; 


CHAPTER   XVIII 


CONCLUSION 


OR  Young  Teachers. — As  it  is  stated 
on  the  title-page,  this  book  is  designed 
for  young  teachers.  It  has  grown  out 
of  the  author's  efforts  to  prepare  young 
-I  persons  for  the  teacher's  work.  In  the 
course  of  nearly  forty  years  in  the  school-room,  he 
has  been  led  to  give  much  attention  to  the  phenom- 
ena of  mind.  He  has  also  read  many  books  treating 
of  the  human  mind  more  or  less  directly.  From  these 
years  of  observation,  reading,  and  reflection,  he  has 
come  to  certain  conclusions  respecting  the  facts  of  the 
mind, — its  powers,  its  laws  of  working,  and  of  growth. 
These  facts,  especially  such  as  relate  to  the  work  of 
teaching,  he  has  endeavored  to  state  in  the  fewest  and 
plainest  words  he  could  command.  He  has  stated 
these  facts  as  they  appear  to  him  ;  of  course,  he  will 
not  be  surprised  to  find  that,  in  some  respects,  they 
may  appear  differently  to  others.  It  is  urged  again, 
upon  all  who  read  the  book,  that  they  test  the  truth 
of  its  statements  by  their  own  observation,  and  es- 
pecially by  referring  to  the  testimony  of  their  own 

consciousness. 

(176) 


CONCLUSION  177 

Writers  on  Psychology  often  give  much  time  and 
space  to  theories  and  speculations ;  but  the  author  has 
aimed,  as  far  as  possible,  to  avoid  all  discussion  of 
theories,  and  to  confine  himself  to  what,  in  his  view, 
are  the  facts  of  the  science.  Again,  in  many  books, 
much  space  is  given  to  controversy,  to  the  stating 
and  refuting  of  the  opinions  of  other  writers.  In 
this  book  we  have  aimed  to  write  nothing  controver- 
sially excepting  in  cases  that  we  deemed  essentially 
vital  to  truth.  Nor  have  we  given  space  to  the  his- 
tory of  the  science  or  to  the  history  of  the  opinions 
that  different  men  have  held  concerning  its  facts. 

In  brief,  we  have  endeavored  to  put  the  facts  of  the 
science  before  young  people  in  such  a  way  that,  by 
study  and  thinking,  they  may  understand  them  ;  hop- 
ing that  they  will  be  able  to  apply  them  in  the  work 
of  teaching.  We  have  tried  to  make  a  text-book, — 
that  is,  a  book  of  texts,  —  striving  to  give  what  may 
be  of  immediate  value,  at  the  same  time  that  it  will 
awaken  a  desire  for  further  investigation,  and  will  aid 
in  making  that  investigation  profitable,  both  by  guid- 
ing personal  observation  and  by  aiding  to  understand 
other  books  upon  the  same  subject. 

Sources  of  Information. — A  student  of  mind  has 
three  sources  of  information,  three  fields  in  which  he 
may  glean.  The  first  and  most  important  is  found  in 
his  own  mind,  studied  in  the  light  of  his  own  con- 
sciousness. As  we  said  in  a  former  part  of  the  book, 
Psychology  differs  from  almost  every  other  study  in 
this  respect.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  one's 
own  mind  is  an  important  object  of  study,  not  only 
because  here  is  found  an  oriijinal  source  of  informa- 


,-.S  KLEMl-NTS  OF   TSYCHOLOGY 

tion,  but  also  because  it  furnishes  a  test  for  all  the  in- 
formation gained  from  every  other  source  :  such  in- 
formation has  a  value  for  us  only  as  it  is  interpreted 
and  tested  in  the  light  of  our  own  conscious  experi- 
ence. We  know  about  other  minds  only  in  the  light 
of  what  we  know  of  our  own  minds. 

Ikit  the  teacher,  who  has  to  deal  with  minds  that 
are  in  the  process  of  development,  not  only  needs  to 
stud)-  carefully  his  own  mind  as  its  activities  are  re- 
vealed in  present  consciousness,  but  he  needs  to  call 
to  his  aid  all  that  memory  can  give  him,  of  his  mental 
experiences  when  he  was  in  the  stages  of  transforma- 
tion or  growth.  If  a  person  has  forgotten  his  own 
childhood,  he  is  not  fit  for  a  teacher  of  children. 

Another  very  important  field  for  study  is  found  in 
observing  the  mental  operations  of  others,  as  they  are 
revealed  by  gestures,  words,  and  the  different  forms 
of  behavior.  The  teacher  has  extraordinary  oppor- 
tunities for  this  kind  of  study,  especially  as  it  relates 
to  juvenile  and  growing  minds.  His  pupils  are  con- 
stantly before  him  as  specimens ;  he  is  in  most  inti- 
mate relations  with  them,  and  these  relations  are  most 
largely  in  the  sphere  of  their  mental  activity.  If  he 
will  observe  carefully,  he  will  not  only  discover  the 
characteristics  in  which  all  minds  are  alike,  but  he 
will  be  strongly  impressed  with  the  fact  that  no  two 
minds  are  exactly  alike ; — each  is  marked  by  individ- 
uality, peculiarities,  and  idiosyncrasies.  These  differ- 
ences call  for  special  care  and  attention.  Probably 
Garfield  was  thinking  particularly  of  them  when  he 
said  that  a  teacher  should  study  the  boy  more  than 
he  studies  the  book. 


CONCLUSION  179 

Thirdly,  the  student  of  mind  can  find  access  to  won- 
derfully rich  stores  of  literature  relating  to  the  sub- 
ject. Many  of  the  ablest  men  in  all  the  ages  have 
given  profound  attention  to  this  study,  and  they  have 
left  in  books  abundant  records  of  the  result  of  their 
labors.  And,  dry  as  such  books  often  are  to  the  be- 
ginner, they  become  strangely  fascinating  to  one  who 
has  already  made  some  progress  in  the  study,  and 
who  is  thus  able  to  comprehend  their  contents  and 
to  enter  into  their  meaning. 

Unity  and  Diversity. — As  was  just  said,  no  two 
minds  are  exactly  alike;  then  the  question  may  arise, 
whether  there  can  be  any  science  of  mind  in  general. 
Science  deals  with  classes  and  uniformities.  Psychol- 
ogy, however,  is  not  singular  in  this  respect ;  no  two 
horses  are  just  alike,  nor  are  any  two  oaks ;  and  the 
same  may  be  said  of  two  objects  in  any  class  in  nat- 
ure. But  it  is  found  that,  notwithstanding  all  the 
differences,  there  are  certain  well-marked  and  invari- 
able likenesses,  which  arc  the  ground  of  scientific 
classifications  and  laws.  The  same  thing  is  true  of 
human  minds ;  it  is  found  that  all  sane  and  sound 
minds  are  alike  in  all  those  grand  general  character- 
istics which  form  the  subject-matter  of  Psychology. 
These  general  truths  must  be  recognized  as  such,  and 
they  must  be  carefully  distinguished,  especially  by 
the  teacher,  from  such  mental  facts  as  arc  individual 
and  peculiar. 

Are  All  Powers  Goon  ?  —  If  one  may  judge  from 
statements  he  sometimes  meets  in  books,  or  hears  in 
conversation,  it  would  seem  that  some  people,  im- 
pressed with  the   evil   results  following  the  abuse  of 


iSO  ELEMKNTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

some  of  the  mental  powers,  are  inclined  to  believe 
that  some  of  our  powers  are  better  than  others,  that 
some  even  are  bad  in  themselves,  and  that  it  might 
be  better  for  us  if  we  lacked  them.  Such  persons 
make  a  great  mistake;  all  our  powers  are  evidently 
designed  to  serve  a  good  and  useful  purpose,  but  ah 
may  be  abused.  Let  us  ask,  however,  in  what  sense 
a  mental  power  can  be  called  good  or  bad.  Evi- 
dently not  in  any  moral  sense ;  morality  relates  only 
to  the  use  that  is  made  of  the  powers, —  it  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  their  nature.  Our  powers  are  all  good, 
in  one  sense,  if  they  are  certain  and  efficient  in  pro- 
ducing their  results,  just  in  tlie  same  sense  that  a  knife 
is  good  when  it  is  made  of  good  steel.  But  good 
powers  may  be  put  to  a  bad  use,  just  as  the  good 
knife  may  be. 

Kducation  should  aim  to  render  all  the  mental  pow- 
ers efficient ;  but,  more  than  that,  it  should  endeavor 
to  lead  to  such  a  use  of  them  as  shall  promote  right 
thinking,  right  living,  a  harmonious  subjection  of  the 
lower  appetites  and  impulses  to  reason  and  conscience, 
and  to  such  a  use  of  the  will  as  shall  lead  its  subject 
into  true  freedom,  as  its  meaning  has  been  explained. 

Bouv,  Soul,  and  Spirit.  —  We  have  divided  man's 
powers  into  two  classes  only ;  viz. ,  physical  and  psy- 
chical. But  we  often  hear  it  said  that  man  has  a 
threefold  nature :  body,  soul,  and  spirit.  We  accept 
this  division,  using  the  word  '  'soul"  to  mean  such  of  the 
lower  psychical  powers  as  the  nobler  brutes  possess,  in 
some  degree,  in  common  with  man.  These  will  not 
include  reason,  conscience,  and  a  free  will.  In  the 
possession  and  exercise  of  these  higher  powers,    man 


CONCLUSION  l8l 

shows  his  real  spiritual  nature, —  a  nature  that  in- 
cludes personality,    morality,   and  responsibility. 

Dreams,  Insanity,  Etc. —  In  many  books  on  men- 
tal science,  much  space  is  given  to  the  discussion  of 
questions  respecting  the  action  of  the  mind  in  dream- 
ing, insanity,  and  abnormal  manifestations.  Many  of 
these  questions  are  very  fascinating,  perhaps,  because 
of  the  veil  of  mystery  that  hangs  about  them.  But  we 
have  purposely  ignored  all  such  questions.  We  are 
writing  a  book  especially  for  teachers,  who  have  to  do 
with  minds  only  in  their  waking  activities,  and  in  their 
sane  and  normal  manifestations. 

Man,  a  Unit.  —  Once  more,  we  desire  to  impress 
on  our  readers,  as  we  leave  them,  that  man  is  a  unit; 
he  is  not  a  sum  of  powers  and  activities;  he  has  many 
powers  and  activities,  but  these  do  not  constitute  the 
man.  Nor  are  these  powers  and  activities  entities  in 
themseh^es.  If  our  language  sometimes  seems  to  im- 
ply actual  existence  of  the  powers  as  things,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  such  language  is  used  simply  for 
convenience,  and  it  must  not  be  taken  literally  with  all 
its  apparent  implications.  These  powers  are  simply 
different  manifestations  of  the  man, — a  complex  unit, — 
acting  in  various  ways.  Furthermore,  in  these  actions 
the  powers  are  blended ;  rarely  or  never  is  the  man 
showing  himself  in  one  of  these  forms  of  activity  alone. 
In  thought,  the  powers  are  distinct  and  separate,  but 
in  fact,  they  are  inextricably  blended  and  interwoven, 
in  their  action. 

Precepts. —  We  conclude  by  giving  twenty-four 
short  precepts,  for  the  consideration  and  guidance  of 
teachers  especially.      With  respect  to  most  of  them, 


lS2  ELEMKNTS  OF   rSYCIIOLOGY 

it  will  be  easy  to  sec  that  they  are  deductions  from 
what  has  been  said  in  the  previous  pages.  They  are 
given  here  in  this  compact  form,  in  order  that  they 
may  be  remembered  and  appUed  the  more  easily : 


EIGHT    PRINCIPLES   OF    MIND-ACTIVITY    AND     MIND-GROWTH 

1.  HiaMi.  — The  mind  can  not  do  its  best  work  un- 
less the  body  and  brain  are  in  good  condition. 

2.  Attention.— ^o  mental  activity  is  of  any  value 
without  careful  attention  to  the  thing  in  hand. 

Corollary:  One  thing  at  a  time. 

3.  Self- Activity. — There  is  no  way  in  which  a  mind 
can  increase  in  knowledge  or  power  except  by  its  own 
activity. 

4.  Groivth. — Mental  acquisition,  and  mental  power 
or  skill,  are  forms  of  grow^th ;  and  all  growth  requires 
time. 

5.  Origin  of  Ideas. —  Ideas  and  thoughts  are  never 
conveyed  from  one  mind  to  another ;  they  are  formed, 
or  awakened,  in  that  mind  where  they  exist. 

6.  The  Senses. — The  mind  gains  the  crude  material 
for  all  it  knows  or  thinks,  through  the  use  of  the  senses. 

7.  Habit. — Neither  knowledge  nor  skill  is  fully  ours 
till  it  has  taken  the  form  of  habit;  frequent  repetition 
tends  to  produce  a  habit. 

8.  Expression.  —  One  can  express  intelligibly  what 
he  understands  clearly;  one  can  not  express  clearly 
anything  that  is  not  clear  in  his  own  mind;  the  at- 
tempt to  make  a  clear  statement  helps  towards  clear- 
ness of  thought. 


CONCLUSION  183 


EIGHT    GENERAL    CHARACTERISTICS    OF    YOUNG    CHILDREN 

1.  Attention. — The  attention  of  children  is  intense, 
but  volatile ;  they  have  little  or  no  power  of  voluntary 
attention. 

2.  T/ic  Senses. — The  mental  activity  of  children  is 
chiefly  shown  in  the  use  of  their  senses. 

3.  Muscular  Activity. — Children  delight  to  use  their 
muscles,  when  they  can  use  them  according  to  their 
own  will  or  fancy. 

4.  Imitation. — Children  have  a  strong  propensity  to 
imitate,  especially  in  things  that  please  them. 

5.  Faith. —  Children  instinctively  believe  what  is 
told  them,  especially  when  told  by  one  whom  they 
esteem. 

6.  Curiosity. — The  curiosity  of  children  is  very  act- 
ive; but,  for  the  time  being,  it  is  easily  satisfied  on 
any  one  point. 

7.  Memory.  —  Children  remember  ivell  what  they 
understand  clearly,  and  what  they  have  an  interest  in. 

8.  Imagination.  —  Children  delight  in  the  play  of 
imagination, — a  fact  which  the  teacher  may  make  good 
use  of,  both  in  teaching  and  in  governing. 

EIGHT    PRINCIPLES   OF   TEACHING 

1.  TeacJiing? — Teaching  is  causing  another  to  know 
what  he  did  not  know  before. 

2.  Begin  IV/iere  ? — Begin  where  the  pupil  now  is ; 
use  the  pupil's  present  knowledge  for  a  foundation. 

-     3.   Atte?itio)i. —  Make  no  attempt  to  teach  till  you 
have  the  pupil's  attention;  stop^  if  you  lose  it. 


1 84 


elemi:nts  of  psychology 


4.  Interest.  —  Aim  first  to  arouse  the  pupil's  inter- 
est in  what  you  propose  to  teacli,  and  to  awaken  his 
curiosity  in  respect  to  it. 

5.  Symbols. —  Do  not  allow  meaningless  symbols  to 
be  used  ;  do  not  confound  the  symbol  with  what  it 
represents ;  be  sure  that  all  symbols  mean  the  same 
to  teacher  and  to  pupil. 

6.  Fixing. —  Fi.x  exactly  in  the  pupil's  memory  what 
ought  to  be  there;  but  never  load  the  memory  un- 
necessarily. 

7.  Responsibility.  —  Hold  the  pupil  strictly  responsi- 
ble for  all  that  he  ought  to  know  or  do. 

Corollary:  Do  nothing  for  him  that  he  can  do  for 
himself. 

8.  Individuality.  —  In  teaching,  always  have  regard 
to  general  principles,  but  respect  the  pupil's  individ- 
uality in  their  application. 


INDEX. 


INDEX 


PACE 

Abnormal  Consciousness,  35 

Abstraction 109 

Abuses  of  Imagination  ...  .  loi 

Acquired  perception 59 

Admiration 1 54 

Affections,   the 147 

Analogy 135 

Analysis  and  Synthesis. .. .  109 

Appetites,  the 152 

Artistic  Imagination 98 

Arts,   fine 98 

Assumption  in  inductive  syl- 
logism    129 

Attention,  cultivation  of.  .  39 

defined 36 

illustrated 36 

objects  of 39 

to  several  things 38 

150DIES,  their  qualities. ...  66 

Body,  soul,  and  spirit 180 

Cause,  man  is  a 166 

Cerebration,  unconscious. .  32 

Children,  characteristics  of,  183 

Choice 169 

is  perfectly  free 170 


PAGE 

Choices  give  character. ...  172 

Classification 115 

Classes,   higher  and  lower..  112 

not  found  in  nature 116 

Committing,     to     Memory, 

rules  for 90 

and  remembering 93 

Comprehension   of  terms..  II3 

Concept,   defined 43 

logical 44,  1 10 

the,   an    intellection 43 

Conception,  cultivation  of.  45 

constructive,  defined. ..  .  104 

"      not  imagination.  105 

"      uses  of. 105 

defined 40 

Concepts,   a  panorama  of.  .  81 

clear  and  obscure 112 

distinct  and  confused.  .  .  112 

how  formed no 

how  gained 106 

importance  of 115 

logical,  characteristics 

of Ill 

Conclusion,    when    trust- 
worthy   125 

Conscience,  always  tlie  same.  160 
(•87) 


i88 


ELEMENTS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


Conscience,  defined 158 

not  always  safe 160 

not  well  defined I57 

relation  to  judgment 1 59 

universal 'o° 

Consciousness,  abnormal. .  35 

as  a  test 178 

defined 3° 

necessary  to  mind 30,  32 

objects  of. 3' 

testimony  of 3" 

Contiguity,  law  of 83 

Contrary  and  contradictory 

terms 114 

Conversion  of  propositions.  121 

"  Cramming  " 80 

Culm-ation,  of  attention ...  39 

of  conception 45 

of  imagination 103 

of  memory 88 

of  morality 161 

of  the  senses 74 

of  the  will 174 

<~alture,    mental,    ten    pre- 
cepts   27 

Curiosity I53 

Deceptions  of  sense,   ap- 
parent   70 

Deductive  syllogism 1 24 

Definition,  logical 115 

Demonstration,   direct  and 

indirect 132 

Demonstrative  reasoning..  132 

Desire,  of  approbation....  152 

of  power 152 

of  society 152 

relation  to   will 167,  171 

Desires,  the 147 


PAGE 

Devices  to  aid  memory. .. .  92 

Distribution  of  terms 1 14 

Dreams,   etc 181 

Education  of  the  mind.. .  180 

Ego,  and  Non-Ego 54 

and  the  body 61 

Emotion,  expressed  by 

sound 64 

Emotions,  the I47 

Enthymeme,  the 130 

Extension  of  terms 113 

Faculty,  a,  defined 29 

Failure  in  life,  causes  of . .  170 

Fancy,  defined 98 

Fear I53 

Feeling,  the  sense  of 55 

Feelings,  physical  and  psy- 
chical   139 

Fine  art 98 

Forgetting,  impossible,  per- 
haps          87 

Free  will 168,  173  ' 

Generalizing,  defined 116 

General  terms 116 

Genus  and  species 112 

Habit 33 

and  morality ....  16^ 

and  will 173 

Hate,  its  use 151 

Hearing,  and  emotion 63 

sense  of. 55 

the  most  internal  sense. .        63 

Hope 153 


INDEX 


189 


PAGE 

Tdeas^   intuitive 49 

Imagination,  abuses  of . . . .  lOl 

artistic 98 

cultivation   of 103 

defined 96 

four  forms  of  product. . .  98 

in  childhood 97 

in  relation  to  free  will..  97 

inventive 98 

in  what  sense  creative. . .  97 

uses  of . . . .    99 

uses  of  to  teachers  espec- 
ially  102 

Inductions,    false 130 

Inductive  syllogism 1 24,  1 28 

Insanity,   etc 181 

Instances     of     remarkable 

memory. 94 

Intellect,   defined 47 

observations  on    51 

Intellectual    process,   three 

steps  in 53 

Interest.    153 

"  Intuitive,"  how  used. ...  66 

Intuitive   power,   defined,  .  47 

Judgment,  defined 118 

Judgments,    primitive 22 

Knowing,  what  is  it  ?. . . .  34 
Knowledge,  can  not  be  im- 
parted   52 

common  and   scientific.  16 

primitive  and  developed.  53 

Law,  in  science,  defined..  11 

of  contiguity 83 

Laws,  of  opposition 120 


PAGE 

Laws,  of  suggestion 81 

of  suggestion,   primary. .  82 

of  suggestion,  secondary.  83 

of  the  syllogism 126 

Logical,  concepts 44,  1 10 

definition 115 

Love,  of  beauty,  truth,  and 

right 150 

of  country 150 

of  self 149 

of  pupils,  how  trained..  150 


Man,  a  cause 

a  unit 19,  137, 

Mechanical  qualities  of  bod- 
ies     . . 

Memory,  belief  in 

beneficent  law  of 

defined 

devices  to  aid 

effects  of  disease  on.... 

elements  in 

how   cultivated 

importance  of 

laws  of 

neglected  

observations  on 

of  the  aged 

remarkable  cases  of 

strong,  with  weak  mind. 

three  meanings  of  word. 

two  uses  of 

Mental  activity,  and  atten- 
tion  

power  of  will  over 

Mental,   habit 

philosophy,  defined 

Mind,  and  body  related... 

and  brain 


166 
iSl 


79 
87 
75 
92 
86 

77 
88 

79 
81 
88 
92 
86 

94 
80 

76 
79 

38 
38 
33 
9 
25 
26 


IQO 


EI, PATENTS    OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


Mind,  anil    matter,    differ- 
ences of 24 

a   unit 23 

human,  is  like  what?..  52 

knows  by  its  own  activity.  51 

nature  of 23 

Minds,  unity  and  diversity 

of 178 

Mnemonics,  worthless 91 

Moods 145 

Morality 161 

four  elements  in ,.  162 

habit  of 164 

how  cultivated 162 

Motion,  an  aid  to  sense...  58 

Motives,  and  will 171 

found  in  sensibility. ..  141,  148 

Necessary  truth 48,  132 

Nominalists 116 

Objects,  of  attention 39 

of  consciousness 31 

Observations,  on  the  intel- 
lect    51 

on  the  memory 92 

Opposition,  of  propositions.  120 

laws  of 120 

Passions,  the 148 

Patriotism 1 50 

Percept,  defined 66 

Perception,  direct  and  ac- 
quired    59 

intuitive 66 

theories  of 71 

through  the   senses 65 

Perceptives,  defined   47 


Phantasy,  defined 

Philosophy,  means  what  ?. 
Physiological    qualities    of 


bodies 

68 

Power,  defined 

19 

intuitive,   defined   

47 

intuitive,  products  of. . .. 

48 

Powers,    mental,    are    they 

all  good  ? 

179 

grand  divisions  of 

20 

observations  on 

22 

order  of  their  action  .... 

21 

scheme  of. 

28 

two  stages  of 

22 

Powers,     presentative,     de- 

fined  

47 

presentative,  described.. 

51 

reflective,    defined 

47 

representative,  defined.. 

47 

Precepts  of  mind-activity.. 

182 

Premises,   defined 

123 

Primary  qualities  of  bodies. 

67 

Principles  of  teaching.... 

183 

Probability,  degrees  of . . . . 

134 

Probable  reasoning 

133 

Probable  truth 

131 

Proposition,   defined 

118 

Propositions,  conversion  of. 

121 

kinds   of. 

119 

opposition  of 

120 

quality  and  quantity  of. 

119 

Psychology,     aim     of    this 

book 

176 

a  mental   discipline 

16 

an  inductive  science. . . . 

II 

a  noble  science. 

12 

defined 

9 
177 

13 

peculiarity   in 12, 

personal  value  of 

INDEX 


191 


Psychology,  relation  to  edu- 
cation   iSo 

study   of   other   minds..  178 

tests  in 12 

value  to  different  profes- 
sions   14 

why  neglected 16 

Qualities  of  bodies 66 

Hamilton's    division.    ..  69 

how   divided _  . .  .  .66,  68 

mechanical 68 

physiological 68 

primary 67 

Reasoning,  defined 122 

demonstrative 132 

hypothetical 131 

probable 133 

Reason,   natural 51 

Recognition 77 

Recollection,    defined 76 

Reflective  powers,  defined.  47 

forms   of 108 

products  of , 108 

Reflex  action,  natural ;i2 

Reid's  answer  to  idealists.  73 

Remembrance,  conditions  of  76 

defined y6 

Representative  powers,  de- 
fined    47 

discussed 75 

"  Represent,"    in  inductive 

syllogism 128 

Reproduction 75i  77 

Resistance,   sense  of 56 

"  Retention,"   meaning  of.  78 

Reverence 155 


PAGE 

Scheme ' 28 

Science,  deductive 10 

defined 10 

inductive 10 

facts  in,  how  gained. ...  11 

how    developed 10 

Seeing,  sense  of 55 

Self-consciousness 35 

Selfishness 149 

Sensation,  and   cognition..  60 

defined 57 

Sensations,  organic  and  vi- 
tal   65 

Sense-perception,  defined..  56,  65 

Senses 54 

cultivation  of 74 

deceptions   of 7° 

to  be  trusted 69 

Sense,  what  each  gives....  57 
Sensibilities,     analysis    not 

complete 146 

classification  of 146 

motives    to   action 141 

related  to   the   body....  142 

Sensibility,  begins  how?..  139 

expressing  and  repressing.  143 

importance  of,  to  teacher.  148 

its  relation  to  intellect. .  143 

not  definable 138 

of  two   kinds 139 

painful  or  pleasant 140 

source  of  joy  or  sorrow. .  141 

Sentimentalism 173 

Sight,  questions  about....  61 

Smelling,  sense  of 56,  65 

Soul,   the 180 

Sound,  defined 64 

Sounds,    natural    and   arti- 
ficial   64 


192 


F.LKMKNTS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


PAGE 

Sounds,  varieties  of. 63 

Spontaneity,  is  not  will...  167 

Suggestion,    laws  of 81 

Syllogism,  deductive 124 

defined 1 23 

inductive 124,  128 

laws  of 126 

two    kinds 123 

Sympathy 155 

Synthesis 109 

Tasting,  sense  of 56,  65 

Teaching,   a  fine  art 99 

principles    of 183 

Temperaments 144 

Terms,absolute  and  relative  1 13 
comprehension    and    ex- 
tension of 113 

distribution  of. 1 14 

division  of. 114 

logical  analysis  of 114 

notative 113 

relation  of. 1 14 

Ttstimony,    as  to  fact  and 

inference 134 

value   of 13^ 

Theories    of    sense-percep- 
tion    71 


Tliought,  expressed   by 

sounds 64 

Touch,  sense  of 55,  59 

Truth,  kinds  of 131 

Truths,   necessary,   self-evi- 
dent    48 

Unconscious  cerebration..  32 

Unit,  man  is  a 19,  137,  181 

Unity     and      diversity     in 

minds 178 

Uses  of  imagination. 99 

Varieties  of  sounds 63 

Volition •....  169 


What  each    sense  gives.. 

What  we  know 

Will,  cultivation  of 

defined  

free 168 

its  power  over  mental 
action 

relation  to  habit 

relation  to   motives 

two    elements 

makes  responsible 

not  desire 

not  spontaneity 


57 

34 

174 

165 

173 

3S 
173 
171 
169 
166 
167 
167 


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